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 i 
Abstract 
Attentional set-shifting tasks, consisting of multiple stages of discrimination learning, 
have been widely used in animals and humans to investigate behavioural flexibility. 
However, there are several learning criteria (e.g., 6-correct-choice-in-a-row, or 10-out-
of-12-correct) by which a subject might be judged to have learned a discrimination. 
Furthermore, the currently frequentist approach does not provide a detailed analysis of 
individual performance. In this PhD study, a large set of archival data of rats 
performing a 7-stage intra-dimensional/extra-dimensional (ID/ED) attentional set-
shifting task was analysed, using a novel Bayesian analytical approach, to estimate 
each rat’s learning processes over its trials within the task. The analysis showed that 
the Bayesian learning criterion may be an appropriate alternative to the frequentist n-
correct-in-a-row criterion for studying performance. The individual analysis of rats’ 
behaviour using the Bayesian model also suggested that the rats responded according 
to a number of irrelevant spatial and perceptual information sources before the correct 
stimulus-reward association was established. The efficacy of the Bayesian analysis of 
individual subjects’ behaviour and the appropriateness of the Bayesian learning 
criterion were also supported by the analysis of simulated data in which the 
behavioural choices in the task were generated by known rules. Additionally, the 
efficacy was also supported by analysis of human behaviour during an analogous 
human 7-stage attentional set-shifting task, where participants’ detailed learning 
processes were collected based on their trial-by-trial oral report. Further, an extended 
Bayesian approach, which considers the effects of feedback (correct vs incorrect) after 
each response in the task, can even help infer whether individual human participants 
have formed an attentional set, which is crucial when applying the set-shifting task to 
an evaluation of cognitive flexibility. Overall, this study demonstrates that the 
Bayesian approach can yield additional information not available to the conventional 
frequentist approach. Future work could include refining the rat Bayesian model and 
the development of an adaptive trial design. 
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Chapter I: Literature Review 
1 Introduction 
Evolution has resulted in notable adaptability in behaviour in both humans and other 
animals, from which various forms of intelligence can be inferred (Mackintosh, 1974). 
One aspect of intelligence is the ability to cope flexibly with a mutable environment. 
For example, in daily life, people can easily follow and engage in varying topics when 
chatting with friends; when hearing a fire alarm, people can immediately stop what 
they are doing or thinking and escape from indoors; when a student takes a maths 
exam, the student can quickly shift across multiple methods and ideas in order to 
solve different questions. Such flexible switches or adjustments in thinking, attention 
or behaviours in response to changing environments or goals come from the mental 
ability sometimes called ‘cognitive flexibility’ (Scott, 1962; Dajani & Uddin, 2015).  
 
While such adaptability is often overlooked in everyday life because of its 
pervasiveness, any deficit or impairment in cognitive flexibility can be devastating for 
the quality of life for those affected. People with cognitive flexibility deficits often 
perform poorly in demanding tasks which require shifts of attention or thinking from 
one aspect to another.  For example, they may have difficulty in simultaneously doing 
two or more daily tasks like chatting and cooking, in updating their old beliefs or 
knowledge during learning, or in handling various emergencies at home or the 
workplace. Adaptability can be degraded in normal ageing and as a result of many 
neurological and psychiatric diseases, including Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, Huntington’s disease, schizophrenia, addiction, problematic gambling, 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), autism, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorder 
(Aloi et al., 2015; Bissonette & Powell, 2012; Bissonette et al., 2013; Fineberg et al., 
2015; Floresco & Jentsch, 2011; Klanker et al., 2013; Van Eylen et al., 2015; Vazey & 
Aston-Jones, 2012; Young et al., 2009). Therefore, understanding the neural, 
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biochemical, and genetic mechanisms of cognitive flexibility will have significant 
scientific and social impacts. 
1.1 Attentional set-shifting tasks 
Various attentional set-shifting tasks have been developed to measure and assess 
putative cognitive flexibility. The most well-known task to infer cognitive flexibility 
is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Figure 1.1; Berg, 1948). In Berg’s study, 
each participant was required to learn to match each card correctly to one of four 
reference cards based on the experimenter’s feedback (‘right’ or ‘wrong’), without 
being told what underlying category was being used. 60 cards each had a number of 
coloured shapes. One of three sorting categories was used: the same number of shapes, 
or the same colour of shape, or the same shape. After the subject correctly sorted five 
consecutive cards, the underlying category was changed, and the participant had to 
find the new category based on the experimenter’s feedback, requiring a shift of his or 
her attention. In Berg’s study, three cycles of category learning were performed, with 
each cycle including three learning stages corresponding to the randomly ordered 
categories. Later variants of the task (e.g., Milner, 1963; see Brown & Tait, 2016 for 
review) use 128 cards, with two cycles of the three categories, and 10 consecutive 
correct as the learning criterion.  
 
Figure 1.1: the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. The participant must learn to match the 
card below to one of the four cards above, where the correct matching category is 
either based on colour, number of shapes, or the shape itself. Image: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WisconsinCardSort.png.  
 
While the WCST has been widely used to infer human cognitive flexibility, 
performance in the WCST may be affected by other factors. For example, participants 
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may have worse WCST performance due to reduced sensitivity to experimenter 
feedback, or poor short-term memory (see discussion on human WCST performance 
in the 1st page of Tait et al., 2014). To isolate complicated, noisy cognitive 
components from those mediating behavioural flexibility, much simpler two-choice 
discrimination learning was adopted. Most of these tasks share a similar procedure, 
i.e., a series of two-choice discrimination learning stages. Across two learning stages, 
the reward-associated stimulus (or cue) is changed either within the same ‘dimension’ 
(called intra-dimensional, or ID) or to a different dimension (called extra-dimensional, 
or ED) (Eimas, 1966; Roberts et al., 1988; Settlage et al., 1956; Shepp & Schrier, 
1969). In these ID/ED tasks, a ‘dimension’ implicitly refers to one type of feature of 
perceptual stimuli, i.e., one dimension refers to one perceptual property of the stimuli. 
For example, in the rat ID/ED task (Birrell and Brown, 2000), rats dig in one of two 
bowls and the stimuli in each bowl consist of a specific medium (e.g., ‘sawdust’) with 
a specific odour (e.g., ‘mint’). Therefore ‘odour’ would be one dimension and 
‘digging medium’ would be the other dimension of the stimuli (see Table 1.1 for more 
examples). At the ID acquisition stage, subjects need to maintain their attention on the 
current reward-relevant dimension to learn about the correct/incorrect status of two 
novel stimuli from that dimension, while two novel stimuli from the other dimension 
remain irrelevant, e.g., from two odour stimuli ‘Cinnamon’ and ‘Ginger’ in the 
previous learning stage to another two odour stimuli ‘Sage’ and ‘Paprika’ in the new 
learning stage. In comparison, at the ED shift stage, subjects need to shift attention 
from a previously reward-relevant stimulus dimension to the previously irrelevant 
dimension, e.g., shift attention from ‘odour’ stimuli to ‘medium’ stimuli, also with 
‘total change’ from old stimuli to novel stimuli in both dimensions (see Table 2.1 for a 
specific example of intra-dimensional and extra-dimensional shift stages). With the 
‘total change’ from old stimuli to novel stimuli, partial reinforcement of any old 
stimuli from previous learning can be avoided in the new learning stages, such that 
the reinforcement effect for the specific (old) stimuli is eliminated but reinforcement 
effects of the perceptual dimension are retained. 
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When a particular dimension is repeatedly reinforced as reward-relevant, with others 
being irrelevant, a subject mentally forms an ‘attentional set’, i.e., tendency or 
preference to attend to that particular dimension of the stimuli. Attentional set can be 
embodied as preparedness, based on prior experience, to attend to one aspect (or 
dimension) of multi-dimensional stimuli, which then facilitates learning about that 
aspect of those stimuli (Tait et al., 2014). Learning set, in a similar context, is 
preparedness, based on prior experience, to learn about the stimuli. Considering that 
attentional set is often used to influence discrimination learning in set-shifting tasks, 
attentional set could be considered as a specific form of learning set. Note that the 
formation of an attentional set can only be inferred from behavioural measurements, 
i.e., if the subject takes significantly more trials to reach the criterion in the ED shift 
stage than in the previous ID stage, this is viewed as indicative that the subject has 
formed an attentional set. If an attentional set is formed, in order to succeed at the ED 
stage, the subject needs to ‘shift’ attention from the previously formed attentional set 
to the previously irrelevant stimulus dimension, and hence the phrase ‘attentional set-
shifting’. During attentional set-shifting, the previously formed attentional set often 
interferes with attentional shifting to the other dimension. When subjects are less 
behaviourally flexible, they take longer to shift to the other dimension. The resolution 
of the conflict between the previously relevant stimulus dimension and the newly-
relevant stimulus dimension, as measured by the trials to the criterion in the ED stage, 
is a measure of behavioural flexibility. 
 
In terms of ID and ED, each change in sorting category in the WCST requires an 
attentional shift, as in an ED stage of the ID/ED task. However, the WCST differs 
from the ID/ED task in some other aspects. For example, during each sorting category 
in WCST, all stimuli are present, with no stimuli being ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, and 
participants need to match a new card to one of four reference cards in each trial – 
unlike in the two-choice learning required as part of the ID/ED task. Also, one ID/ED 
stage just uses two possible stimuli for each of two dimensions, resulting in four 
possible stimuli combinations, while each WCST stage uses four possible stimuli for 
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each of three dimensions (colour, shape, and number), resulting in 64 possible cards. 
Therefore, while one ID/ED stage just requires participants to suppress one dimension 
of irrelevant stimuli, each WCST stage requires participants to suppress two irrelevant 
dimensions. In addition, each ID/ED stage uses totally new stimuli, while WCST may 
repeatedly use the cards over stages. Last but not least, the nature of the suppression is 
different at some stages. For instance, in the ID/ED task there is reversal learning, 
which probably require much more effort to supress the attention to the unrewarded 
stimulus than in the WCST. In tasks measuring behavioural flexibility, both ID stage(s) 
and ED stages are typically included. As one of such attentional set-shifting tasks, the 
ID/ED task in the Cambridge Neuropsychological Automated Testing Battery 
(CANTAB) has been widely used in both humans and non-human primates such as 
marmosets (Dias et al., 1996; Roberts et al., 1988; Jazbec et al., 2007). The task 
consists of a series of two-choice visual discriminations between either different line 
segments or abstract shapes on a touch screen, including a simple discrimination (SD; 
where stimuli differ along only one dimension), compound discrimination (CD; where 
a second but reward-irrelevant dimension is included), ID acquisition stage, ED shift 
stage, and reversal learning stages (REV; where the previously rewarded stimulus 
becomes incorrect and the other previously incorrect stimulus of the same dimension 
becomes rewarded). A typical series of discriminations in the CANTAB ID/ED task 
has the order of simple discrimination– reversal learning – compound discrimination 
– reversal learning – ID – reversal learning – ED – reversal learning (Roberts et al., 
1988; Table 1.1).  
 
The CANTAB ID/ED task has also been adapted for rats (Birrell & Brown, 2000). 
However, rats seem reluctant to discriminate visual cues and often take hundreds of 
trials to finish training and testing over multiple days, which is time-consuming and 
limits the applications of the ID/ED task particularly in measuring acute effects of 
experimental manipulations (Tait et al., 2014). To avoid such issues, the rat version of 
the ID/ED task was developed to exploit the natural foraging behaviour of rats and 
uses digging bowls filled with scented media (Birrell & Brown, 2000). In the task, 
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which typically has seven stages (SD-CD-REV1-ID-REV2-ED-REV3; the ‘7-stage 
task’, Table 1.1), rats learn to discriminate bowls and dig in one of two paired bowls 
for a food reward based on one relevant dimension of stimuli in each learning stage. 
The reward-relevant stimulus dimension could be digging medium in the bowls or 
odour applied to the digging medium. Since rats naturally use odour and tactile cues 
for foraging, they typically learn to discriminate between two bowls of both 
dimensions within about 90 minutes. 
 
While the 7-stage task has been widely used in rats, the early reversal stages may not 
always be sufficient to encourage set-formation, e.g., in rats with orbital prefrontal 
cortex (OFC) lesions (Chase et al., 2012). To enhance set-formation, a modified 
version of the 7-stage task has been used which excludes the reversal stages and 
includes three more ID stages (‘4ID’ in Table 1.1; Bissonette et al., 2008; Chase et al., 
2012; Clarke et al., 2005). A cost between the last ID stage and the ED stage (i.e., 
taking more trials to learn the ED stage) indicates successful set-formation. Since ED 
deficits can be inferred to reflect attentional set-shifting deficits only when an 
attentional set can be concluded to have been formed, the 4ID task is more sensitive to 
set-formation-impaired subjects compared to the standard 7-stage task and can allow 
measures of set-shifting ability in instances where set is not formed in the 7-stage task. 
This is important because a majority of behavioural flexibility studies on rats involve 
evaluating ED shift ability in both control and experimental conditions, e.g., 
following manipulation of brain function through lesions, neural inactivation, or 
administration of neuroactive substances. 
 
Similar to the CANTAB ID/ED task for primates, an automated touch-screen task 
using visual cues was developed for mice, but without reversal stages (Brigman et al., 
2005) (‘Touch-screen’ in Table 1.1). This task requires mice to nose-poke the 
appropriate stimulus on the screen in order to receive reward from a food well under 
the screen, and wider varieties of visual stimuli can be easily displayed on the screen. 
Brigman et al. used this task for a between-subjects study, (i.e., one group of mice did 
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SD-CD-ID, and the other group did SD-CD-ED), and reported no difference between 
ID and ED performance. This suggests that mice may not have formed attentional set 
before the ID or ED stage, probably because there was insufficient learning 
experience, (i.e., only the SD and CD stage), before the ID or ED stage. On the other 
hand, since this task does not require body movement, it can be extended and applied 
to motor-deficit mice and to mice with genetic or pharmacologic manipulations 
(Bissonette & Powell, 2012; Graybeal et al., 2014; Mar et al., 2013; Marquardt et al., 
2017). 
 
Different from the CANTAB ID/ED task and its variants, strategy- or rule-shifting 
tasks have been developed with fewer learning stages and without novel stimuli 
across stages. One is the plus-maze (or cross-maze) task (Block et al, 2007; Floresco 
et al., 2006; Ragozzino et al., 2002). In this task, rats first learn to turn right (or left) in 
a plus maze for food reward without considering the starting arm and which arm 
contains a visual cue, namely response discrimination. Then, rats learn to turn to the 
arm which contains the visual cue for food reward, without considering whether it is a 
left or right turn, namely visual-cue discrimination (Ragozzino, 2002; Ragozzino et 
al., 2002). In this task, the rule needs to be shifted from spatial dimension to 
perceptual dimension, which is different from the 7-stage task where attentional set 
needs to be shifted between two different perceptual dimensions. The recently 
developed water T-maze task for mice is similar to the cross-maze task, but is 
performed in a water T-maze with additional reversal learning stages (Brooks et al., 
2012; Table 1.1).  
 
Another similar strategy-shifting task is the automated lever-pressing task, operated in 
a chamber (Brady & Floresco, 2015; Floresco et al, 2008). In this task, rats first learn 
to press the lever for food reward where the light above is illuminated, without 
considering whether the lever with the illuminated light is on the left or right. Then 
rats learn to press the right lever (i.e., ‘position response’ learning) without 
considering whether the light is illuminated above the right or left lever (Floresco et al, 
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2008). The automated lever-pressing task reduced the experimenter’s manual effort 
during the rat’s learning and dramatically improved throughput, while the 7-stage task 
requires an experimenter to manually configure bowls with food filled in one bowl for 
each learning trial. Compared to the 7-stage task, the (plus or T) maze task and the 
lever-pressing task did not change stimuli across learning stages. 
 
More recently, one completely automated nose-poking ID/ED task has been 
developed for rodents (Scheggia & Papaleo, 2016), where three stimuli from three 
dimensions are provided, including light stimuli, texture, and odour. Since no manual 
work is required for each learning trial and the number and order of learning stages 
can be flexibly set with accompanying software, this new ID/ED task can be used for 
a large throughput of attentional set-shifting study on mice. However, the stimuli in 
the task are not compound (i.e., not mixed together in each chamber), meaning that 
there is a need for attentional reorienting spatially whilst ED-shifting. Any ‘cost’ seen 
at the ED might derive from the need to reorient attention rather than (or as well as) 
‘shift’ from one perceptual dimension to the other.  
 
While the animal set-shifting or strategy-shifting tasks were adapted from relevant 
human tasks such that the stimuli and configurations are more appropriate for these 
species to perform the tasks, they share the same purpose as that of human tasks, i.e., 
measuring one or more aspects of cognitive flexibility by shifting attention over two 
or more discrimination learning stages. Animal studies of cognitive flexibility with 
these shifting tasks have been widely adopted because it is difficult to directly 
investigate human brains due to ethical issues. As shown in the following (Section 
1.2.2), the animal shifting tasks have helped researchers deeply understand the 
mechanism of cognitive flexibility from multiple levels.  
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Table 1.1: attentional set-shifting tasks and strategy-shifting tasks. CS: card sorting; 
Rev: reversal learning; ID1-ID4: four different ID shifts; VC: visual-cue 
discrimination; TR: turn-direction response learning; PR: position response learning; 
rTR: turn-direction response learning after water T-maze is rotated; ‘-’: from one 
learning stage to the subsequent learning stage; ‘m/n’: m correct response in n 
consecutive trials.  
Tasks Stimulus 
dimension 
Procedure Learning 
criteria 
p value 
given 
criteria 
Species 
WCST 
(Berg, 1948) 
Colour, number, 
shape 
9 consecutive 
CS 
5/5  0.031 Human 
CANTAB ID/ED 
(Roberts et al., 1988) 
Shape, line SD-Rev-CD- 
Rev-ID-Rev-
ED-Rev 
Rev: 
18/20  
Others: 
54/60 
1.8x10-
4 
 
<10-10 
Human, 
marmoset 
 
7-stage (Birrel & 
Brown, 2000) 
Odour,  
digging medium  
SD-CD-Rev-ID- 
Rev-ED-Rev 
6/6 0.016 Rats 
4ID (Bissonette et 
al., 2008; Chase et 
al., 2012) 
Odour,  
digging medium 
SD-CD-ID1-
ID2 -ID3-ID4-
ED 
6/6 0.016 Mice 
Rats 
Automated ID/ED 
task (Scheggia & 
Papaleo, 2016) 
Odour,  
texture,  
light 
e.g. SD-CD-
Rev- ID1-Rev-
ID2-Rev-ED-
Rev 
8/10 0.044 Mice 
Plus-maze (or cross 
maze) (Floresco et al , 
2006; Ragozzino et 
al.,2002) 
Turn direction, 
visual cue 
TR-VC 10/10 0.001 Rats 
Lever-pressing 
(Floresco et al, 2008) 
Position,  
visual cue 
VC-PR 8/8 0.004 Rats 
Touch-screen 
(Brigman et al., 2005) 
Shape, line SD-CD-ID/ED 16/20  0.005 Mice 
Water T-maze 
(Brooks et al., 2012) 
Turn direction, 
visual cue 
TR-Rev-VC- 
Rev-TR-rTR 
10/12 0.016 Mice 
 
1.2 Significance of attentional set-shifting tasks 
These attentional set-shifting tasks and their variations play a key role in human and 
animal behavioural studies for understanding various health issues (e.g., mental 
disorders and ageing) at different levels (including brain regions, neurotransmission, 
and genes) and for developing relevant pharmacological therapies. If the performance 
of subjects from the experimental group differs from that of the control group in a 
relevant set-shifting task, e.g., experimental subjects take longer to learn the ED stage 
than control subjects, it would suggest that the experimental factor somehow 
influences the set-shifting ability. 
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1.2.1 Human studies 
Set-shifting tasks have played a key role in relating various human disorders and 
relevant deficits in cognitive flexibility. In human studies, the WCST and CANTAB 
ID/ED tasks have shown that apparent cognitive rigidity is a symptom in many 
neurological and psychiatric disorders with frontal lobe dysfunction or disconnection 
(Bissonette et al., 2013; for review see Brown & Tait, 2016; Klanker et al., 2013). It 
has long been known that patients with damaged frontal lobes showed impaired 
performance in the WCST (Berg, 1948). In the WCST, schizophrenia patients can 
learn the categories to sort the cards, but have great difficulty adapting to changes to 
the category (Egan et al., 2001; Prentice et al., 2008). Schizophrenic patients also 
showed impaired reversal learning in the CANTAB ID/ED task (Elliott et al. 1995; 
Leeson et al., 2009; Waltz & Gold, 2007). With the WCST, patients with depression 
(Borkowska & Rybakowski 2001), mild Alzheimer’s disease (Nagahama et al. 2003; 
Perry et al. 2000), Parkinson’s disease (PD) (Lange et al., 2016), and autism spectrum 
disorder (Westwood et al., 2016) showed perseveration errors when card-sorting 
categories were changed. Lange et al. (2016) recently showed that perseveration 
errors in PD patients may result from the neural impairments of multiple executive 
processes relevant to set-shifting process. With the CANTAB ID/ED task, impaired 
ED shifting ability in patients with Huntington’s (HD) and PD can be easily detected 
even at the early stages of the diseases (Lawrence et al., 1996; Owen et al., 1992; 
Robbins, 2007). Further analysis with a novel stimulus dimension replacing the 
previously reward-relevant dimension showed that the ED shift deficit in HD comes 
from perseveration to the previously relevant dimension (Lawrence et al., 1999). In 
addition, patients with eating disorders showed an ED shift deficit, which also 
appeared in their first degree relatives, suggesting that genetic factors may play a role 
in eating disorder and certain (unknown) cognitive process might affect set-shifting 
and contribute to eating disorders (Treasure & Schmidt, 2013). An ED shift deficit 
was also found in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Chamberlain et al., 2006). 
All these disorders have been shown to be associated with frontostriatal circuit 
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disruption (Chudasama & Robbins, 2006). With the sensitivity of attentional set-
shifting tasks to various neurodegenerative disorders, the CANTAB ID/ED task and 
the WCST have become standard clinical practice to evaluate cognitive flexibility in 
neuropsychological assessments (Vazey & Aston-Jones, 2012).  
1.2.2 Animal studies 
Studies of non-human mammals using attentional set-shifting tasks confirm that the  
frontal cortex is crucial for cognitive flexibility, as it is in humans. Across species, the 
ED shift has been shown to be selectively impaired in humans with frontal cortex 
damage (Manes et al., 2002; Owen et al., 1991), in non-human primates with lateral 
PFC damage (Dias et al., 1996, 1997), and in rodents with medial frontal cortex  
damage (Birrell & Brown, 2000; Bissonette et al., 2008; Ghods-Shariﬁ et al., 2008; 
Hamilton & Brigman, 2015; see left region in Figure 1.2). While the anatomy of 
frontal cortex varies across species, the consistent findings across species on ED shift 
may indicate that medial frontal cortex in rodents is analogous or even homologous to 
primate lateral prefrontal cortex (Brown & Bowman, 2002; Brown & Tait, 2016). 
 
Different from ED shifting, reversal learning performance was shown to be 
selectively impaired in marmosets (Dias et al., 1996, 1997) and rodents (Bissonette et 
al., 2008; Boulougouris et al., 2007; Brigman et al., 2013; Hamilton & Brigman, 2015; 
Izquierdo et al., 2013; McAlonan & Brown, 2003) with orbitofrontal cortex (OFC, top 
left region in Figure 1.2) damage. However, with the 4ID task, Chase et al. (2012) 
found that rats with OFC lesions also showed impaired learning in the series of IDs, 
which suggests that OFC is not only crucial for reversal learning, but also plays a key 
role in set-formation (Chase et al., 2012). Interestingly, in OFC-lesioned rats 
performing the 4ID task, ED shifting was found to be impaired as well, indicating that 
OFC affects both reversal and set-shifting abilities either directly or as a mediator. On 
the other hand, a recent study shows that excitotoxic lesion of OFC sub-regions 
(including Walker’s areas 11, 13 and 14) does not affect reversal learning in macaque 
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monkeys (Rudebeck & Murray, 2011; Rudebeck et al., 2013), but damage to the white 
matter laterally adjacent to OFC caused reversal deficits in macaque monkeys 
(Rudebeck & Murray, 2011; Rudebeck et al., 2013; Chau et al., 2015), suggesting the 
involvement of nearby white matter in reversal learning impairment which was 
thought to be caused only by OFC lesion (at least for macaque monkeys). Further 
study is required to clarify the mixed findings on the role of OFC.  
 
Reversal learning and ID performance may be affected not just by the OFC and its 
surrounding area. A recent study showed that rats with lesions of the ventral midline 
thalamus (i.e., nucleus reuniens) showed significant impairment in the first reversal 
learning stage and the subsequent ID stage in the 7-stage set-shifting task (Linley et 
al., 2016). The nucleus reuniens is densely and reciprocally connected with 
hippocampus and the mPFC, and therefore the lesioned nucleus reuniens may directly 
cause the dysfunction of its connected areas, which play crucial roles in set-shifting 
(Linley et al., 2016). In addition, while lesion of either mPFC or hippocampus in rats 
does not impair reversal learning, the lesion of the two regions together impaired 
spatial reversal learning significantly with a strategy-shifting task (Mala et al., 2015). 
This suggests that multiple non-OFC brain areas could cooperatively affect spatial 
reversal learning, although the cooperative effect on perceptual discrimination 
reversal learning remains to be explored with set-shifting tasks. 
 
Furthermore, with the 4ID task, Lindgren et al. (2013) found rats with dorsomedial 
striatum (DMS, dorsal and ventral caudate in Figure 1.2) lesions had a similar 
learning performance between ED and previous ID stages, which suggests the 
attentional set was not formed before the ED stage in these DMS-lesioned rats. This 
indicates DMS may have a role in set-formation. Set-formation may also be affected 
by anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, top left region in Figure 1.2), because rats with 
ACC lesions also showed no ID/ED difference (Ng et al. 2007). Also, the anterior and 
posterior cingulate cortex is found to selectively degrade ID performance (Ng et al. 
2007; Kim et al., 2016), suggesting that normal functioning of the cingulate cortex is 
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crucial for intra-dimensional acquisitions. In addition, rats with subthalamic nucleus 
(STN) lesions are also impaired in set-formation (Xia et al., unpublished; Tait et al., 
2017). All these findings indicate that set-formation may be a complex process 
involving the functions of multiple interrelated brain regions, such that impairments 
might arise from dysfunction at multiple points in the neural circuit.  
 
Figure 1.2: a sagittal view of rat brain anatomy, with three neurotransmitter pathways.  
The dopamine pathway (red) starts from ventral tegmentum (lower-right green box); 
glutaminergic pathways (blue) link prefrontal cortex (far left green box), 
hippocampus (upper-right green box), and basal ganglia (mid-bottom green boxes). 
GABAergic inhibitory neuron pathway (green curve) links ventral tegmentum to 
ventral pallidum and to nucleus accumbens (middle-left green boxes). BST = bed 
nucleus of the stria terminalis. DR = dorsal raphe nucleus; PAG = periaqueductal grey 
area. This figure is to roughly show the brain structure of rats and neural pathways 
across relevant brain regions, rather than to show the effect of various manipulations.  
From http://sites.sinauer.com/animalcommunication2e/chapter10.04.html.  
 
 
Still with the 4ID task, Wright et al. (2015) found that rats with anterior thalamic 
damage showed impaired ID performance compared to control subjects. Since the 
thalamus-lesioned rats also finished the ED stage more rapidly than the previous ID 
stage, the damage of anterior thalamus is not disrupting the set-formation; otherwise, 
rats would have a similar performance in ED and ID. This study revealed that the 
anterior thalamus is crucial in directing attention to task-relevant stimuli particularly 
for ID learning, but at the expense of ED shift performance (Wright et al., 2015). 
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Similarly, the shifting between different dimensions or rules probably also requires 
proper interactions among multiple brain regions. For example, the pharmacological 
blockade of communication between the PFC and the perirhinal cortex (PER) 
impaired rats’ learning performance when shifting reward-associated rules in an 
object-location paired association task (Hernandez et al., 2017). Considering that PER 
is an intermediate area which is reciprocally connected to mPFC and hippocampus, 
and the finding that hippocampus activity is associated with the inhibition of an 
incorrect response (Lee & Byeon, 2014), this study suggests that the mPFC-PER-
hippocampus circuit is important for rule- or set-shifting ability (Hernandez et al., 
2017). What’s more, a recent study with a touch-screen set-shifting task in mice 
showed that the damage of the cerebellum (in terms of global loss of Purkinje cells in 
cerebellum due to mutation) would impair both reversal learning and ED shift 
(Dickson et al., 2017), supporting that normal functioning of cognitive flexibility is 
supported by an even larger brain circuit. 
 
From the above brief review of animal studies of cognitive flexibility, it is clear that 
various shifting tasks have been playing a key role in exploring the neural mechanism 
of cognitive flexibility. In particular, different parts of the frontal cortex and striatum 
are involved in the learning at different stages of the task. 
 
Besides helping to explore brain region functions, these attentional set-shifting tasks 
have also helped in the development of animal models of schizophrenia. The 
cognitive deficits, particularly an ED shifting impairment, in human patients with 
schizophrenia is associated with a reduction in prefrontal dopaminergic 
neurotransmission (Harrison, 1999). Therefore, rat models of schizophrenia can be 
induced by administering drugs that directly target the prefrontal dopaminergic 
system. For example, the administration of the drug phencyclidine (PCP) or ketamine 
has been shown to impair ED shift performance in rats by indirectly inducing 
dopaminergic dysfunction in the frontal cortex, leading to a potential animal model of 
schizophrenia (Jentsch & Roth, 1999; Nikiforuk et al., 2010; see Tait et al., 2014 for a 
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review). A similar finding was reported by developmental administration of ketamine 
in mice (Jeevakumar et al., 2015). With this schizophrenia model, Nikiforuk et al. 
(2016) found that the positive allosteric modulators (PAMs) of the alpha-7-nicotinic 
acetylcholine receptors can effectively reverse the ED deficit in rats, providing a 
potential treatment of schizophrenia with the PAMs. Recently, the phosphodiesterase 
10A selective inhibitor TAK-063 was also found to remove the ED deficit and other 
cognitive dysfunctions associated with schizophrenia in rodent model, suggesting that 
TAK-063 may potentially ameliorate cognitive deficits of schizophrenia (Shiraishi et 
al., 2016).  
 
As another example, aged rats showed impairment in set-shifting ability compared to 
young rats just as in aged humans, suggesting that the aged rat model can be used to 
investigate possible ageing causes and potential pharmacy to slow down the ageing 
process or mediate ageing-related cognitive dysfunction (Beas et al., 2013). Beas et al. 
(2017) recently showed that lower expression of GABA receptors in mPFC is strongly 
correlated with worse strategy-shifting performance in aged rats, and GABA receptor 
agonist baclofen enhanced their set-shifting performance, suggesting that GABA 
receptors may play a necessary role in affecting ageing-related cognitive flexibility 
ability. Finally, brief and repeated exposure to cocaine leads to reversal learning 
impairments, suggesting a rat model of the impacts of drug use (Izquierdo et al., 2010; 
Seu & Jentsch, 2009; see Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012 for a review), and physical 
exercise in rats improved both reversal and ED performance, supporting the positive 
effect of sport on cognitive flexibility (Brockett et al., 2015). Such animal models 
provide convenient ways to develop and validate novel pharmacological agents and 
therapies for relevant disorders and diseases with cognitive flexibility symptoms, or 
even to improve health.  
 
Since dysfunctions or lesions in the frontostriatal circuit have been shown associated 
with impaired cognitive flexibility, it is expected that any interruption of 
neurotransmitter pathways in the frontostriatal circuit would also influence cognitive 
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flexibility abilities. Together with animal models, shifting tasks have further helped 
understand cognitive flexibility at the neurochemical level, particularly the effect of 
neurotransmitters and receptors on various disorders. 
Dopamine (DA) 
The dopamine pathway (red curves in Figure 1.2) in the frontal cortex and basal 
ganglia plays a key role in reward-motivated learning behaviour. Therefore, disruption 
of DA activity in the frontostriatal circuit is expected to influence discrimination 
learning in attentional set-shifting tasks (Glimcher, 2011). Studies with a maze-based 
task found that the blockade of either D1 or D2 receptors in rodent mPFC induces 
severe perseveration errors in strategy-shifting, while D1 and D2 agonists have no 
effect on strategy-shifting (Ragozzino, 2002; Floresco et al., 2006). Unlike D1 and D2, 
stimulation of D4 receptors in PFC results in more perseveration errors in strategy-
shifting, whereas the blockade of D4 improves strategy-shifting performance. 
Furthermore, depletion of PFC DA impairs ID (Crofts et al., 2001) but improves ED 
(Roberts et al., 1994) in marmosets, which suggests that PFC DA depletion impairs 
attentional set-formation. These findings suggest that various DA receptors in PFC 
may need to cooperate well for normal shifting performance (Floresco, 2013). 
 
Besides the effect of PFC DA on ID and ED shifting performance, DA in the striatum 
is also involved in cognitive flexibility. In particular, studies found that DA 
transmission depletion in DMS selectively impairs reversal learning in both primates 
(Clarke et al., 2011) and rats (O’Neil & Brown, 2007). In comparison, in the ventral 
striatum, the D2 receptor agonist may lead to more perseveration errors in both 
reversal learning and shifting (Haluk & Floresco, 2009; Yawata et al., 2012), while the 
D1 receptor blockade may lead to more strategy-acquisition errors (i.e., taking more 
trials to acquire the reward-relevant strategy) in mice measured by number of 12-trial-
long learning sessions (Yawata et al., 2012). Subsequently, a recent study in rats found 
that the synaptic DA level in the ventromedial striatum increases in response to 
unexpected reward in a lever-based reversal learning paradigm, and such increase in 
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DA level was observed only when rats successfully learned the reversal (Klanker et al., 
2015), further supporting that striatal DA is involved in the adaptation of previously 
learned behaviour. All together, these findings support that striatal DA receptors are 
crucial in disengagement of previous learning and establishment of new learning 
(Yawata et al., 2012). 
 
In vivo measurement of extracellular DA levels shows that DA levels in nucleus 
accumbens (part of ventral striatum, lower left region in Figure 1.2) increased when 
shifting rules on a T-maze-based strategy-shifting task, and DA levels in mPFC 
increased when both acquiring and shifting rules (Stefani & Moghaddam, 2006). 
Consistently, the role of DA in cognitive flexibility has also been observed in humans. 
For example, in patients with PD, administration of L-DOPA reversed the ED shift 
deficit in the CANTAB ID/ED task, while it impaired reversal learning performance 
(Cools, 2006; Kehagia et al., 2010). 
Serotonin 
Unlike the DA effect in prefrontal-striatal circuit on set-shifting and reversal learning, 
serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine; 5-HT) in the OFC only was found to affect reversal 
learning. Specifically, in marmosets, depletion of OFC 5-HT (but not DA) impaired 
reversal learning with significantly more perseveration errors (Clark et al., 2005, 
2007), while 5-HT depletion in the medial caudate nucleus did not (Clarke et al., 
2011). Consistently, with a touch screen reversal task, inactivation of the 5-HT 
transporter (resulting in increased 5-HT levels and, potentially, DA levels, for the 5-
HT transporter can take up DA at least in rodents) improves reversal learning 
(particularly by decreasing perseveration errors) compared to controls in mice, 
suggesting that 5-HT transporter loss may increase sensitivity to negative feedback, 
and pharmacological treatments leading to the loss of the 5-HT transporter could 
reduce impairments in reversal learning (Brigman et al., 2010). 
 
Interestingly, a recent study found depletion of 5-HT in primate OFC impaired 
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reversal learning when DA level in the putamen was also low, but did not impair 
reversal ability when putamen DA level was high. This suggests that the reversal 
learning may be affected by the balance between 5-HT levels in OFC and DA levels 
in the dorsal striatum (Groman et al., 2013). 
Norepinephrine (NE) 
Attentional set-shifting tasks helped confirm that NE in mPFC plays a role in ED 
shifting. The norepinephrine (NE; also called Noradrenaline or NA) autoreceptor 
antagonist atipamezole (Lapiz & Morilak, 2006) or treatment of NE reuptake blocker 
(Lapiz et al., 2007), both of which increase NE neurotransmitter levels in the mPFC, 
were found to improve ED shift performance in the 7-stage task. Consistently, NE 
depletion (Tait et al. 2007) or NE deafferentation (McGaughy et al. 2008) in mPFC 
selectively cause ED shift impairment. Given that NE is mainly synthesised in the 
locus coeruleus and is projected to both mPFC and OFC, it is not surprising that 
optogenetic silencing of locus coeruleus activity impaired both ED shift and reversal 
learning performance, but did not impair ID and set-formation in an attentional set-
shifting task on mice (Janitzky et al., 2015). The set-shifting deficit by NE 
deafferentation (McGaughy et al. 2008) can be reduced by increasing NE activity via 
blocking NE reuptake (Newman et al., 2008). Also, treatment with an NE reuptake 
inhibitor was found to be able to prevent or reverse an ED shift deficit originally 
caused by chronic stress (Bondi et al., 2008; Nikiforuk & Popik, 2011; Naegeli et al., 
2013). Because NE neurons were found to be lost in early PD patients who also show 
impaired set-shifting ability (Vazey & Aston-Jones, 2012), and chronic stress is 
characteristic of depressive patients, the investigation of the NE effect on cognitive 
flexibility may help develop new therapies for early PD and stress in depression 
(Naegeli et al., 2013; Vazey & Aston-Jones, 2012). 
Acetylcholine (ACh) 
Besides DA, 5-HT, and NE, acetylcholine (ACh) in DMS has also been confirmed as 
being associated with cognitive flexibility. An ACh antagonist infused into rat DMS 
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caused a reversal learning impairment (McCool et al., 2008), but there is no effect on 
rats’ cognitive flexibility from cholinergic lesions in basal forebrain and PFC regions 
(McGaughy et al., 2008; Tait & Brown, 2008). Consistently, cognitive rigidity was 
found to be associated with a degraded ACh receptor M1 in rat DMS (Nieves-
Martinez et al., 2012), and inactivation of cholinergic interneurons (which release 
ACh) in striatum caused more perseveration errors when shifting to a new strategy in 
rats (Aoki et al., 2015). Also, because ACh synthesis in striatum often degrades in 
aged rats (Das et al., 2001) and aged rats often show impaired reversal learning 
deficits (Brushﬁeld et al., 2008; Schoenbaum et al., 2002), degraded ACh activity may 
underlie some of the cognitive deficits in ageing that are reflected in set-shifting 
performance. In this regard, increasing striatal ACh activity via AChE 
(acetylcholinesterase) inhibitor tacrine reduces ageing-related cognitive deficit (Tait et 
al., 2013), and the ACh receptor agonist nicotine improved both ID and ED shift 
performance in normal rats (Allison & Shoaib, 2013). All the evidence supports that 
ACh in DMS is crucial for normal function of cognitive flexibility, in particular for 
reversal learning.  
N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) 
Many studies using shifting tasks have shown that NMDA receptor antagonists 
injected into mPFC impair behavioural flexibility. The NMDA antagonists 
phencyclidine (PCP) and ketamine were found to impair reversal learning in rats 
(Abdul-Monim et al., 2006; Floresco et al., 2009; Idris et al., 2010), and PCP and 
another antagonist MK-801 (dizocilpine) were found to impair ED shift in rats 
(Rodefer et al., 2005; Stefani & Moghaddam, 2005). Blockade of the NMDA GluN2B 
receptor in PFC (Dalton et al., 2011), and knockout of NMDA GluN2A receptors 
(Marquardt et al., 2014), also impaired set-shifting, and cortex-wide deletion of 
GluN2B (Radke et al., 2015), or the local blockade of GluN2B in the lateral OFC 
(Thompson et al., 2015), caused reversal deficits in a touch-screen task. Because 
inactivation or blockade of NMDA receptors produces negative symptoms and 
cognitive deficits of schizophrenia, but DA agonists do not, investigation of the 
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effects of NMDA manipulations on behavioural flexibility in attentional set-shifting 
tasks using rodents may facilitate the exploration of pharmacological therapies for 
schizophrenia (Neil et al., 2010). 
 
Recently, Jett et al. (2017) showed that blocking NMDA or AMPA (α-amino-3-
hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid) receptors in the rat mPFC, causing 
compromised glutamate neurotransmission, is associated with chronic stress-induced 
ED deficits. On the other hand, acute administration of NMDA receptor antagonist 
ketamine, which increases glutamate neurotransmission via AMPA receptors in mPFC, 
reversed chronic stress-induced ED deficits (Jett et al., 2015). These results suggest 
that investigation of the role of NMDA receptors on chronic stress may help explore 
therapy for stress-related psychiatric disorders like depression.  
 
A recent interesting study showed that multiple neurotransmitters could cooperatively 
affect behavioural flexibility. While individual administration of a low-dose of either 
NMDA receptor antagonist or D1 receptor antagonist did not impair strategy-shifting 
performance in a lever-press task, the administration of both antagonists together did 
impair task performance (Desai et al., 2017), suggesting that subtle abnormality in 
different types of neurotransmitters may act cooperatively to cause a deficit in 
behavioural flexibility. 
 
The above brief summary clearly shows that multiple neurotransmitters in the 
frontostriatal circuit influence cognitive flexibility from different aspects, either 
independently or cooperatively, with the help of shifting tasks. The effects of various 
neurotransmitters on cognitive flexibility have even been confirmed at the genetic 
level via studies of neurotransmitter-related genes, as seen below.  
Genetic factors 
Shifting tasks used with transgenic mice have helped confirm the effects of various 
neurotransmitters on behavioural flexibility (Klanker et al., 2013). For example, 
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DARPP gene (dopamine- and cAMP-regulated neuronal phosphoprotein) is related to 
D1 receptor activation, and DARPP-32 knockout mice showed a reversal learning 
deficit (Heyser et al., 2000). This supports that D1 receptor activation is necessary in 
reversal learning. Researchers also found that mice with D2 receptor (gene: Drd2) 
knockout showed perseveration errors in simple reversal learning (Kruzich & Grandy, 
2004; Kruzich et al., 2006), while mice with D3 receptor knockout showed enhanced 
performance in compound reversal learning (Glickstein et al., 2005). Interestingly, D2 
receptor knockout did not affect mice’s ID and ED shift performance (DeSteno & 
Schmauss, 2009), suggesting that D2 receptors may selectively regulate reversal 
learning. However, it is not clear whether the effect of genes on cognitive flexibility is 
direct or indirect (e.g., via increased neurotransmitter levels), and since receptor 
knockout affected the whole brain, it is not clear which brain region of the receptors 
causes the impairment (Klanker et al., 2013). 
 
For the effect of GABA-related genes, studies found that mice with mutant Met or 
Plaur genes had fewer GABAergic interneurons in OFC and striatum and showed 
reversal learning impairments (Bissonette et al., 2010, 2015; Martins et al., 2011). The 
reversal learning deficit in mutant Plaur mice can be restored after postnatal 
supplementation of the HGF gene (Bissonette et al., 2010). Because all the three 
genes (Met, HGF, and Plaur) associated with GABAergic interneurons are found 
associated with schizophrenia (Torrey et al., 2005; Bissonette & Powell, 2012), such 
transgenic studies in mice may speed up the exploration of gene therapies for 
associated disorders like schizophrenia. A recent transgenic study on mice has 
indicated already that abnormality in GABAergic interneuron-driven Gamma 
oscillations in the PFC may play a key role in causing cognitive inflexibility in 
schizophrenia and provides a potential therapeutic strategy for the disorder (Cho et al., 
2015).  
 
Overall, extensive study findings on cognitive flexibility from multiple levels, as 
briefly demonstrated above, have clearly shown the significance of attentional set-
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shifting tasks. Because of the importance of set-shifting tasks, any development of 
new methodology in analysing set-shifting task performance, and refinement of set-
shifting tasks, would benefit the study of cognitive flexibility. For this purpose, in this 
PhD project, a new Bayesian approach has been developed. To make it easier to 
understand our Bayesian approach, I will first introduce the basics of the Bayesian 
approach in the following section, and will describe our Bayesian approach in the 
methodology section later.   
 
1.3 Bayes’ rule 
The fundamental component of the Bayesian method, i.e., Bayes’ rule (Gelman et al., 
2003), is introduced here, considering its crucial role in the whole project. Bayes’ rule 
provides a way to update one’s belief after receiving new evidence. Mathematically, 
Bayes’ rule combines currently observed data with a previously formed belief to 
estimate how likely each specific hypothesis h  is true:  
)(
)()|(
)|(
EP
hHPhHEP
EhHP

     (1)   
The above formula consists of four probability functions P(.) with two variables H 
and E:  
a) H is a variable called hypothesis, and h  is a specific hypothesis from the set 
of possible hypotheses. For example, nationality can be assigned with a 
specific value ‘UK’, ‘USA’, or ‘China’, etc.  
b) E is a variable called data or evidence, consisting of a set of observed 
information. For example, the data E could include a student’s appearance 
and English accent in order to estimate how likely the student’s nationality is 
UK’.  
c) )|( EhHP   is the posterior probability function. It represents the posterior 
probability of hypothesis H being a specific value h  given the data E, where 
‘|’ symbol represents ‘given’. It measures how likely a specific hypothesis h  
is true after (therefore posterior) the new evidence E is observed. The 
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posterior probability is what people or researchers want to know. How can 
we obtain the posterior probability )|( EhHP  ? The above Bayes’ rule tells 
us the posterior probability can be obtained by calculating the three functions 
on the right side of the formula.  
d) )|( hHEP   is a likelihood function, representing the likelihood of the 
hypothesis h  given the evidence E. This function measures how likely the 
data E is observed if a specific hypothesis h  is true. In other words, it 
measures the consistency between the observed data E and a specific 
hypothesis h . For example, if a student’s nationality is ‘UK’, how likely is it 
that the student has an oriental face and standard British accent? In general, 
the likelihood function )|( hHEP   needs to be defined beforehand for any 
particular application (see Section 2.4). Once the likelihood function is 
designed, then given a specific hypothesis h , the likelihood function 
)|( hHEP   will give us a likelihood value for a particular observation E. 
Note that different observations of E may correspond to different likelihood 
values for the same hypothesis h .  
e) )( hHP   is the prior probability of a specific hypothesis h  being true. It 
represents the degree of people’s belief that a specific hypothesis h  is true 
before (therefore ‘prior’) observing the evidence E. The prior information 
about the specific hypothesis h  often comes from previous relevant 
experience.  
f) )(EP  is called marginal likelihood, which is a normalisation factor to make 
sure that the sum of the posteriors )|( EhHP   over all the possible 
hypotheses h ’s  is 1.0.  
 
Based on Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability of every specific hypothesis h  being 
true is estimated based on not only the consistency between the hypothesis h  and the 
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new observed evidence E, but also the old prior belief that the hypothesis h  is true. 
Bayes’ theorem is about the strength of belief for each possible hypothesis, whereas 
the classical frequentist approach embedded in current learning criteria in set-shifting 
tasks only considers the confidence of a single hypothesis, i.e., the null hypothesis. 
Also, the prior belief information is not considered in the classical frequentist 
approach. 
1.4 Issues in task design and frequentist approach to data analysis 
Attentional set-shifting tasks on animals have been extensively used to study 
behavioural flexibility. But how do we know whether animals have learned as a 
researcher intended during discrimination learning in the set-shifting tasks? In all 
animal-learning studies, we can only infer whether animals have learned the correct 
stimulus-reward association based on the pattern of the behavioural choices. The 
behavioural learning criterion adopted in the attentional set-shifting tasks is typically 
based on a frequentist approach using inferential statistics. For example, a criterion of 
6-correct-choices-in-a-row given a null hypothesis of responding randomly (p = 0.056 
= 0.0156) was adopted to determine whether a rat has learned to find the reward-
associated stimulus in each stage in the 7-stage task (Birrell & Brown, 2000). 
However, there are other criteria under which the rat might be judged to have learned 
a discrimination. Suppose a rat makes five correct choices, followed by one error, 
then again five correct choices followed by one error (Table 1.2).  Although the 
chances of randomly choosing the correct bowls on 10 out of 12 trials is less than 2% 
(0.019), such a 10-out-of-12 correct choice would not satisfy the 6-correct-choice-in-
a-row criterion. This raises two issues: (1) how big the ‘window’ over which 
performance is considered should be, for windows that are too large will not detect 
learning well, and windows that are too small are prone to statistical errors; and (2) 
must a subject (animal or human) perform perfectly to conclude that the subject has 
learned the contingencies in the task? 
 
Table 1.2: an example of a rat’s choice results in a learning stage. 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15-20 
Choice ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓✓✓✓✓✓ 
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Another issue is that the 6-correct-choice-in-a-row criterion (or similar criteria; 
Brigman et al., 2005; Brooks et al., 2012; Floresco et al , 2006; see Table 1.1) takes a 
classical null-vs-alternative hypothesis inferential testing approach. The rationale 
behind this approach is that, if the null hypothesis is very unlikely true (e.g., less than 
5% chance), then the null hypothesis is rejected. The problem is that once the null 
hypothesis is rejected, there are often multiple alternative hypotheses consistent with 
the data. Deciding which of these alternatives is correct is beyond the scope of null 
hypothesis testing. For the 6-correct-choices-in-a-row criterion, ‘randomly choosing a 
bowl’ is the null hypothesis, and ‘using the reward-associated stimulus for bowl 
choice’ is considered as the (only) alternative hypothesis. However, this is a potential 
error in statistical reasoning, because there are other alternative hypotheses about the 
response pattern of the rat that do not lead to correct responding or random 
responding. For example, a rat may always choose bowls on the same side. This 
means the traditional ‘null-versus-alternative’ hypothesis testing approach does not 
fully describe the behaviour. The consequence of this is that while the criterion may 
indicate learning, it discards other information about the animal’s choices. This could 
lead to either more trials being presented even after the animal has learned the 
discrimination (‘false negative), or it could lead to finishing a stage even if the animal 
has not learned the discrimination (i.e., ‘false positive’). For example, if a rat correctly 
chooses bowls in six consecutive trials, with the six side choices ‘left-left-right-left-
right-left’, the rat might choose bowls by alternatively changing side of choice in last 
five trials rather than by reward-associated information, leading to a ‘false positive’. 
In this case, the rat would probably be under-trained and need more training.  
 
The problem of false positives increases as the number of trials increases. I have 
performed a computer simulation to estimate the likelihood of happening to respond 
correctly in six consecutive trials when virtual rats are actually responding randomly 
(Figure 1.3). The simulation result shows that the likelihood of false positives 
increases quickly with more trials, indicating that false positives may often happen 
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when using 6-in-a-row criterion to judge rats’ learning, particularly when rats find it 
hard to learn. This becomes disproportionately problematic for studies of animals 
exhibiting impaired behavioural flexibility; in which case, false positives would likely 
happen when animals take longer to learn, thereby reducing the apparent magnitude 
of the impairment.  
 
Figure 1.3: the likelihood of false positive increases with more trials with two 
different learning criteria. With the 6-in-a-row criterion (red curve), to estimate the 
false positive likelihood for a specific trial number k, I generated 5000 sequences of k 
binary (i.e., ‘correct’/‘incorrect’) values, with each binary value randomly generated. 
A sequence is considered ‘false positive’ if there exist six consecutive correct values 
anywhere in the sequence. The false positive likelihood is the ratio between the 
number of ‘false positive’ sequences and the total sequence number 5000. A similar 
simulation process was performed for the 8-correct-in-10 criterion (green curve). The 
simulation result with 6-in-row criterion (red curve) is confirmed by a recursive 
formula (black curve) recently described by Fazekas et al. (2010). 
 
Moreover, the traditional hypothesis-testing approach can only help us decide when 
animals have learned, it does not allow us to determine which pattern of possible 
responding, which could be relevant to perceptual stimuli or spatial locations,  
predominates in each learning stage for each rat. Before establishing the correct 
stimulus-reward association, a rat may have tried other non-random but reward-
irrelevant spatial patterns or stimulus characteristics on which to base a bowl choice 
(see Section 2.3 for detail). Knowing these details from each rat would help 
researchers understand more deeply the course of learning when animals solve 
discrimination learning problems, and explore the difference in learning processes 
between individuals and groups (e.g., the effects of different lesions or drug 
treatments). The approach based on null hypothesis p-values cannot provide such 
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detailed information. 
1.5 Utilising a simple Bayesian approach to analysing the 4ID task 
I have implemented a simple Bayesian approach to avoid those issues mentioned 
above, by estimating the probability of each hypothetical pattern of behavioural 
choice at each learning trial. The Bayesian approach is not trying to model rats’ 
decision processes from the viewpoint of a rat learning the task, but trying to 
determine how close the rats’ responding matches a particular hypothetical pattern, as 
observed from the viewpoint of the experimenter.  
 
In pilot work (unpublished undergraduate dissertation), the initial exploration of the 
Bayesian approach to analysing the archival data of an attentional set-shifting task 
(the 4ID task) in rats indicated that learning in some instances was stronger or weaker 
as judged from posterior probabilities of Bayesian analysis than the p-value indicated. 
Specifically, rats continued to be trained in some stages even when the Bayesian 
probability of the correct choice pattern was large (e.g., >0.95), while training stopped 
on other occasions even though the Bayesian posterior probabilities associated with 
the correct choice pattern were modest (e.g., ~0.6). This initial exploration also 
showed that the degree of learning may affect a rat’s attentional set-shifting 
performance in the ED stage. To avoid a varying degree of learning in rats, I proposed 
replacing the traditional n-correct-choice-in-a-row criterion by the Bayesian learning 
criterion, i.e., the rat should finish a learning stage when the Bayesian (posterior) 
probability of the correct choice pattern becomes larger than a threshold (e.g., 0.95). 
 
Since the frequentist p-value and Bayes’ posterior probability can lead to different 
conclusions about when the rats have learned, it becomes necessary to explore the 
relationship between p-values and Bayes’ posterior probability. Also, not all the 
observed information about rats’ learning behaviour was considered in the initial 
Bayesian model. Including all the observed information would more likely result in a 
better mathematical model in accurately estimating the posterior probability of each 
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hypothetical pattern. In this thesis, I will extend the Bayesian model and further 
explore its applications in analysing attentional set-shifting task data. 
Chapter II: Bayesian Analysis of Rat Attentional Set-shifting  
2 Materials and Methods  
2.1 Animals and apparatus 
Forty-seven normal control rats with sham lesion surgery and forty-six medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC)-lesioned rats (Lister hooded; Harlan, UK) were used to 
perform the 7-stage task. Rats were maintained on a moderately restricted diet (15–20 
g of food for each rat per day). On the day before each rat performed the task, each rat 
was exposed to the food-baited bowls and then was trained to complete two simple 
discrimination stages to a criterion of six consecutive correct trials. On the next day, 
the rat completed all seven stages of the task by satisfying the 6-correct-in-a-row 
criterion. In each learning stage, each rat dug one of two bowls in each trial to search 
for the food reward (Figure 2.1). Each bowl was distinguishable from the other in the 
trial by having a different digging medium inside the bowl and/or a different odour 
emanating from the digging medium. In each trial the configuration of the bowls and 
the rat’s behavioural response was recorded (Figure 2.1), including which bowl was 
chosen by the rat, whether the chosen bowl contained a food reward, whether the rat 
dug after encountering one bowl (recorded as 1st), or went to investigate the other 
bowl before digging (recorded as 2nd), and the time spent on the trial. Based on the 
trial configuration generation rules, the reward-relevant stimulus would not appear on 
the same side for more than three times in a row. The archival data were collected 
from years 2006 to 2009 in the lab of Professor Verity Brown1 (Tait et al., 2009). The 
data were originally collected and analysed for multiple attentional set-shifting studies. 
This is the first time that the Bayesian analysis has been applied to pooled data across 
                                                        
1 The data were collected by Dr David Tait, Dr Alexander Chase, Sarah Hersman, Sarah Dennis, 
Robert Johns, Tamlyn Watermeyer, Anne Bremicker, Francesca Hand, Louise MacLellan, and 
Stephanie Hunter 
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multiple cohorts of rats. The reader is referred to Tait et al. (2009) for details about the 
apparatus and the testing method. All the data collection was carried out in accordance 
with the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, under the Project licences granted 
to Prof. Verity J. Brown, with Project License (PPL) number 60/3138, 60/3837, and 
60/4459, approved by the University of St Andrews Animal Welfare and Ethics 
Committee and the UK Home Office. 
 
Figure 2.1: an example trial from the 7-stage task. In the apparatus, there are two 
chambers (upper half of the box). Within each chamber, there is one bowl (circle) 
containing one particular medium and one particular odour, e.g., the left bowl 
contains medium M2 and odour O1. The food is in only one of the two bowls and 
associated with either one particular medium or odour. Here, the food is associated 
with medium M1 (in bold blue). The curve with the arrow represents the rat’s 
behaviour at this learning trial, i.e., the rat first approached the left bowl, but did not 
dig in it and then went to dig in the right bowl. 
2.2 The 7-stage task 
Briefly, after training on two simple two-choice discriminations in which stimuli 
differed along only one perceptual dimension, each rat was tested in a single day in a 
series of seven two-choice discrimination stages (Table 2.1). The first stage was a 
simple discrimination (SD) either between two odours (as an example in Table 2.1) or 
between two digging media. Rats learned which of the two stimuli was associated 
with a food reward. In the second stage, an irrelevant stimulus dimension was added 
to form a compound discrimination (CD), with the reward-associated stimulus 
unchanged compared to the previous SD stage. The third stage was reversal learning 
(REV1), where the reward-relevant dimension and all the stimuli remained unchanged 
compared to the CD stage. However, the reward-associated stimulus was reversed 
within the perceptual dimension (Table 2.1). Once the reversal learning was finished, 
another compound learning stage (ID) followed, in which the stimuli in both 
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dimensions were novel compared to previous stages, although the reward-relevant 
stimulus dimension was unchanged compared to the previous three stages. This 
compound stage was then followed by a second reversal learning stage (REV2). 
Through the sequence of stages from SD to REV2, the experiment was designed to 
reinforce the rat’s attention to one dimension of stimulus (e.g., ‘odour’ in Table 2.1) in 
order to obtain the food reward. In the stage subsequent to REV2, the previously 
rewarded dimension (‘odour’) became irrelevant, and rats had to learn to attend to 
another dimension (e.g., ‘medium’ in Table 2.1) to obtain reward. In order to succeed 
in this extra-dimensional (‘ED’) discrimination stage, the rat in general had to shift its 
attention from one dimension (‘odour’) to the other dimension (‘medium’), and 
therefore, rats generally required more trials to reach the learning criterion. After the 
ED stage, the task ended with another reversal (REV3). In the 7-stage task, the 
assignment order of stimuli pairs in each stage and the shift of dimension (from odour 
to medium, or vice versa) are counter-balanced insofar as possible. 
 
Table 2.1: the 7-stage task. For each trial, bowls can be discriminated either between 
two odours or between two digging media. At each trial, the correct, reward-
associated stimulus (in bold) is paired with one stimulus from the reward-irrelevant 
dimension, and pseudo-randomly assigned into either the left or the right bowl. M1-
M6: six distinctive medium stimuli; O1-O6: six odour stimuli. 
Discrimination 
learning stage 
Dimensions Stimulus combinations 
Reward- 
associated 
Reward- 
irrelevant 
Rewarded 
combination 
Un-rewarded 
combination 
Simple (SD) Odour None O1 O2 
Compound (CD) Odour Medium O1, M1 O2, M2 
O1, M2 O2, M1 
Reversal (REV1) Odour Medium O2, M1 O1, M2 
O2, M2 O1, M1 
Intra-dimensional (ID) Odour Medium O3, M3 O4, M4 
O3, M4 O4, M3 
Reversal (REV2) Odour Medium O4, M3 O3, M4 
O4, M4 O3, M3 
Extra-dimensional shift (ED) Medium Odour M5, O5 M6, O6 
M5, O6 M6, O5 
Reversal (REV3) Medium Odour M6, O5 M5, O6 
M6, O6 M5, O5 
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2.3 Hypothetical response patterns 
In each discrimination learning stage of the set-shifting task, only one stimulus (e.g., a 
specific odour or medium) is associated with the food reward. A rat must learn to find 
the association between this stimulus and the food reward based on the feedback (i.e., 
either found food or not found food) from its choice of bowl on each trial. However, 
before the rats have learned the correct stimulus, there is no reason to believe that 
their choice of bowl is random. Rather, a rat might use various response patterns 
based on the stimulus configuration. There are at least two classes of external 
information about the bowls that the rat might use: spatial and perceptual. If a rat 
chooses a bowl based on the spatial locations of bowls rather than the stimuli in the 
bowls, then the rat would be using a spatial response pattern for bowl choice. Instead, 
if the rat chooses a bowl based on the stimuli (e.g., digging medium or odour) in the 
bowls, the rat would be using a perceptual response pattern for bowl choice. The 
plausible spatial and perceptual response patterns for bowl choice in the 7-stage task 
are listed below. 
 
Spatial response patterns: 
 Spatial alternation: if choosing the left (or right) side at the last trial, 
choose the right (or left) side for the current trial. 
 Spatial perseveration: return to the same location as the previous trial, no 
matter whether the location is on the left or on the right. This would 
capture a side bias (left or right). 
 Win-stay: if rewarded at the last trial, choose the same location for the 
current trial; otherwise choose the alternative location. 
 Win-shift: if rewarded at the last trial, choose the alternative location for 
the current trial; otherwise, choose the same location.   
 
Perceptual response patterns: there are four different stimuli combined across the 
two bowls, assuming no other perceptual characteristics are used given that the 
bowls are standardised: two odours (O1 and O2) and two media (M1 and M2). A 
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rat may choose a bowl based on one of the following perceptual response patterns: 
 M1: choose the bowl which contains M1. 
 M2: choose the bowl which contains M2. 
 O1: choose the bowl which contains O1. 
 O2: choose the bowl which contains O2. 
 
Note that different perceptual stimuli may be used in different stages; therefore 
perceptual response patterns will be specific to particular stages. In comparison, the 
above four spatial response patterns may appear in any stage. Also note that here, only 
the simple response patterns were considered. More complex response patterns (e.g., 
the combination of O1 and M2) were not included, although they could be added if 
necessary. In addition, while the literature used the term rules to describe the above 
response patterns, we believe that response pattern is a more appropriate term, 
because (1) we can never know for sure what rules rats used, (2) even whether rats 
actually used any rules during learning, and (3) rats might make a selection to exclude 
a possibility even though they had a tentative rule in mind (e.g., a rat chose cumin 
maybe because it wanted to confirm it was incorrect rather than thinking cumin was 
correct). 
 
Because we cannot know for sure which response pattern was actually used at each 
trial for each rat, we can only estimate the probability that the rat’s choices match a 
given response pattern. More formally, we apply Bayes’ rule to estimate the posterior 
probability of the following eight hypotheses regarding the possible response patterns 
at each trial: 
 Hypothesis 1 ( 1h ), or spatial alternation hypothesis: the rat uses spatial 
alternation response pattern to choose bowls. 
 Hypothesis 2 ( 2h ), or spatial perseveration hypothesis: the rat uses spatial 
perseveration response pattern to choose bowls. 
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 Hypothesis 3 ( 3h ), or spatial win-stay hypothesis: the rat uses spatial win-
stay response pattern to choose bowls. 
 Hypothesis 4 ( 4h ), or spatial win-shift hypothesis: the rat uses spatial win-
shift response pattern to choose bowls. 
 Hypothesis 5 ( 5h ), or M1 hypothesis: the rat uses perceptual M1 response 
pattern to choose bowls. 
 Hypothesis 6 ( 6h ), or M2 hypothesis: the rat uses perceptual M2 response 
pattern to choose bowls. 
 Hypothesis 7 ( 7h ), or O1 hypothesis: the rat uses perceptual O1 response 
pattern to choose bowls. 
 Hypothesis 8 ( 8h ), or O2 hypothesis: the rat uses perceptual O2 response 
pattern to choose bowls. 
Note that in the SD stage, only two (rather than four) stimuli appear in the bowls. 
Therefore, for the SD stage, there are in total only six hypotheses. On the other hand, 
more hypotheses would be generated if more complex response patterns were 
considered. However, Bayesian estimate of these eight hypotheses already provides 
much richer information compared to the hypothesis testing approach, which 
evaluates only one hypothesis linked to the random responding associated with the 
null hypothesis. Also, the eight hypotheses are used as a proof of concept to establish 
the utility of Bayesian analysis applied to learning. Other hypotheses could be added 
to the Bayesian analysis with limited effort if necessary. In addition, we assume that 
the eight hypotheses are disjointed (mutually exclusive of each other).This 
assumption is reasonable because the rat cannot simultaneously use two or more 
response patterns to make choice in a trial. In other words, considering one hypothesis 
being true would be exclusive of all the other seven hypotheses being true. I would 
like to clarify that such independence assumption describes relationship between the 
hypotheses in the same trial. Such assumption does not exclude the potential 
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relationships between hypotheses across trials. For example, if rats would try spatial 
response patterns first and then stimulus-based response patterns, the priors of 
stimulus-based hypotheses at current trial might be affected by how likely the rat tries 
both the stimulus-based response pattern and spatial response patterns from the 
previous trial. We did not explore this possibility because (1) we were exploring to 
begin with and this add yet another free variable to the analysis and (2) Occam’s razor 
– until we have concrete data that suggests this on balance we should assume a 
simpler mechanism. From the observation of Bayesian analysis results on multiple 
rats’ data, we found no evidence for such spatial-stimulus circle of patterns. Note as 
well that there are other potential dependences between the hypotheses across trials, 
for instance the rats always went with odour first and then medium. All such potential 
cross-trial dependence relationship does not contradict with the within-trial 
independence relationship between hypotheses. 
2.4 Posterior probability of each hypothesis on a given trial 
It is not possible to know with certainty the basis on which a rat chooses bowls in the 
task, but it is possible to determine the degree to which the observed rat’s learning 
data across trials is consistent with each of the response pattern hypotheses. The 
observed data in each trial includes (1) the two perceptual characteristics (one odour 
and one medium) in the chosen bowl, (2) the rat’s chosen location, and (3) whether 
the rat dug after encountering only one, or both, bowls. 
 
To estimate the probability of each of the eight hypotheses, we use the observed data 
from both the current trial and all previous trials (either within the stage or across 
stages, depending on which stage the current trial is in). Let E  and *E  respectively 
denote the new observed data from the current trial and the old data from all previous 
trials, respectively. Then, all the observed data from the first trial to the current trial 
within a learning stage will be the combined observation *},{ EE . To estimate the 
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probability of a specific hypothesis ih  (where ih  can be any of the listed hypotheses 
1h  to 8h ) after we observe the rat’s data *},{ EE , Bayes’ rule tells us 
        
*)|(
*)|(*}),{|(
*}),{|(
EEP
EhHPEhHEP
EEhHP iii

         (2.1) 
which is a simple extension of Equation (1.1) (Section 1.3) with the addition of the 
observation of previous trials, *E . Note that including E* in Equation (2.1) is the 
only difference to Equation (1.1). H is the hypothesis variable, the value of which 
could be any of the eight specific hypotheses. The comma ‘,’ in the likelihood 
*}),{|( EhHEP i  means ‘and’; therefore *}),{|( EhHEP i represents the 
probability of E given ihH   and *E . 
 
Equation (2.1) tells us that to estimate the posterior probability *}),{|( EEhHP i  of 
a specific hypothesis ih  in the current trial (i.e., left side of Equation 2.1), we need to 
compute the likelihood *}),{|( EhHEP i , set the prior probability of the specific 
hypothesis ih , *)|( EhHP i , and compute the marginal likelihood *)|( EEP . 
Intuitively, the posterior probability *}),{|( EEhHP i  measures how likely a rat 
used the response pattern linked to the hypothesis ih  to make choices, after the 
digging behaviour at both current and previous trials was observed. The likelihood 
*}),{|( EhHEP i  measures how likely it is that we would observe the data E  if a 
rat used the response pattern linked to hypothesis ih  to dig a bowl. The prior 
*)|( EhHP i  represents the researcher’s prior confidence that the rat would use the 
response pattern linked to ih  to choose a bowl before the rat made a choice at the 
current trial. The marginal likelihood *)|( EEP  is simply a normalisation factor. In 
the following, we will introduce how to respectively compute the likelihood of spatial 
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hypotheses and perceptual hypotheses, and then how to compute the prior probability 
and the marginal likelihood. 
Likelihood of spatial hypotheses 
The likelihood *}),{|( EhHEP i  measures how likely it is that we will observe the 
data  E  at the current trial if the rat used the specific response pattern corresponding 
to hypothesis ih  to dig in a bowl in the current trial. The observed data *E  appears in 
the likelihood because observed information from the previous trial would be 
involved in computing the likelihood of spatial hypotheses (e.g., win-stay; see below 
for details). Two types of information from the observed data in the current trial 
contribute to the likelihood computation. 
Considering encountering one or both bowls before bowl choice 
One part of observation, 1E , is whether the rat dug after encountering one, or both, 
bowls. The former is more compatible with a spatial pattern of responding whereas 
the latter is more compatible with a pattern of responding based on the perceptual 
characteristics of the bowl. For example, if the rat’s choice is based on the spatial 
perseveration and it had dug in the left bowl on the previous trial, then the rat would 
choose the same location (the left bowl) in the current trial. By contrast, if the rat 
approached either bowl and then moves to the alternative location, it is unlikely that 
the rat is using spatial information to guide its choice, because the rat would dig the 
first bowl it encounters if it was using a spatial response pattern (as discussed above). 
So, if we only consider the observed data about whether the rat dug in the first (i.e., 
stE 11  ) or the second bowl (
ndE 21  ), the likelihood of any spatial hypothesis ih  
(either 1h , 2h , 3h , or 4h ) could be estimated by 
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In Equation (2.2), the parameter   represents the high likelihood that a rat will 
choose to dig in whichever bowl it encounters first if it is using a spatial response 
pattern; therefore,   should be set at a value close to 100% (i.e., 1.0). Nevertheless, 
allowing for the naturally inquisitive explore-exploit behaviour of these 
spontaneously foraging animals (Stephens, 2008), we set 9.0 , resulting in  
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Note that   should not be set to 1.0, because otherwise the likelihood (Equation 2.2) 
could be 0.0 (i.e., 1- ) for some spatial hypotheses in some trials, which in turn 
would cause the posterior probability of the corresponding hypotheses to be 0.0 (from 
Equation 2.1). Intuitively, the probability of any hypothesis should not be zero. 
Considering location and stimuli in the chosen bowl  
So far, we have only considered the information regarding whether a rat chose to dig 
after encountering one, or both, bowls. Choosing the first bowl does not necessarily 
mean that the likelihood of a specific spatial hypothesis ih  is high. To finally 
determine the likelihood of a specific hypothesis ih , in other words, to measure the 
consistency between the observed data and the specific response pattern 
corresponding to the hypothesis ih  in the current trial, we have to consider the other 
observed information, 2E  , including the rat’s chosen location and perceptual stimuli 
in the chosen bowls. Intuitively, if a rat dug in the left bowl at both the previous trial 
and the current trial, we would think the rat is more likely to use the spatial 
perseveration rather than spatial alternation response pattern to choose bowls, because 
the rat dug in the same-side bowl over the two trials. In this example, because the 
spatial perseveration response pattern is consistent with the rat’s digging behaviour 
and the spatial alternation response pattern is not consistent with the rat’s behaviour, 
the likelihood of the hypothesis corresponding to the spatial perseveration response 
pattern would be higher, and the likelihood of the hypothesis corresponding to the 
spatial alternation response pattern would be lower. Formally, the probability of 
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observing 2E  will be higher if 2E  is consistent with the hypothesis being considered, 
and vice versa. As a result, the above likelihood function (Equation 2.2) for any 
spatial hypothesis ih  can be further refined to 
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The parameter 1  represents the high likelihood of the spatial hypothesis ih  when ih  
is consistent with the observation 2E  at the current trial. Note that 1  is less than   
(Equation 2.2), because otherwise zero or negative values ( 1  ) could be assigned 
to the likelihood function (Equation 2.3), which would then cause zero or negative 
posterior probability (from Equation 2.1). Similarly, the parameter 2  must be less 
than 1 . By default, we set 8.01   and 05.02  , resulting in  
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Figure 2.2 shows an example of calculating the likelihood of each spatial (and 
perceptual) hypothesis at two different conditions: the rat digging in the bowl it first 
encountered (
stE 11  ; Figure 2.2, lower left) or going to investigate the second bowl 
before making a response (
ndE 21  ; Figure 2.2, lower right). 
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Figure 2.2: an example of calculating likelihood of each hypothesis based on the 
previous and current trials’ observation. Suppose in the previous trial (upper figure), 
the rat directly went to dig in the right bowl which did not contain the food-associated 
M2 (solid blue). Then, in the current trial, if the rat directly went to dig in the left 
bowl (lower left, subfigure A, curve with arrow), then 
stE 11  , and the likelihood of 
each spatial hypothesis (the lower-left table) can be calculated by Equation (2.3) and 
the likelihood of each perceptual hypothesis can be calculated by Equation (2.6). 
Instead, if the rat approached the left bowl but then went to dig the right bowl (lower 
right, subfigure B, curve with arrow), then 
ndE 21  , and the likelihood of each spatial 
hypothesis (collected in the lower-right table) can be calculated by Equation (2.4) and 
the likelihood of each perceptual hypothesis can be calculated by Equation (2.7). The 
calculation of the likelihood of spatial hypotheses depends on the rat’s behaviour in 
both the current and the previous trial, while the calculation of the likelihood of 
perceptual hypotheses depends only on the rat’s current trial behaviour. Note in the 
tables, ‘Alternat’ is the abbreviation of Alternation, and ‘Perserv’ for Perseveration. 
 
Likelihood of perceptual hypotheses 
The above likelihood estimates are for spatial hypotheses. While the likelihood of any 
perceptual hypothesis will be computed the same way, the parameters in the 
likelihood function will be different for perceptual hypotheses.  
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Similar to the discussion on the likelihood of spatial hypotheses, we first look at how 
to estimate the likelihood of any perceptual hypothesis if we only consider the 
observed data about whether the rat dug after one, or both, bowls were encountered. 
Intuitively, because the medium and odour configuration at every trial is designed in a 
(pseudo-)random way, and therefore, the rat could not know which medium or odour 
is in which bowl, the probability of finding any specific medium or odour from the 
first bowl the rat encountered is equivalent to that from the second bowl. In other 
words, when the rat wants to choose a bowl containing a specific medium (or odour), 
the probability of finding the specific medium in the first bowl and then digging in the 
first bowl is equal to the probability of finding the specific medium in the second 
bowl and then digging in it. For example, if the rat is using the perceptual response 
pattern M1 (corresponding perceptual hypothesis is 5h ) to choose which bowl to dig 
in, then the rat must approach one of the bowls, and the likelihood of encountering 
M1 in the first bowl it approaches is only 50%. That means, the likelihood of digging 
in the first bowl it approaches will not be higher (or lower) than the likelihood of not 
digging in that bowl, but rather moving to the second bowl. Thus, if we only consider 
the observed data about whether the rat dug in the first bowl it encountered (i.e., 
stE 11  ) or dug in one bowl after encountering the two bowls (
ndE 21  ), the 
likelihood of any perceptual hypothesis ih  (either 5h , 6h , 7h , or 8h ) is 
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where 5.0  represents the equal likelihood of choosing the first and the second 
bowl the rat encounters if it uses a perceptual response pattern to choose bowls, 
resulting in 
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Similar to the further division for spatial hypotheses (please see the rationale about 
how to further divide in the previous section), the above likelihood function for 
perceptual hypotheses can be further divided by considering the remaining 
observation 2E  in the current trial, 
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As for 1  and 2  in Equations (2.3) and (2.4), both 1  and 2  will be less than 0.5. 
By default we set 45.021   , resulting in 
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Based on the above formulae, the likelihood of every specific hypothesis ih  in the 
current trial can be calculated by considering whether the rat chose the first bowl it 
encounters, and then by considering whether the rat’s bowl choice is consistent with 
the specific response pattern corresponding to ih .  Figure 2.2 shows an example of 
calculating the likelihood of each spatial and perceptual hypothesis when the rat dug 
the bowl it firstly encountered (
stE 11  ; Figure 2.2, lower left) or went to dig the 
second bowl (
ndE 21  ; Figure 2.2, lower right). 
Prior probability 
The prior probability *)|( EhHP i  represents the researcher’s prior confidence that 
 42 
the rat used the response pattern associated with ih  to choose a bowl before the rat 
started the current trial. Within a learning stage, if we estimate that the rat likely 
chooses a bowl on the last trial based on a specific response pattern associated with 
hypothesis ih , then we would expect that the rat will also likely use the same response 
pattern to choose bowls in the current trial. Therefore, it is possible to use the 
posterior probability of the specific hypothesis ih  estimated from the last trial as the 
prior probability of the same hypothesis ih  for the current trial. In this way, the 
Bayesian approach combines the contribution of the new observed data in the current 
trial (reflected in likelihood function) with the contribution of observed data from 
previous trials (reflected in prior function). 
 
However, special considerations are necessary for prior resetting in the first trial of 
each learning stage (Table 2.2). For the first trial of the first stage (SD) in the task, the 
rat has just begun the task and has not encountered any of the stimuli to be used in this 
stage. Therefore, we have no evidence to determine which response patterns were 
more likely used by rats; thus we assume all the possible hypotheses equiprobable 
with the prior probabilities for all hypotheses being set to 1/number of hypotheses 
(1/6).  
 
For each of the other six stages, the stage begins when the rat has learned a particular 
perceptual feature that signals the location of the food reward in the previous learning 
stage. The stimuli in the new learning stage might be the same (e.g., in reversal 
stages), i.e., the same as those in the previous learning stage, or be partial (e.g., in CD 
stage), i.e., partially appear in the previous stage, or be novel (e.g., in ID and ED 
stages), i.e., novel exemplars of the same stimulus dimensions as the previous 
learning stage (Table 2.2, second column).  
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Table 2.2: prior setting for the first trial of each learning stage. 
Stages Consistency with  
previous stimuli 
Prior in first trial 
SD N/A Set as equal (i.e., 1/6) for all six hypotheses 
CD same + novel Two new perceptual hypotheses’ prior set with 1/8; 
All existing six hypotheses’ priors maintained from SD  
REV1 same Priors of all eight hypotheses maintained from CD 
ID novel Priors of all eight hypotheses reset as equal (i.e., 1/8) 
REV2 same Priors of all eight hypotheses maintained from ID 
ED novel Priors of all eight hypotheses reset as equal (i.e., 1/8) 
REV3 same Priors of all eight hypotheses maintained from ED 
 
 
For reversal stages, the prior of each hypothesis in the first trial of the new learning 
stage is the hypothesis’ posterior probability in the last trial of the previous learning 
stage, because there is nothing to signal to the rat that conditions have changed. In 
other words, in this first trial, the rat would be expected to use the same hypothesis to 
choose bowls as it used on the previous (correct) trial. 
 
For the CD stage, where the stimuli partly change with the addition of another (albeit 
irrelevant) dimension, considering the fact that the rat has learned the reward-
associated stimulus, the rat would be expected to choose bowls with the same reward-
associated perceptual response pattern. Therefore, the priors of the old stimuli in the 
first trial of the new learning stage are the same as their posterior probabilities in the 
last trial of the SD stage. For the priors of the two new perceptual hypotheses in this 
stage, since the rat prefers the reward-associated (old) response patterns, the initial 
priors of the two new hypotheses would be low, e.g., being 1/8 (considering the total 
number of hypotheses being 8). With similar reasoning, all spatial hypotheses’ priors 
will be the same as their posteriors in the last trial of the previous stage. 
 
Finally, for ID and ED stages, since all stimuli are novel compared to those in the 
previous stage, the stimulus of the rat’s preference in the previous stage disappears 
and the rat would probably have no preference for any of the new stimuli. In other 
words, the rat would have equivalent preference for the stimuli. Therefore, the priors 
of all hypotheses (including spatial hypotheses) are reset to equiprobable initial priors 
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1/8 (if the total number of hypotheses is eight). In this condition, the priors of the 
spatial hypotheses are also reset to the initial prior, because rats may revert to using a 
spatial response pattern for making a choice when they do not know which, if any, 
perceptual stimulus might predict where the food is.  
 
Another special consideration concerns the minimum prior. Intuitively, even if we 
have very low prior confidence that a rat will use a certain response pattern, the 
confidence will not be null, but rather will be at a low level. With that in mind, a 
lower bound is placed on all priors, such that the minimum value of each prior in any 
trial does not fall below a threshold, e.g., 0.001. In addition, note that the hypotheses’ 
prior can be renormalised such that their sum is 1.0. However, this prior 
renormalisation is not necessary because of the renormalisation of the product of 
likelihood and prior for each hypothesis by the marginal likelihood (see below). 
Marginal likelihood 
The other term in the Bayes’ rule is the marginal likelihood *)|( EEP  in the current 
trial. As a normalisation factor, it is simply the sum of the product of likelihood and 
prior over all hypotheses. So the marginal likelihood *)|( EEP  can be directly 
calculated by summing the product *)|(*}),{|( EhHPEhHEP ii   over all 
hypotheses, 
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  (2.8) 
Posterior probability 
Based on Bayes’ rule (Equation 2.1), the posterior probability of each hypothesis, ih , 
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can be calculated as follows: 
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Based on the formula of marginal likelihood and posteriors, the posterior probabilities 
of all the possible (i.e., eight) hypotheses will be summed to 1.0, as shown in the 
example below. 
 
As an example, let’s assume the likelihood of the eight hypotheses 1h  to 8h  are 
respectively 0.80, 0.10, 0.80, 0.10, 0.45, 0.05, 0.05, 0.45, and the prior of the eight 
hypotheses are respectively 0.02, 0.08, 0.17, 0.03, 0.56, 0.04, 0.07, 0.03. Then, the 
marginal likelihood can be computed by Equation (2.8), 
434.0
03.0*45.007.0*05.004.0*05.056.0*45.0
03.0*10.017.0*80.008.0*10.002.0*80.0*)|(


EEP
 
And the posterior probabilities of the eight hypotheses based on the above formulae 
are, respectively 
037.0434.0/02.0*80.0*}),{|( 1  EEhHP
018.0434.0/08.0*10.0*}),{|( 2  EEhHP  
313.0434.0/17.0*80.0*}),{|( 3  EEhHP  
007.0434.0/03.0*10.0*}),{|( 4  EEhHP  
581.0434.0/56.0*45.0*}),{|( 5  EEhHP  
005.0434.0/04.0*05.0*}),{|( 6  EEhHP  
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008.0434.0/07.0*05.0*}),{|( 7  EEhHP  
031.0434.0/03.0*45.0*}),{|( 8  EEhHP  
The sum of the eight posteriors is 
0.1031.0008.0005.0581.0007.0313.0018.0037.0   
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3 Results from the empirical rat research 
With Bayes’ rule, every hypothesis’ posterior probability was estimated for each trial 
in each learning stage of the 7-stage task for each rat. If a rat performed perfectly in 
the task, the posterior probability of the reward-associated perceptual hypothesis 
should soon be monotonically increased to a value close to 1.0 over trials in each 
learning stage, after making a few mistakes (‘unlucky guesses’) in choosing bowls at 
the beginning of the stage. The posterior probabilities of the remaining hypotheses 
should quickly decrease to small values close to 0.0 when the posterior probability of 
the rewarded hypothesis becomes large (close to 1.0). In the following, we used 
Bayesian probability information to explore Bayesian learning criterion, the detailed 
learning process of individual rats, and various spatial response patterns within and 
between rat groups. The computation of posterior probability of each hypothesis in 
each trial for each rat was implemented in MATLAB. 
3.1 p-value versus Bayesian estimate 
The widely used 6-in-a-row learning criterion is based on the calculation of p-value 
for the null hypothesis that the rat is randomly choosing bowls. If the number of 
consecutively correct bowl choices is n  since last wrong choice, then the p-value is 
np 5.0 . In this way, for every rat’s data collected with the 7-stage task, a p-value can 
be calculated for every learning trial.  
 
The Bayesian approach provides a possible alternative learning criterion to determine 
whether a rat has learned the reward-associated stimulus in each learning stage. More 
specifically, if the posterior probability of the reward-associated hypothesis is larger 
than a pre-defined high threshold (e.g., 0.95, meaning that we are 95% confident the 
rat is using the reward-associated stimulus to choose bowls) at certain trial, we would 
consider that the rat has learned the stimulus-reward association. The Bayesian 
learning criterion is based on the calculation of the Bayesian probability of the 
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reward-associated hypothesis. The Bayesian probability of the reward-associated 
hypothesis (called b-value in the following) can be calculated by the Bayesian 
approach for every learning trial. 
 
The degree of correlation between the p-value (actually 1−p) and the b-value was 
computed to evaluate whether the Bayesian learning criterion might be an appropriate 
alternative to the 6-in-a-row criterion. If the correlation is too low, then it is unlikely 
that the Bayesian estimate will be useful, for the p-value is expected to be a good 
criterion for judging when the appropriate learning has occurred. If the correlation is 
too high (e.g., >0.9), then the b-value would be of little worth because it would not 
provide additional information compared to the p-value. The average correlation 
between the b-value and p-value across trials for all rats was found to be moderate 
and positive (mean correlation=0.57, n=93, range within one standard deviation [0.47, 
0.66], corrected by Fisher’s transform, Fisher 1921), suggesting that b-value broadly 
agrees with p-value but is partially independent of it.  
 
However, it is possible that the psychological processes that operate in one (e.g., 
lesioned) group might make the correlation different to that of the other (e.g., control) 
group. Since we want the Bayesian technique to apply equally well to all groups of 
rats, it would be unsettling if the properties changed from group to group. For each rat, 
we obtained the correlation (called P-B correlation) between the p-value and the b-
value over all the trials. As a result, we obtained 46 P-B correlation values for the 46 
lesioned rats, and 47 P-B correlation values for the 47 control rats. Figure 3.1 (left) 
shows the variations of the P-B correlations for the lesion group and control group 
respectively. The P-B correlation for the control group (mean rank=52.57) is 
significantly higher than that for the lesion group (mean rank=41.30), U(97)=819, 
Z=2.01, p=0.044. This is potentially problematic, for it might indicate the properties 
of the Bayesian estimate varies by group. 
 
For each rat, we not only calculated a P-B correlation, but also counted the total 
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number of trials the rat took to finish all the seven stages. Interestingly, higher P-B 
correlations often correspond to a smaller total number of trials, which more likely 
appears in control rats (Figure 3.1, right, filled dots). In contrast, lower P-B 
correlations corresponds to a higher total number of trials, which more likely appears 
in lesioned rats (Figure 3.1, right).  
 
Thus, the apparent difference in P-B correlation between the two groups could be an 
emergent property of the number of trials the rats took to complete the task. A one-
way ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor and number of task trials as a 
covariate was conducted. There was a significant effect of the covariate (F(1,90)=40.2, 
p<0.001, partial eta-squared=0.31), but not of group (F(1,90)=0.00, p=0.98, partial 
eta-squared<0.001). Thus, the apparent difference between the two groups appears to 
reflect merely the number of trials taken to complete the task. 
 
   
Figure 3.1: P-B correlations for both groups. Left: the P-B correlation for lesioned rats 
(left box-plot) is lower than that for control rats (right box-plot); Right: the scatter plot 
between the total number of trials required to complete all seven stages (x-axis) and 
the P-B correlation (y-axis) over all the control and lesioned rats. It should be noted 
that while the relationship between the total number of trials and the P-B correlation 
can be summarised with a linear function, the best fit would probably be a curvilinear 
function 
 
But, a new question arises: why does the correlation between p-value and Bayesian 
estimate (i.e., P-B correlation) decrease with more task trials? We demonstrated above 
that the false positive likelihood of the 6-in-a-row criterion increases over trials 
(Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.974, p<0.01, R2=0.949; Figure 1.3 in Section 1). 
The false positive likelihood (for corresponding total number of trials) and the P-B 
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correlation for each rat were found to be strongly correlated (Pearson correlation 
coefficient =-0.618, p<0.01, R2=0.382; Figure 3.2), as though the association between 
the p- and b-values breaks down as the possibility of false positives inflates over trials.  
 
Figure 3.2: scatter plot of the correlation between p-value and b-value (i.e., P-B 
correlation) and the false positive likelihood corresponding to the total number of 
trials. 
 
To further compare p-value and b-value, we also evaluated their performance in 
predicting whether a rat’s next trial choice is correct based on the current trial’s p- or 
b-value. For the prediction performance of p-value, an individual logistic regression 
was fitted to predict the next trial’s choice correctness based on the current trial’s p-
value over all seven stages’ learning trials for each rat. Similarly, a logistic regression 
was fitted using the b-value for each rat. Both p-value and b-value are significant 
predictors. This resulted in 93 individual regression models for both the p-value 
predictor and b-value predictor, respectively. B-value was the significant predictor 
(p<0.05) in 36 out of 93 rats, and p-value was the significant predictor (p<0.05) in 46 
out of 93 rats. Therefore, b-value as significant predictor is not significantly different 
from p-value as significant predictor (chi-square(1)=2.18, p=0.14, ns.). Furthermore, 
for both predictors, the residual of prediction for each trial was computed as the 
difference between predicted value (between 0 and 1) and the actual outcome (with 
‘1’ for correct choice and ‘0’ for incorrect choice). If p-value and b-value have similar 
prediction performance, the absolute residuals from both predictors should be similar 
when predicting choice correctness for the same trial. The average difference between 
the absolute residual of p-value prediction and the absolute residual of b-value over 
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all rats’ trials is approximately 0.0012 (note that the average difference could be 
maximally 1.0), suggesting that p-value and b-value have similar performance in 
predicting the next trial’s outcome. 
3.2 Bayesian learning criterion is not always consistent with 6-in-a-row 
criterion 
A Bayesian learning criterion can be used to determine whether or not a rat has 
learned the reward-associated stimulus in each learning stage. We know all the 93 
archival rats’ data were collected based on the 6-in-a-row criterion, but would the 
performance of these rats satisfy a Bayesian learning criterion? We computed the 
posterior probability of the reward hypothesis corresponding to the reward-associated 
response pattern on the final trial (when 6-in-a-row correct responses had been made) 
of each stage for each rat (Figure 3.3). As a reasonable Bayesian criterion, we chose a 
posterior probability for the reward hypothesis associated with the reward-associated 
response pattern of 0.95. From these histograms (Figure 3.3), we can see that most 
rats satisfy this Bayesian learning criterion in the CD stage, but about half or fewer 
rats did not satisfy the Bayesian criterion in each of the other stages, respectively. This 
result might indicate that the pattern of the rats’ responding is consistent with multiple 
hypotheses, causing low Bayesian estimate of the correct (rewarded) hypothesis. 
Another possible reason is that the patterns of the rats’ initial responding are 
consistent with non-rewarded response patterns, forcing the posterior probability of 
the hypothesis associated with correct responding to be very low just before the last 
six trials. 
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Figure 3.3: histogram of the last-trial Bayesian posterior probability of the hypothesis 
corresponding to the reward-associated response pattern (called ‘reward hypothesis’ 
henceforth) for each learning stage. Vertical blue line: the position of the Bayesian 
threshold 0.95 on the x-axis. By definition, all animals reached the 6-in-a-row 
criterion on the trial, p<0.016 via null hypothesis testing.  Although the p-values are 
identical, the varying Bayesian posterior probabilities raise the possibility that 
learning was not uniform across rats at each stage. Indeed, note that some of the 
Bayesian posterior probabilities are close to 0. The percentage of rats reaching the 
Bayesian learning criterion was also shown on the top right for each stage. 
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3.3 Bayesian analysis of individual rat data 
Because the Bayesian approach can estimate the probability of each hypothesis for 
each trial in a learning stage, we can analyse the learning process of individual rats for 
each learning stage. Figure 3.4 (top) demonstrates individual analyses of two rats for 
the ED stage. Each curve represents the Bayesian probability of a given hypothesis 
over the course of the trials, except that the black curve represents sum probabilities 
of two hypotheses from the reward-irrelevant perceptual dimension. From the top left 
figure (rat ‘06/188’), we can infer that the rat first focused on the reward-irrelevant 
perceptual dimension (black curve) and then shifted to the other perceptual dimension, 
using the reward-associated stimulus (the solid blue curve) over the unrewarded 
stimulus from that dimension (the dashed blue curve). In comparison, the other rat on 
the right (‘06/190’) probably tried the win-stay spatial response pattern (solid green) 
to choose bowls from the beginning and lasted for quite a few trials before finally 
focusing on the reward-associated response pattern. Note that it is difficult to obtain 
such detailed individual analysis using the traditional frequentist approach, by which 
an estimate of multiple response patterns at each trial is impossible and in general 
only the statistics of groups of data can be obtained. 
 
While we can analyse rats’ individual performances as above, such analysis is 
descriptive rather than quantitative. To quantitatively represent the individual 
performance of rats, we proposed to use the correlation between the posterior 
probabilities of relevant dimension and irrelevant dimension over trials in the ED 
stage, where the posterior probability of relevant dimension is the sum of the posterior 
probabilities of the two perceptual hypotheses in the relevant perceptual dimension, 
and similarly for the posterior probability of irrelevant dimension. Figure 3.4 (bottom) 
shows the histogram of the correlations between posterior probabilities of relevant 
and irrelevant dimensions across trials for both lesion and control groups. As expected, 
the correlations from the above two rats’ data in the ED stage are quite different: one 
having very strong negative correlation, and the other having a weak and positive 
correlation (see the two blue arrows in Figure 3.4). Interestingly, the histogram shows 
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that the distributions of correlations are clearly different between the two groups, 
D47,46 = 0.44, p<0.01 with two sample Kolmogorov-Smimov test. Most control rats 
have negative and strong correlations (Figure 3.4 bottom, histogram in light gray); in 
comparison, most mPFC-lesioned rats have weak correlations (Figure 3.4 bottom, 
shaded histogram). This may indicate that control rats are more likely focused on 
perceptual response patterns in the ED stage, which may have led to strong negative 
correlations between the two perceptual dimension’s probabilities. In comparison, 
lesioned rats may have tried various spatial response patterns more often, such that the 
posterior probabilities of relevant and irrelevant dimensions would become smaller 
and more likely have similar trends or no obvious trends across trials, which would 
then cause either positive correlations or null correlations.   
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Figure 3.4: Bayesian analysis of individual performance at the ED shift stage, in 
which normal rats are expected to respond initially to the old perceptual dimension 
before learning that the previously unattended perceptual dimension is now relevant. 
One normal rat 06/188 (top left) responded in a way that was consistent with 
attending to the irrelevant perceptual dimension (black curve) initially and then 
shifting to the rewarded response pattern (solid blue curve), thus causing a strong 
negative correlation between Bayesian probability of reward and the irrelevant 
dimension across trials (see the blue arrow from top left to bottom). In contrast, 
another normal rat 06/190 (top right) used an apparent win-stay response pattern 
(solid green) rather than a response pattern according to the previously attended 
perceptual dimension. Thus, the hypothesis linked with the previously attended 
perceptual dimension had a posterior probability close to 0, and consequently, a low 
correlation between Bayesian estimates of the relevant and irrelevant dimensions (see 
the blue arrow from top right to bottom). Bottom: stacked histogram; around half of 
the control rats have a strong negative correlation between Bayesian probabilities of 
relevant and irrelevant dimensions in the ED stage, while the majority (65%) of 
lesioned rats have weak correlations. Such difference in the correlation between 
control and lesioned rats suggests that lesioned rats used other response patterns than 
simply tracking the previously attended perceptual dimension, and thus, the 
impairment in those rats might not have been due to being unable to shift attentional 
set per se. 
3.4 Both lesioned and normal rats tried multiple spatial response patterns 
Based on individual analysis, we extracted more information about the rats’ response 
patterns that could not be obtained from the original frequentist approach applied to 
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these data. We know that rats have strong spatial memory and therefore can use 
spatial patterns in learning. If a rat used a reward-irrelevant (including spatial) 
response pattern systematically, the rat would receive reward 50% of the time. At this 
low rate of reinforcement, it is less likely that the posterior probability of the reward-
irrelevant hypothesis will increase as high as 0.95. Therefore, we used a moderately 
high value (i.e., 0.6 here) to infer if a rat used spatial (therefore reward-irrelevant) 
response patterns, i.e., if the Bayesian posterior probability of a spatial response 
pattern is larger than 0.6 in a trial, we would consider that the rat used the spatial 
response pattern to make choice in the trial. Note that while Bayesian analysis result 
was used to determine whether a rat tried spatial patterns, the criterion to determine 
whether a rat tried spatial patterns is non-Bayesian. This is because Bayesian analysis 
can only provide the probability of trying a spatial hypothesis rather than make a 
decision whether a rat tried the specific hypothesis. In other words, the decision 
making here (i.e., whether a rat tried a specific spatial response pattern) is non-
Bayesian. With this criterion (i.e., a rat tried the spatial response pattern if the 
posterior of the spatial hypothesis is larger than 0.6), we found that each rat may have 
tried two to four spatial response patterns. Table 3.1 shows that each spatial response 
pattern appears to have been used by the majority of both lesioned and control rats. In 
particular, spatial perseveration was used by most lesioned and control rats. However, 
Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit Test shows there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of lesioned rats using different spatial response patterns (Chi-
Square(3)=1.08, n.s.; Table 3.1, first row), and similarly for the control rats (Chi-
Square(3)=3.60, n.s.; Table 3.1, second row). On the other hand, the frequencies of 
rats using spatial alternation are significantly different between groups (Chi-Square(1) 
= 9.40, p<0.01; Table 3.1, second column), while the frequencies are not significantly 
different between groups for each of the other three spatial response patterns.  
 
Although the extensive use of spatial response patterns complicates the analysis of the 
attentional set-shifting task trying to assess rats’ performance on ID and ED set-
shifting ability, it may also provide additional information about rats’ learning. For 
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instance, the use of spatial response patterns might be a very good indicator that the 
rat doesn’t have confidence about where the reward can be found.  
 
Table 3.1: number (%s) of rats using each spatial response patterns in the 7-stage task. 
We consider that a rat used a spatial response pattern if the posterior probability of the 
corresponding spatial hypothesis was larger than 0.6 on any learning trial of the task.  
 Alternation Perseveration Win-stay Win-shift 
Lesioned rats  
(out of 46) 
41  
(89%) 
44  
(96%) 
35  
(76%) 
39 
(85%) 
Control rats  
(out of 47) 
29 
(62%) 
42 
(89%) 
30 
(64%) 
39 
(83%) 
 
 
3.5 Lesioned rats tried more spatial trials in ED stage than normal rats 
We have demonstrated that rats probably used spatial response patterns to choose 
bowls during learning. Here we also would like to know how long they tried spatial 
response patterns and whether lesion is associated with the length of spatial patterns, 
particularly in the ED stage. From previous studies, we already know mPFC-lesioned 
rats take longer to learn the ED stage, as seen from the first pair of bars in Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5 (middle pair of bars) also shows that lesioned rats use spatial response 
patterns on significantly more trials; m=1.62, sd=2.36 for control group, m=6.41, 
sd=5.59 for lesion group, t(91)=̶5.41, p<0.001, d=0.57. Interestingly, when we 
exclude such spatial trials (where rats chose bowls using spatial response patterns) 
from the total trials of the ED stage for each rat, we found there is no significant 
difference between both groups of rats on trying other patterns; m=11.34, sd=4.47 for 
control group, m=13.45, sd=6.05 for lesion group, t(91)=̶1.92, p=0.058, ns. This 
suggests that the difference in ED trials between the two groups is mainly from the 
difference in the number of spatial trials used by both groups.  
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Figure 3.5: number of spatial trials in ED is different between two groups. 
3.6 Lesioned rats tried more spatial trials in reversal stages than normal rats 
Besides the ED stage, we also compared the length of spatial response patterns for 
other stages in the 7-stage task. Two-way ANOVA shows that the number of spatial 
trials used by lesioned rats are significantly higher than that in control rats (Figure 
3.6), F(1,637)=50.51, p<0.05, partial η2=0.073. Similarly, the proportion of spatial 
trials (relative to the total number of trials within each stage) used by lesioned rats are 
also significantly higher than that in control rats (Figure 3.7), F(1,637)=35.99, p<0.05, 
partial η2=0.053. 
 
Independent two-sample t-tests with Dunn-Sidak correction showed that the number 
of spatial trials in each reversal stage is significantly higher in lesioned rats than that 
in control rats (Figure 3.6); t(91)=-2.20, p<0.05, d=0.23 for REV1, t(91)=-2.64, 
p<0.05, d=0.28 for REV2, t(91)=-3.17, p<0.05, d=0.33 for REV3. Similarly, an 
independent two-sample T-test with Dunn-Sidak correction shows that the proportion 
of spatial trials from both REV2 and REV3 are significantly higher in lesioned rats 
than those in control rats (Figure 3.7), t(91)=-2.31, p<0.05, d=0.24 for REV2 and 
t(91)=-3.01, p<0.05, d=0.32 for REV3, while the proportion of spatial trials from 
REV1 is not significantly different between the two groups, t(91)=-1.38, p=0.23, ns. 
These results suggest that lesioned rats used longer spatial response patterns in 
learning than control rats, particularly in the latter two reversal stages.  
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Figure 3.6: number of spatial trials within each stage for both control and lesion 
groups. Lesioned rats used significantly more spatial trials than control rats in all three 
reversal stages as well as the ED stage. 
 
Figure 3.7: the proportion of spatial trials relative to the total number of trials within 
each stage for both control and lesion groups. Lesioned rats used a significantly 
higher proportion of spatial trials than control rats in the latter two reversal stages 
(REV2 and REV3), as well as the ED stage. 
3.7 Association between length of spatial pattern and learning 
Considering rats have widely used spatial response patterns to choose bowls in 
learning, it would be interesting to investigate the association between the number of 
spatial trials and the length of learning for each stage. Table 3.2 (first row) shows that 
there are strong correlations between the number of spatial trials and the total number 
of trials within each stage for the lesion group. That means, the more trials where 
lesioned rats used spatial response patterns to choose bowls within a stage, the more 
trials spent to finish that stage. In comparison, the correlations are weaker in the 
control group than those in the lesion group (Table 3.2, second row). Also see Figure 
3.8 for examples about the correlations for each group. 
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Table 3.2: correlations between the number of spatial trials and the total number of 
trials within each stage or with the combination of all stages, for both the lesion group 
(46 rats) and control group (47 rats). All the correlations are significant (p<0.05). 
Besides Pearson’s correlation coefficient R, Spearman’s rho (in parentheses) was also 
reported due to heteroscedasticity of spatial trials in each stage. 
 All 
stages 
SD CD REV1 ID REV2 ED REV3 
Lesion 
group 
0.780 
(0.649) 
0.805 
(0.777) 
0.751 
(0.614) 
0.807 
(0.655) 
0.794 
(0.619) 
0.761 
(0.620) 
0.680 
(0.664) 
0.877 
(0.702) 
Control 
group 
0.464 
(0.441) 
0.680 
(0.622) 
0.616 
(0.520) 
0.508 
(0.293) 
0.610 
(0.568) 
0.530 
(0.551) 
0.367 
(0.366) 
0.425 
(0.481) 
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Figure 3.8: scatter plots to show the correlations between the number of spatial trials 
and the total number of trials to finish the REV1 stage (first column) and ED stage 
(second column), for 46 lesion rats (first row) and 47 control rats (second row) 
respectively. The correlations are weaker in the control group than in the lesion group. 
See Table 3.2 for the complete set of correlations. 
3.8 First spatial response patterns at the ED are different between two rat 
groups 
With a Bayesian analysis, not only the length of spatial response patterns, but also the 
types of spatial response patterns can be analysed.  Specifically, the type of first 
spatial hypotheses that rats use in the ED stage can be assessed. Figure 3.9 shows that 
the frequency distribution of first spatial response patterns is significantly different 
between control and lesion groups, Chi-square(4)=16.53, p<0.01. Lesioned rats are 
inclined to use spatial perseveration before other spatial patterns (including spatial 
alternation, win-stay, and win-shift) in the ED stage, while the majority of control rats 
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did not try any spatial patterns in the ED stage. 
 
Figure 3.9: frequency of first spatial patterns used in both lesion and control groups. 
Most control rats did not use any spatial response patterns, while lesioned rats 
predominantly used spatial perseveration in choosing bowls. The total number of rats 
are similar between two groups, i.e., 47 control rats and 46 lesioned rats. 
3.9 Overtraining reversal effect 
When an animal continues to be trained (e.g., overtrained over 50 trials) after reaching 
a learning criterion (e.g., 6-in-a-row) in one learning stage, the animal would more 
likely learn faster in the subsequent reversal learning stage compared to those animals 
without being over-trained. This phenomenon is called the overtraining reversal effect 
(Reid, 1953; Mackintosh, 1974). The overtraining reversal effect is associated with 
‘difficult’ learning, i.e., learning where there are distractions (irrelevant dimensions). 
So what overtraining does is to strengthen attentional set, by providing more 
experience of relevant vs irrelevant dimensions. During a reversal where there is no 
overtraining, a subject would likely have just a weak (or no) attentional set, and the 
stimuli from the irrelevant dimension would be partially reinforced before reversal 
(Mackintosh, 1974). In this case, in the reversal stage, once the subject found the 
previously correct stimulus becomes incorrect, the partial reinforcement of the 
irrelevant-dimension stimuli would make the subject likely choose to try an 
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irrelevant-dimension stimulus over the previously incorrect stimulus within the 
relevant dimension. However, if the subject is over-trained before the reversal, the 
subject would likely attend to the relevant dimension, knowing that the stimuli from 
the irrelevant dimension are irrelevant to reward. In other words, the partial 
reinforcement of irrelevant-dimension stimuli would be largely reduced by the 
overtraining. In this case, in the reversal stage, once the subject found the previously 
correct stimulus does not correspond to reward, the subject would more likely try the 
previously incorrect but currently correct stimulus within the relevant dimension 
rather than irrelevant-dimension stimuli. As a result, overtraining would make the 
subject take fewer errors to learn the reversal.  
 
While the rats performing the 7-stage task were not explicitly over-trained when 
judged by 6-in-a-row criterion, some rats may have received more training than 
necessary if judged by the Bayesian learning criterion. Here, we explored whether an 
apparent overtraining reversal effect exists using the new Bayesian learning criterion 
on the archival rats’ data.  
 
Although rats were not explicitly overtrained, the rats received more training on the 
correct stimulus prior to the first reversal stage REV1 than prior to the latter two 
reversal stages REV2 and REV3, because food reward was associated with the same 
stimulus in both the SD and CD stages before REV1. Here, the degree of training 
before the REV1 stage is represented by the number of trials of which the Bayesian 
probability of the reward-associated hypothesis is larger than 0.95 in the previous SD 
and CD stages. Similarly, the degree of training before REV2 and REV3 was 
collected from their preceding stages, ID and ED, respectively. Figure 3.10 (first row) 
shows there is a slight trend of overtraining reversal effect for REV1 stage in both 
lesioned and control groups. In comparison, such a slight trend decreased or 
disappeared for the other two reversal stages particularly for the control group (Figure 
3.10, second and third rows), probably because there is relatively less training before 
those two reversal stages.  
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Figure 3.10: correlations between the trials of a reversal stage (y-axis) and the degree 
of training in the previous stage (x-axis), for both the control group (left column, 47 
rats) and lesion group (right column, 46 rats). There is slight overtraining reversal 
effect in the first reversal stage REV1 (first row) for both groups. In each figure, R is 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, and rho is Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. 
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4 Discussion on Bayesian analysis of rat data 
Building on the initial exploration of a Bayesian analysis in an attentional set-shifting 
task in my undergraduate project, I have extended and refined the Bayesian approach 
in both the likelihood function and the prior function. Compared to the traditional 
frequentist approach, Bayesian analysis provides us with detailed information about 
what response patterns may have been tried in each learning trial for each rat. Based 
on the individual analysis, we found that all rats used intermittent spatial patterns of 
responding while they were learning the stimulus-reward associations, and mPFC-
lesioned rats used more spatial trials than control rats in ED and reversal stages. In 
addition, the appropriateness of the Bayesian learning criterion was validated on real 
7-stage data, although the Bayesian learning criterion does not always match with the 
frequentist 6-in-a-row criterion in determining the time point at which rats learned the 
correct stimulus-reward association.  
4.1 Bayesian approach 
The observations regarding whether the rat chooses to dig after encountering only one, 
or both, bowls has been appropriately embedded into the likelihood function. If a rat 
is using a spatial response pattern to choose bowls, it would know which bowl to dig 
in without observing stimuli in the bowls, and therefore, it would more likely directly 
go to the to-be-dug bowl. As a result, the rat would more likely dig in the first bowl it 
encountered. In comparison, if a rat is using a particular perceptual response pattern to 
choose bowls, the rat cannot decide to choose which bowl to dig in before observing 
the stimuli in bowls. This is because the stimulus associated with the particular 
perceptual response pattern could be in either bowl. As a result, if the rat rejects the 
first bowl it encounters, it is more likely using a perceptual response pattern to choose 
bowls. For the prior function, a lower-bound prior value is pre-defined for all 
hypotheses to match the intuition of having a minimum confidence for any hypothesis. 
With these refinements of the Bayesian analysis from my undergraduate thesis, it is 
expected that the posterior probability of each hypothesis in each trial is more 
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accurate than the Bayesian analysis without using the one/both bowls observation. 
This has been partially confirmed with simulated rat data (see Section 5.4). 
 
Recently, Lloyd and Leslie (2013) proposed a complex Bayesian model which 
explicitly represented rats’ decision-making processes (e.g., decide which response 
pattern to use for bowl choice in each trial) in order to simulate rat behaviour in 
reversal learning. They modelled the rats’ learning and decision-making processes 
from the perspective of the animals. Therefore, their model could help people 
understand the neural mechanism of how rats learn and make decisions in reversal 
learning. Similarly, Rygula et al. (2015) applied an existing reinforcement learning 
model to estimate the probability of marmosets choosing one of two stimuli in simple 
discriminative learning and reversal learning. Costa et al. (2015) developed a complex 
Bayesian model to explicitly estimate the probability that rhesus monkeys reversed 
choice strategy based on the monkeys’ choices at each trial in a reversal learning task. 
Both Rygula’s and Costa’s methods are from the perspective of the animals and can 
only estimate the probability of two task-specific hypotheses. 
 
In contrast, our Bayesian approach is used to describe rats’ patterns of responding 
from the perspective of experimenters, not only in reversal learning but also for both 
ID and ED shift stages. In essence, the approach presented here can be considered a 
kind of template matching in which the Bayesian posterior probability estimate 
quantifies the degree to which the empirical response pattern (i.e., the observation) 
matches the idealised pattern associated with a given hypothesis. Our approach is 
based on the pure Bayes rule and was used to analyse the archival data of rats’ 
behaviour and to estimate the probability of multiple (>2) spatial and perceptual 
hypotheses in each learning trial for each rat, not only for simple discrimination but 
also for compound discrimination learning. By contrast, the other methods do not 
attempt to analyse data and learning behaviour, but were mainly developed to 
simulate rats’ reversal learning behaviour, or estimate animals’ internal decision 
making. Overall, our Bayesian approach was developed for a unique and different 
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research aim. 
4.2 Bayesian learning criterion 
The most direct application of Bayesian analysis is to create a new learning criterion 
based on the estimated Bayesian probability (i.e., posterior probability) of the reward- 
associated perceptual hypothesis for each discriminative learning stage. When a rat 
has learned the correct association between the stimuli in the bowls and reward, the 
Bayesian probability of the reward-associated perceptual hypothesis in general can 
quickly increase to a high value (e.g., 0.95) in a few trials. Even in the false negative 
conditions under which the rat can be judged to have learned the discrimination but 
the 6-correct-choice-in-a-row criterion is not satisfied (e.g., 10-out-of-12-correct-
choice, Brooks et al., 2012), the Bayesian probability will tend to reach a high value 
(see section 5.3 for empirical evidence). The moderate correlation between the p-
value (used for 6-in-a-row criterion) and the b-value (used for Bayesian criterion) 
suggests that b-value broadly agrees with p-value but is partially independent of it, 
raising the possibility that the Bayesian criterion provides different, and perhaps more 
accurate, information about the subjects’ response patterns (Section 3.1). Therefore, 
by comparing the Bayesian probability of the reward-associated hypothesis with the 
pre-set high threshold value (0.95) in each learning trial, we can determine whether or 
not the rat has learned the stimulus-reward association in a timely manner.  
 
Theoretically, the Bayesian learning criterion is also a better choice when there are 
more than two hypotheses to be tested simultaneously. It is not optimal to accept the 
hypothesis that rats use the reward-associated stimulus to choose bowls by just 
rejecting the null hypothesis that rats use random-guess to choose bowls, because 
there are other reward-irrelevant spatial and perceptual response patterns that are 
plausible. This means the traditional null-versus-alternative hypothesis testing is 
severely limited as a means to decide the point at which a rat has learned the stimulus-
reward association. Instead, the probability of every plausible reward-irrelevant 
hypothesis needs to be estimated and rejected in order to accept the reward-relevant 
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hypothesis. This can be achieved by using a Bayesian approach as presented here. 
 
With the archival rats’ 7-stage task data, we found that about half or fewer rats did not 
satisfy the Bayesian learning criterion in every stage, except the CD stage. In the CD 
stage, the reward-associated stimulus is not changed compared to the previous SD 
stage. Therefore, rats can often easily focus on the same reward-associated stimulus 
from the beginning of the CD stage. Consistently, in most rats the Bayesian criterion 
would have been satisfied before fulfilling the 6-in-a-row criterion within the CD 
stage. In this case, the 6-correct-trials-in-a-row criterion (Birrell & Brown, 2000; 
Chase et al., 2012) is stricter than the Bayesian criterion, and this would suggest the 
possibility of rat training that is more than necessary. In contrast, in the reversal 
learning stages, rats need to first suppress the tendency to choose bowls using the 
previously rewarded (but currently un-rewarded) stimulus and then change to 
establish a new association between a previously un-rewarded stimulus and the food 
reward. Because of this difficulty, rats often take more trials, and try various incorrect 
hypotheses before finding the new correct response pattern. To make the new 
association stable enough, rats may need relatively more trials to strengthen the new 
association, and the Bayesian analysis presented here suggests there might have been 
under-training in reversal stages. In addition, for the rats’ data which did not satisfy 
Bayesian criterion in the ID and ED stages, the rats may happen to respond correctly 
(i.e., a false positive) in last six trials while actually using alternative response 
patterns for bowl choice. In this case, the Bayesian criterion suggests more trials 
would be necessary to rule out such alternative and incorrect hypotheses. The fact that 
different criteria – Bayesian and 6-correct-trials-in-a-row – differ in either direction 
with respect to whether learning has occurred indicates that this is not simply a 
difference in the ‘strictness’ of the criterion but rather about what can be inferred 
about cognition from analysis of patterns of behavioural responses.  
4.3 Bayesian analysis of individual rat’s performance 
Besides potentially using Bayesian methods to define a learning criterion, individual 
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analysis of rats’ task performance is another advantage of the Bayesian approach. 
More specifically, the Bayesian approach can determine which response patterns have 
been tried to choose bowls in each stage for each rat. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first time a detailed learning profile has been estimated for each rat run in 
an attentional set-shifting task. Such detailed individual analysis could also be 
obtained by testing multiple null hypotheses with the frequentist approach. However, 
the frequentist approach is vulnerable to false positives (and false negatives) in 
evaluating multiple null hypotheses over multiple trials. As a result, the frequentist 
approach has not been used to obtain detailed individual analysis of rat’s performance, 
but only to obtain the statistics of groups of rats’ data (Birrell & Brown, 2000; Roberts 
et al., 1988). Additionally, individual analysis provided by the Bayesian approach 
might be useful when the sample size is low, e.g., because of the financial and ethical 
costs of using nonhuman primates (e.g., Roberts et al., 1988), or in case studies of 
neurological or psychiatric patients (e.g., Prentice et al., 2008; Lange et al., 2016). 
 
Furthermore, we proposed a quantitative measure, i.e., the correlation between the 
posterior probabilities of relevant dimension and irrelevant dimension over trials 
within a stage, to quantify the transition from responding to the old dimension to the 
new one. When a rat focuses on perceptual response patterns for bowl choice, the 
correlation would be negative and strong particularly at the start of the stage. Instead, 
if a rat tries various spatial response patterns during learning, the correlation would be 
more likely positive and/or weak. We have found that the distributions of such 
correlations over rats are different between intact and neurologically impaired rats. 
Most control rats have strong and negative correlations in the ED stage, while most 
mPFC-lesioned rats have weak or positive correlations in ED. This suggests that most 
control rats may have focused on perceptual dimensions during ED learning, while 
most mPFC-lesioned rats may not.  
 
This quantitative measure could be potentially used to explore the degree of set-
formation for individual rats. Since the purpose of the ED stage is to explore the rats’ 
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ability to shift from the previously formed attentional set to a new attentional set, the 
ED stage can only test set-shifting ability if a set has been well-formed. To date, the 
significant difference in the number of learning trials between the ID and the ED stage 
at the group level is used to support the idea that rats have formed attentional set 
before the ED stage (Birrell & Brown, 2000; Brown & Tait, 2016; Roberts et al., 
1988). The rationale behind this traditional criterion is that old learning would 
interfere with new learning as the context changes such that rats would require more 
effort (i.e., an increased number of trials) to finish the new learning if attentional set is 
formed in the old learning. However, the group-level difference between ID and ED 
trials does not mean each rat takes more trials in the ED stage compared to in the ID 
stage. Actually, six out of 46 lesioned rats and 17 out of 47 control rats took either 
equivalent or fewer trials in the ED stage compared to the ID stage. More importantly, 
the fact that a rat has more ED trials than ID trials does not necessarily mean that the 
rat had formed the attentional set. If a rat has a well-formed attentional set before the 
ED stage, the rat should choose bowls based on the stimuli within the previously 
relevant but currently irrelevant dimension at the beginning of the ED stage, 
increasing the probability of the irrelevant dimension and decreasing the probability 
of the relevant dimension that is associated with reward. Also, in the last six trials 
within the ED stage where rats almost likely tried the rewarded stimulus response, the 
probability of the relevant dimension often increases, while the probability of 
irrelevant dimension response will be kept at small values or even further decrease. 
Considering the contrary changes of two dimensions’ probabilities at the beginning 
and the end of the ED stage, any rat with good set-formation would probably have a 
negative and often strong correlation between the two dimensions’ probabilities 
within the ED stage. In contrast, rats without robust set-formation would likely lead to 
a weak or positive correlation within the ED stage (see Figure 3.4 as an example). 
This quantitative measure could potentially be used to determine whether each rat has 
a well-formed attentional set for further data analysis about ED performance.  
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4.4 Rats tried spatial response patterns in both control and lesioned groups 
Based on the individual analysis of each rat’s learning process, we found that both 
lesioned and normal rats tried multiple types of spatial response patterns in the 7-stage 
task, with spatial perseveration slightly more common than the other three spatial 
response patterns. Foraging for food is an inherently spatial task and rats are very 
adept in mapping their environment (Geva-Sagiv et al., 2015). In the natural 
environment, spatial memory might allow the rat to forage more efficiently by 
avoiding reliance on perceptual cues that are proximal to the potential food sources.  
In effect, if the rat has a spatial map, it might not need to know the perceptual 
characteristics of a given location. Furthermore, in this task, the rat must dig in one of 
two bowls on each trial, even before it knows which one contains food. The initial 
‘look and see’ that characterises at least the first trial, and likely a few more, may be 
based on a spatial choice, but that does not mean that the rat is (necessarily) not 
attending to the perceptual aspects of the bowl in which it is digging. Obviously, it is 
never possible to ‘know’ what the rat knows or thinks. We can only observe behaviour 
or neural information processing. However, the rapidity with which a rat changes its 
behaviour from following a spatial behavioural pattern to responding consistently to 
the correct stimulus, strongly suggests that it is learning (acquiring information) about 
the correct stimulus even while making initial bowl selections based on spatial 
properties. 
4.5 Lesioned rats tried spatial patterns for more trials than control rats 
Again, based on individual analysis of each rat’s performance, we also found that 
mPFC-lesioned rats spent more trials using spatial response patterns for bowl choice 
than control rats, and interestingly, the number of remaining ED trials, after excluding 
spatial trials, was similar for the lesion and control groups. In the ED stage, rats need 
to disengage from the old attentional set (i.e., the previously relevant but currently 
irrelevant dimension) and then learn a new attentional set. During the disengagement 
process, rats would probably focus on the two stimuli of the previously rewarded 
perceptual dimension. After disengagement, rats may try various response patterns, 
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including spatial response patterns, in order to learn the association between food 
reward and the new dimension. Therefore, the result we found here may indicate that 
the lesion of mPFC may mainly affect rats’ ability to attend to or associate with the 
new reward-relevant dimension (e.g., mPFC-lesioned rats might react to uncertainty 
differently by requiring more evidence before they commit to reward hypothesis), 
rather than affect disengagement from the old dimensional set.  
 
This is inconsistent with the previous study’s result showing that mPFC-inactivation 
mainly caused perseveration errors in the shift stage (Floresco et al., 2008). Such 
inconsistency may come from multiple factors. The previous study is based on a 
lever-pressing task which requires rats to shift from visual cue discrimination to 
position discrimination, whereas our data is from the 7-stage task which requires rats 
to shift from a discriminating medium to discriminating odours (or from odours to 
medium). In the lever-pressing task, the same visual stimuli were still there and 
spatial response is relevant with reward in the shift stage, while the medium and 
odour stimuli in the ED stage of the 7-stage task are novel and have not appeared in 
previous stages, and spatial response patterns are never usable to solve the 
discrimination in the 7-stage task. In the lever-pressing task, it is expected that rats 
would always get perseverative errors in the shift stage because the previously 
reward-relevant stimulus (not just dimension) was still present in the shift stage. The 
differences in types of discrimination learning and in novelty of stimuli in the ED 
stage between the two tasks may somehow interact with the effect of mPFC lesion on 
ED shift, causing different difficulties during the rat’s learning. Another factor may 
come from the data collection procedure. In the first four trials of each learning stage 
in the 7-stage task, each rat was allowed to dig the other bowl if it dug in the first, 
unrewarded bowl (Tait et al., 2014). This special step may make rats more quickly 
disengage from the previously relevant but currently irrelevant dimension, thus 
suppressing the perseverative errors that rats would have made. From this perspective, 
the lack of mPFC lesion effect on perseverative errors from the Bayesian analysis 
may be potentially from the special data collection step during the first four trials in 
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the ED stage. Further study without this step in data collection with the 7-stage task 
may help clarify whether mPFC lesion really affects perseverative errors or not.  
 
Interestingly, besides the ED stage, we also found that lesioned rats spent more trials 
using spatial response patterns than control rats, particularly in the latter two reversal 
stages in the 7-stage task. Together with the above finding for the ED stage, this 
finding suggests that lesions of mPFC may affect rats’ ability to not only attend to the 
previously irrelevant perceptual dimension in the ED shift, but also attend to the 
previous unrewarded but currently rewarded stimulus of the same perceptual 
dimension in reversal learning. This again is not consistent with previous findings that 
mPFC lesion only affects rat’s or mice’s ED shift performance (Birrell & Brown, 
2000; Bissonette et al., 2008; Brown & Tait, 2016). However, initial analysis of our 
large set of rats’ data (46 lesioned and 47 controls) did show that lesioned rats spent 
significantly more trials completing not only the ED stage but also the latter reversal 
stages than control rats. Therefore, that previous studies did not find the effects of 
mPFC lesions on reversal learning might have been due to insufficient statistical 
power given the modest effect size. Alternatively, there might be other noise factors 
which caused such inconsistency between our findings and previous studies which 
also used the 7-stage task for data collection, such as the location and size of the 
lesions. Therefore, further study particularly with a large dataset is necessary to 
clarify how mPFC lesion can really potentially affect reversal learning in compound 
discrimination. 
 
Following the investigation of spatial response patterns, we also found that there are 
strong correlations between the number of spatial trials and the total number of trials 
within each stage for the lesion group. This is reasonable, because when rats took 
longer to find the correct hypothesis, they would likely use various spatial response 
patterns in more learning trials. Unexpectedly, the same rationale does not seem valid 
for control rats, because we found the correlations between the number of spatial trials 
and stage trials are clearly weaker, but still statistically significant. One possibility is 
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that normal rats may more flexibly change hypotheses during learning, such that 
spatial response patterns used by normal rats are more difficult to estimate than those 
used by lesioned rats. 
4.6 First spatial hypothesis in ED 
Bayesian analysis of individual rats’ performance can also help answer certain 
questions of special interest from researchers. One interesting question is about the 
type of first spatial response pattern rats used in the ED stage. With Bayesian analysis, 
we found lesioned rats more likely tried spatial perseveration than the other three 
spatial response patterns, while most control rats did not try any spatial response 
pattern at all in the ED stage. The limited number of control rats which tried spatial 
response patterns showed a slight preference for win-shift compared to the other three 
spatial response patterns in bowl choice. Since spatial perseveration requires less 
cognitive burden than win-shift, and the low use of spatial response patterns in most 
control rats may come from quick (flexible) changes between different response 
patterns for bowl choice, the above finding provides a different type of evidence to 
support the idea that control rats are more cognitively flexible than lesioned rats.  
4.7 Overtraining reversal effect 
Besides the powerful applications of the proposed Bayesian approach in various 
individual, and subsequent group-level, analyses, we also tried to explore the 
traditional overtraining reversal effect (Reid, 1953; Mackintosh, 1974) in the 7-stage 
task data, where the degree of apparent overtraining before a reversal stage is 
represented by the number of trials after reaching the Bayesian criterion. Overall, we 
did not find an overtraining reversal effect, although there is a slight trend for the first 
reversal stage (REV1) in both groups. This finding seems to be inconsistent with the 
traditional overtraining reversal effect (Reid, 1953; Mackintosh, 1974). However, the 
traditional overtraining reversal effect is obtained based on explicit overtraining of 
rats after reaching a learning criterion (e.g., 6-correct-in-a-row). In comparison, for 
the archival data we analysed, each rat was stopped immediately after meeting the 6-
correct-in-a-row criterion, therefore largely limiting the degree of potential 
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overtraining. As a result, it is plausible not to find the overtraining reversal effect from 
the less likely overtrained rats’ data. This rationale is supported by the slight trend of 
apparent overtraining reversal effect in the first reversal stage, where rats may have 
received slightly more apparent overtraining before the reversal stage (than those 
before the latter reversal stages) because the same reward-associated stimulus was 
used in both SD and CD stages.  
4.8 Summary 
In summary, all the above results and discussions have shown the Bayesian approach 
can extract richer information from set-shifting task data, particularly based on 
individual analysis of rats’ performance. What is important is that these results are not 
just about the data from 93 rats undertaking the 7-stage task. The results are about 
how we infer what approach animals take in learning. We used this large dataset and 
results to demonstrate the general applications of Bayesian analysis that can be used 
in other learning situations. 
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5 Bayesian analysis of simulated data 
In the 7-stage task, we never know for certain the response patterns a given rat uses to 
choose bowls at each trial. We can only estimate the probability of corresponding 
hypotheses at each trial by the proposed Bayesian approach. Therefore, one 
fundamental question arises: does a higher Bayesian estimate of a hypothesis really 
indicate the rat is using the corresponding response pattern to make its choices? 
 
To answer this question, virtual rat behaviour can be simulated and then analysed by 
the proposed Bayesian approach. The basic idea of simulation is to assume that we 
know what sequence of response patterns a virtual rat would use to learn a virtual 
stage (no matter what the stage is). Then together with the real pre-determined bowl 
designs (which bowls contains which stimuli in each trial), any sequence of known 
response patterns would generate simulated (virtual) stage data. Once we get 
simulation data, we can apply the Bayesian analysis to the simulated data to estimate 
Bayesian probabilities for each hypothesis associated with a specific response pattern 
at each (virtual) trial in the simulation data. The Bayesian analysis result can then be 
compared with the ground-truth response patterns underlying the simulated data to 
evaluate the validity of the Bayesian approach. 
5.1 Individual analysis on simulated data 
One concern regarding the Bayesian analysis of individual rats’ performance is 
whether a high Bayesian probability of a spatial hypothesis really indicates that the rat 
used the corresponding spatial response pattern to dig in the bowls. To answer this 
question, we assume we know virtual rats would use a series of spatial response 
patterns followed by six reward-relevant hypotheses to learn a stage (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1: a series of known ‘ground-truth’ response patterns used to generate 
simulation data. ‘Random’ means the virtual rat would randomly dig in either the left 
or the right bowl. 
Trials 1 2-5 6-11 12-15 16-19 20-25 
Hypothesis Random Spatial 
perseveration  
Win-stay Spatial 
alternation 
Win-shift Rewarded 
stimulus 
 
 
Based on the ground-truth response pattern series and the same pre-determined bowl 
designs as used in real data collection, a simulation observation can be generated 
(Figure 5.1). For example, if spatial perseveration is the ground-truth response pattern 
for the 5th trial, then the side choice on this trial will be the same as that in the 
previous (4th) trial, e.g., the left side in Figure 5.1. If the reward is in the chosen bowl, 
the rat would get the reward; otherwise not (as shown in Figure 5.1). This will 
generate an observation about which bowl contains which stimuli, which bowl 
contains a food reward, which bowl was chosen, and whether the rat got a reward or 
not for the 5th simulated trial.  
 
So far, only the observation about 1st/2nd bowl choice (i.e., digging in the first bowl 
the rat approached, or rejecting that and investigating the second bowl before making 
a response) remains to be simulated for each trial. To generate the 1st/2nd observation 
for the k-th trial, if the kth response pattern in the known response pattern series is a 
spatial one, the virtual rat would dig in the 1st bowl with probability 0.9 and or reject 
the 1st bowl and investigate the 2nd bowl with probability 0.1 (Figure 5.1); otherwise, 
if the kth response pattern is perceptual, the virtual rat would dig in, or reject, the 1st 
bowl equally with probability 0.5. This way to generate 1st/2nd observation is 
consistent with the parameter setting in the likelihood function of the Bayesian model.  
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Figure 5.1: an example of generating a simulated observation for a learning trial. The 
configuration of medium and odour in each bowl for the 5th trial and food-associated 
stimulus (O4) were directly obtained from the pre-determined bowl designs as used 
traditionally in the ID stage of the 7-stage task. If we know that the virtual rat would 
use spatial perseveration to choose a bowl at the 5th trial (Table 5.1), and the rat chose 
the left bowl at the previous trial (upper figure), then the simulated choice at the 5th 
trial would be the left bowl (lower left or lower right figure). Since the food reward is 
associated with odour O4 (bold blue) and it is not in the chosen (left) bowl, the rat did 
not get reward at the 5th trial. Because the rat would use spatial perseveration to 
choose the bowl at the 5th trial, the rat would more probably (90%) go to dig in the left 
bowl directly rather than approach the right bowl and then go to dig in the left bowl. 
Therefore, the simulated observation would be like the lower left figure with 
probability 90% and like the lower right figure with probability 10%. 
 
With the above process, one simulation was generated for the sequence of known 
response patterns and then analysed by our Bayesian model. Figure 5.2 is an example 
of a Bayesian analysis result, which supports the idea that high (e.g., larger than 0.6) 
probability of a spatial hypothesis does indicate that the rat may really be using the 
corresponding spatial response pattern to choose bowls.  
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Figure 5.2: Bayesian probability of each hypothesis over trials of a simulation when 
the virtual rat used spatial perseveration (dotted red), win-stay (solid green), spatial 
alternation (solid red), and win-shift (dotted green) response patterns to choose bowls. 
This is just one of the 60 stimulations. Solid blue curve: the posterior probability of 
the reward-associated perceptual hypothesis over trials; dotted blue curve: the 
posterior probability of non-reward associated perceptual hypothesis in the relevant 
dimension. Black curve: the sum probability of the two perceptual hypotheses in the 
irrelevant dimension. The red and green curves represent the posterior probabilities of 
the four spatial hypotheses over trials. Each grey vertical line demonstrates the onset 
of a new ground-truth response pattern (see Table 5.1), and each colour bar on the top 
represents the ground-truth response pattern for a set of consecutive trials. 
 
The Bayesian analysis result from one simulation may not be representative enough 
due to stochastic simulation of 1st/2nd observation for each trial. Here, 60 simulations 
were generated with the same above process and the same series of known hypotheses 
(Table 5.1). The only possible difference is the 1st/2nd observation for each trial 
between stages. Over the 60 simulated stages, the highest Bayesian probability of 
each spatial hypothesis from each stage was collected, resulting in the histogram of 
the maximum probability of each hypothesis over the 60 stages (Figure 5.3). Figure 
5.3 shows that the highest probability of each spatial hypothesis in most simulations is 
larger than 0.6, particularly for spatial perseveration, spatial alternation, and win-stay 
response patterns. This result confirms that high Bayesian probability of a spatial 
hypothesis often indicates that the simulated rat did use the corresponding spatial 
response pattern to choose bowls. Thus, we believe that the use of the Bayesian 
approach on rats performing the experiment is likely to capture bona fide regularities 
in their behaviour. 
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Figure 5.3: distribution of each spatial hypothesis’ highest probabilities over 
simulated stages. The highest probability of each spatial hypothesis in most simulated 
stages is larger than 0.6, particularly for spatial perseveration, spatial alternation, and 
win-stay response patterns. 
 
Interestingly, Figure 5.3 (last histogram) also shows that the Bayesian estimate of the 
win-shift response pattern is quite low (even less than 0.3) in some simulations, even 
though the virtual rat did use this spatial response pattern. Figure 5.4 demonstrates an 
example simulation within which the highest probability of the hypothesis associated 
with win-shift response pattern (dotted green curve) is ~0.3. Detailed inspection of the 
simulated stage’s observation found that the virtual rat selected the 2nd bowl at trial 19 
where the spatial win-shift response pattern is simulated, leading to low likelihood of 
the hypothesis associated with the win-shift response pattern, which in turn led to the 
low Bayesian estimate of the win-shift.  
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Figure 5.4: Bayesian probability of each hypothesis over trials of a simulation when 
the virtual rat did try all four spatial hypotheses. The Bayesian estimate of the 
hypothesis associated with win-shift response pattern is not high enough (black 
arrow) although the virtual rat did use it for bowl choice (between the two grey 
vertical lines). Each colour bar on the top represents the ground-truth response pattern 
for the corresponding set of consecutive trials. 
 
The above analysis focused on spatial response patterns. However, the irrelevant 
perceptual dimension is the interest of focus at the beginning of the ED stage. One 
similar doubt is how often a high Bayesian probability of the irrelevant dimension 
really indicates that the rat used the stimuli of the irrelevant dimension to dig in bowls. 
With the same simulation process as above, one simulated ED stage was generated 
based on another series of known hypotheses (Table 5.2). The Bayesian analysis of 
the simulation data (Figure 5.5) supports the idea that high Bayesian probability of the 
irrelevant dimension (black curve; the sum of the probability of the two perceptual 
hypotheses in the irrelevant perceptual dimension) does indicate that the rat may 
really be using a certain perceptual response pattern of the irrelevant dimension to dig 
in bowls. 
 
Table 5.2: a series of known response patterns used to generate simulated ED stage 
data. To generate a simulated ED stage, one of the two perceptual hypotheses from the 
irrelevant dimension is randomly chosen once and used for the first four trials. 
Although the simulated ED stages contain some spatial response patterns, here we 
focus our analysis on the first several trials, as the beginning of the ED stage is one 
area of focus in the analysis of real rats’ data.  
Trial 1-4 5-7 8-11 12-17 
Response 
pattern 
One perceptual hypothesis 
from the irrelevant perceptual 
dimension 
Spatial 
perseveration  
Win-shift Rewarded 
stimulus 
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Figure 5.5: Bayesian probability of each hypothesis over trials of one simulated ED 
stage (out of 60 simulated stages) when the virtual rat used one stimulus of the 
irrelevant dimension to choose bowls in the first four trials. The Bayesian analysis did 
find the rat used certain stimuli of the irrelevant dimension to choose bowls at the 
beginning of the stage (arrow).  
 
Similar to the analysis for spatial hypotheses, 60 simulation stages were generated 
based on the series of known response patterns (Table 5.2). Over the 60 simulations, 
the highest Bayesian probability of the irrelevant dimension from the first four trials 
of each simulated ED stage was collected, resulting in the histogram of the maximum 
probability of the irrelevant dimension over simulations (Figure 5.6). Again, Figure 
5.6 supports the idea that high Bayesian probability (e.g., larger than 0.6) of the 
irrelevant dimension often indicates that the rat did use a certain perceptual response 
pattern of the irrelevant dimension to choose bowls. 
 
However, Figure 5.6 also shows that the Bayesian estimate of the irrelevant 
dimension is just around 0.2 in a few simulated stages. Figure 5.7 demonstrates an 
example of such a simulation. Although the virtual rat actually used one perceptual 
stimulus of the irrelevant dimension to choose bowls over the first four trials, detailed 
inspection of the example stage’s observation showed that the virtual rat selected the 
1st bowl and the bowl choice side alternated over the first four trials, leading to the 
high Bayesian estimate of the hypothesis associated with the spatial alternation 
response pattern, and therefore, low Bayesian estimate of irrelevant dimension. In 
other words, the simulated rat’s choices in the first four trials support multiple 
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response patterns, and the Bayesian analysis seems to reflect genuine ambiguity in the 
response patterns.  
 
Figure 5.6: distribution of highest probabilities of the irrelevant dimension from the 
first four trials over simulation stages. The highest probability of the irrelevant 
dimension in most stages is larger than 0.6. The 1st/2nd observation is randomly 
generated for each of the first four trials, leading to multiple different values of the 
highest probability of the irrelevant dimension for different simulation data. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Bayesian probability of each hypothesis over trials of one simulation when 
the virtual rat used one perceptual stimulus of irrelevant dimension to choose bowls in 
the first four trials, but the Bayesian estimate of the irrelevant dimension is very low 
(around 0.2). There are six simulations having similar low Bayesian estimates. 
5.2 Bayesian analysis of spatial patterns in simulated data 
The number of spatial trials within a certain stage (e.g., ED stage) has been estimated 
and compared between two groups of rats based on Bayesian analysis of real data (see 
Section 3 for details), where spatial trials are those trials in which the rat used certain 
spatial response patterns to choose bowls. The findings about spatial trials on the real 
data are convincing only if the Bayesian estimates of spatial hypotheses did reflect the 
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actual spatial response patterns used by rats. In other words, higher estimated numbers 
of spatial trials within a stage should really indicate that rats actually spend more trials 
using corresponding spatial response patterns to choose bowls. To confirm the 
effectiveness of the Bayesian analysis in estimating spatial response patterns, 
simulation data with known spatial response patterns were generated and then 
analysed by the Bayesian approach as below. 
 
First, 160 simulated rats’ ID stage data were generated, with each stage consisting of a 
maximum of 20 trials. The data were generated by implementing the following 
procedure in MATLAB: 
 
For each spatial response pattern h from the set of the four spatial response patterns: 
 For each consecutive trial number k from the set {3, 5, 7, 9} 
 Repeat the following procedure 10 times, to generate 10 simulated ID stages 
 Generate a sequence of 20 ground-truth response patterns, with an 
example of the generation process shown in Figure 5.8 where the 
response pattern h is perseveration and k=5. The generation process is 
under two constraints, (1) the last six response patterns being reward-
associated and (2) k consecutive trials with the spatial response pattern h 
appearing randomly in the sequence (but not in the last six trials). All the 
other positions in the sequence were filled randomly with other response 
patterns (including the non-rewarded and two irrelevant perceptual and 
the other three spatial response patterns), under the constraint that any 
chosen response pattern was filled in 2 to 4 consecutive trials if possible.  
 For the just-generated sequence of 20 ground-truth response patterns, 
generates the rat’s simulated behaviour (side choice, got reward or not, 
1st/2nd) for each of the 20 trials as described in Section 5.1 (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.8: an example demonstrating how to generate a sequence of 20 responses 
patterns with perseveration in five consecutive trials (h is perseveration, k=5). 
Suppose the rewarded response pattern is M1, and non-rewarded and two irrelevant 
perceptual response patterns are M2, O1, and O2 respectively. Step 1: set the 
rewarded response pattern M1 to the last six trials. Step 2: randomly select five 
consecutive trials (except for the last six trials) and set the perseveration response 
pattern to them. Steps 3-6: randomly select one response pattern from the remaining 3 
perceptual and 3 spatial response patterns, and set it to consecutive trials of length 2-4 
every time. Red trials: not yet filled with response patterns so far; dark green trials: 
being filled with a response pattern; light green trials: already filled with response 
patterns. 
 
Once the 160 virtual rats’ ID stage data were generated from the above procedure, 
each virtual ID was then analysed using the Bayesian approach. For each virtual ID 
that contains a ground-truth number of trials of specific spatial response pattern h, the 
estimated number of trials of this spatial response h was collected based on the 
corresponding Bayesian estimates (as done for real rat data in Section 3). 
 
Polynomial (linear) contrast was conducted between the estimated numbers of trials 
of the spatial hypothesis (‘estimated spatial trials’ in short; dependent variable) and 
the ground-truth number of trials of spatial hypothesis (‘ground-truth spatial trials’ in 
short; independent variable) (Figure 5.9). Ground-truth spatial trials had a significant 
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effect on estimated spatial trials, F(1, 156) = 101.45, p<0.001, with the more trials in 
which rats used spatial response patterns to choose bowls, the more estimated spatial 
trials were from the proposed Bayesian approach. Figure 5.9 also shows that the mean 
estimated spatial trials were always less than the ground-truth spatial trials by about 
1.5 to 2.5 trials. This is reasonable because it often takes a few trials for the posterior 
probability of the spatial hypothesis to increase to a high value, such that the 
estimated number of spatial trials is often smaller than the actual number of spatial 
trials.  
 
Figure 5.9: the estimated number of spatial trials increases with more ground-truth 
spatial trials. Vertical line segments represent the standard errors. For each virtual ID 
that contains a ground-truth number of trials of specific spatial response pattern h, the 
estimated number of spatial trials was collected where Bayesian estimate of the spatial 
response pattern h is larger than 0.6. 
5.3 Evaluation of Bayesian criterion in simulated data 
The Bayesian approach provides an alternative learning criterion to determine 
whether or not a rat has learned the reward-associated stimulus in each learning stage. 
More specifically, if the posterior probability of the reward-associated hypothesis is 
larger than a pre-defined high threshold at a certain trial (e.g., 0.95, meaning that we 
are 95% confident the rat is using the reward-associated stimulus to choose bowls), 
we would consider that the rat has learned the stimulus-reward association. Note that 
the high threshold 0.95 is only compared to the posterior probability of the reward-
associated hypothesis in the Bayesian learning criterion, while another threshold 0.6 
used in the thesis is to determine whether non-reward associated response patterns 
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were used before learning the reward-associated response pattern in each stage. 
 
To show whether the Bayesian criterion works appropriately, 40 simulation stages 
were generated, with each stage 20 trials long. More specifically, to generate a 
simulation stage, a series of 20 ground-truth response patterns were manually pre-
determined such that the following bowl choice results (Table 5.3) were generated 
based on the predetermined real bowl designs of the ID stage. The only possible 
differences among the 40 simulated data were the 1st/2nd observation in trials. 
 
Table 5.3: the sequence of 20 bowl choice results for each of the 40 simulations. 
Trial 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15-20 
Rewarded ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓✓✓✓✓
✓ 
 
 
The 40 simulated stages were then analysed by the Bayesian approach, and the first 
trial to Bayesian criterion (where posterior probability of the reward-associated 
hypothesis reaches 0.95) was obtained for each simulated stage. Figure 5.10 shows 
that, with Bayesian criterion, the virtual rats would be considered to have learned the 
stimulus-reward association around trial 10 to 12 in most of the 40 simulated stages 
(also see Figure 5.11, left). In comparison, the rat has to take the full 20 trials to finish 
each stage if using the frequentist 6-in-a-row criterion. Interestingly, from Table 5.3, it 
did look like the virtual rat has learned around trial 10 or 11.  
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Figure 5.10: histogram of trials to Bayesian criterion (with threshold 0.95) over 40 
simulations, with each stage 20 trials long and having the same bowl choice results as 
seen in Table 5.4, but often having different sequence of 1st/2nd observations between 
simulations. 
 
One observation from Figure 5.10 is that the trials to Bayesian criterion are more than 
15 in a few stages, although all the simulated stages have the same sequence of bowl 
choice results. Detailed investigation showed that the longer trial to Bayesian criterion 
comes from the dominance of a spatial response pattern win-shift around trial 10 
(Figure 5.11, right), the Bayesian estimate of which increases to a high value (0.8) 
mainly due to the consistency between bowl choices and the spatial hypothesis 
associated with the win-shift response pattern in trials 6 to 10.  In comparison, the 
correct hypothesis is not consistent with the rat’s bowl choice in trial 8, leading to the 
decrease in the probability of the correct hypothesis from trial 8. Again, this supports 
the idea that the Bayesian approach handles true ambiguity well because it considers a 
set of hypotheses rather than just the frequentist null hypothesis.   
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Figure 5.11: probability of each hypothesis over trials for two simulated stages. Left: 
the estimated trial to Bayesian criterion is 10; Right: the estimated trials to Bayesian 
criterion are 18, probably because the spatial hypothesis associated with the win-shift 
response pattern (dotted green curve) is consistent with a few trials’ observation 
where the virtual rat continuously chose the 1st bowl without going to check the 2nd 
bowl.  
 
The above result indicates that Bayesian criterion is consistent with the frequentist 10-
correct-out-12 criterion (see the 10-correct-out-of-12 trials in Table 5.3). To show that 
the Bayesian criterion is consistent with multiple different frequentist learning criteria, 
we also applied Bayesian analysis to another 40 simulations, with each stage just six 
trials long and having the same bowl choice result (Table 5.4). All the 40 simulation 
stages were different only in the 1st/2nd observation which was randomly generated for 
each trial in each simulation. 
 
Table 5.4: the same sequence of six bowl choice results for each of the 40 simulations. 
Trial 1   2 3 4 5 6 
Rewarded ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
 
Figure 5.12 shows that the Bayesian criterion (with threshold 0.95) is satisfied or 
close to satisfied at the last trial in most of the 40 simulations, supporting the idea that 
the Bayesian criterion is consistent with the traditional 6-in-a-row criterion at least in 
this simple condition (where a stage consists of just six trials). 
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Figure 5.12: histogram of Bayesian probability of the reward-associated hypothesis in 
the last trials of the 40 simulations, with each stage just six trials long. Bayesian 
criterion is satisfied or close to be satisfied in the last trials of most simulations. 
 
For the four simulated stages, for which the last-trial reward probability is around 
0.35 (Figure 5.12), detailed investigation told us that the observation from trials 2 to 5 
is consistent with the spatial alternation response pattern (particularly choosing the 1st 
bowl without checking the 2nd bowl), causing the higher Bayesian probability of the 
corresponding hypothesis (Figure 5.13 right, solid red curve). Interestingly, in this 
case, we may also think the rat used spatial alternation to choose bowls. Therefore, 
the lower Bayesian estimate of reward hypothesis in the last trial, while not consistent 
with 6-in-a-row criterion, seems to be consistent with a human’s subjective judgement. 
Note that if such a pattern were seen in a real rat, it would be considered as having 
learned the stage by the 6-in-a-row criterion, whereas the closer level of analysis by 
the Bayesian approach allows highlighting of the ambiguity. 
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Figure 5.13: probability of each hypothesis over trials for two simulations. Left: an 
example simulation stage in which Bayesian criterion is consistent with the 6-in-a-
row criterion; Right: one simulation with Bayesian criterion not satisfied at last trial, 
due to the higher Bayesian estimate of the hypothesis associated with the spatial 
alternation response pattern which is consistent with the observed data from trials 2 to 
5. 
 
The above two sets of results together indicate that Bayesian criterion may summarise 
behavioural choice well in multiple conditions in which rats may have learned the 
stimulus-reward association and seems quite consistent with human subjective 
judgement on rats’ learning. Therefore, the Bayesian criterion may be an appropriate 
alternative to the frequentist 6-in-a-row criterion when determining whether a rat has 
learned the stimulus-reward association. In addition, the Bayesian approach handles 
true ambiguity of response patterns well, which occasionally occurs even if there has 
been careful counterbalancing of conditions, because it depends in part on how the rat 
responds. 
5.4 Justification of the likelihood function 
In the proposed Bayesian model, the 1st/2nd observation at each trial is included in the 
likelihood function in order to differentiate the likelihood of spatial hypotheses from 
perceptual hypotheses. Here we use the simulated data to provide more evidence for 
the effect of the 1st/2nd observation in the likelihood on the correct estimate of 
response patterns.  
 
Just as described in Section 5.1, we generated one representative simulation based on 
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a sequence of known response patterns (Table 5.5; reproducing Table 5.1) and then 
analysed the simulated stage data using (1) the proposed Bayesian model (i.e., with 
1st/2nd observation included in the likelihood function) and (2) the simplified Bayesian 
model (i.e., with ‘1st/2nd’ observation excluded in the likelihood function).  
 
Table 5.5: a series of ground-truth response patterns used to generate simulation data. 
‘Random’ means the virtual rat would randomly dig either left or right bowl. 
Trials 1 2-5 6-11 12-15 16-19 20-25 
Hypothesis Random Spatial 
perseveration  
Win-stay Spatial 
alternation 
Win-shift Rewarded 
stimulus 
 
 
The analysis did show that the 1st/2nd observation in the likelihood function is very 
useful to estimate correctly what response patterns were being used by rats. 
Specifically, Figure 5.14 (right) shows that, with the simplified Bayesian model which 
excluded the 1st/2nd observation in the likelihood function, the spatial alternation 
response pattern was not found, while a certain erroneous perceptual response pattern 
(black curve) was estimated. In comparison, the proposed Bayesian model with 1st/2nd 
observation included in the likelihood function correctly estimated all the spatial 
response patterns (Figure 5.14, left). This result supports the idea that 1st/2nd 
observation should be included in the likelihood function in the Bayesian model. 
 Figure 5.14: representative Bayesian analysis results with two different Bayesian 
models. The Bayesian model considering 1st/2nd observation (left) performs better 
than the Bayesian model without 1st/2nd observation (right). The colour bars above 
each figure represent the ground-truth response patterns for each set of consecutive 
trials. 
 
All the above Bayesian analyses on the simulated data provide convincing evidence 
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for the validity of Bayesian analysis on rats’ data. In particular, high Bayesian 
probability of a hypothesis often indicates that the rat used the corresponding response 
patterns to dig bowls, and higher estimated number of spatial trials within a stage 
really indicates that rats actually use spatial response patterns to choose bowls in more 
trials. In addition, the appropriateness of the Bayesian learning criterion and the effect 
of 1st/2nd observation in the likelihood function were also supported by the Bayesian 
analysis on simulated data. 
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Chapter III: Bayesian Analysis of Human Set-shifting  
 
While Bayesian analysis has been shown to be promising in analysing the 7-stage task 
in rats, we evaluated the validity of the Bayesian analysis on the basis of simulated 
data. To further explore the validity of the Bayesian analysis, I used an analogous 
human 7-stage task, similar to the CANTAB® ID/ED task (Roberts et al., 1988), to 
collect human participants’ oral reporting of the response strategy that they used to 
make their choice in each trial. By correlating the participants’ subjective reports and 
the Bayesian estimates of response patterns, I hoped to evaluate whether the Bayesian 
estimates match the response intentions of human participants.  
 
Given the apparent differences in the way in which humans and rats approach the task, 
I found that the Bayesian model developed for rats could not be directly applied to the 
human task. Therefore, I modified the approach that I used in rats to consider the 
effect of feedback consequent to each response choice in the task (reward vs 
nonrewarded) on learning. Adding this information for human participants improved 
the applicability of the Bayesian analysis, but it did not do so for rats. This implies 
that humans might engage in hypothesis-testing, using feedback to eliminate false 
hypotheses about the correct choice, whereas rats might use simple associative 
mechanisms in which the effect of feedback is subtler on a trial-by-trial basis. 
6 Method for human attentional set-shifting 
6.1 Participants and apparatus 
Thirty-eight students from the University of St Andrews were recruited, mainly from 
the University’s online SONA system, comprising twenty-six female and twelve male 
participants and with an age range of 18-25.  
 
A task (Figure 6.1) analogous to the CANTAB IDED task (Roberts et al., 1988) was 
coded in MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc.) and run on a common modern 14-inch 
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Lenova laptop (IdeaPad 510S) in quiet testing rooms. The software was displayed at 
the centre of the laptop screen, with the size of the software graphical user interface 
(GUI) approximately 640-by-620 pixels, and with normal viewing distance (around 
20-25 inches) between the screen and the participant. A box containing the 
combination of a blob stimulus and a stick stimulus (or just one of them for the SD 
stage) was displayed on the top half of the task window (Figure 6.1). Participants 
could click the button immediately below the box to change back and forth between 
the first and second stimulus (or stimuli). The task used stimuli and stage structure 
analogous to the CANTAB ED/ED but was modified to make it more functionally 
similar to the rat 7-stage task, allowing the participant to see stimuli in only one box 
at a time. The participants could make their choice simply by clicking on the box 
framing the blob and stick stimuli and indicated their confidence in their choice by 
moving a sliding pointer along a horizontal scroll bar. The microphone built into the 
laptop was used to collect each participant’s oral report of the reason for the choice 
they made in each learning trial.  
 
Figure 6.1: a screen-shot of the 7-stage task software for an example learning trial. In 
the window, the top box contains a pair of orange blob and black stick(s) stimuli. 
Participant can click the arrow button below the box to view another pair of stimuli.  
6.2 Materials and procedure 
The human 7-stage task, like the rat 7-stage task, consists of a simple discrimination 
learning stage and six compound discrimination learning stages in the order simple 
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discrimination (SD) – compound discrimination (CD) – reversal (REV1) – intra-
dimensional (ID) – reversal (REV2) – extra-dimensional shift (ED) – reversal (REV3). 
The trial design for each learning stage is the same as that for the rat task, with the 
exception that the two dimensions of stimuli in the human task are ‘blob’ and ‘stick’ 
(Figure 6.2) rather than ‘medium’ and ‘odour’ as in the rat task. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: stimuli used in the human 7-stage task. Two dimensions of stimuli are 
used: blob (first two columns) and stick (third and fourth columns). The stimuli in 
each row are used for a different compound stage and subsequent reversal stage. 
 
Before starting the task, each participant was asked to watch a short video on the 
computer screen demonstrating how to make a choice and how to answer the 
questions about their choice confidence and choice reason. Each participant was told 
to try to make a correct choice at each trial. The program was then initiated on the 
laptop to begin testing. Each participant was first required to input his or her gender 
and age (just for statistical information of participants) on the software GUI and then 
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click a ‘Start’ button to initiate the first trial of the first learning stage in the 7-stage 
task. 
 
In each trial, the participant could view one or the other pair of stimuli simply by 
clicking the button below the stimuli box (Figure 6.3, top row). The participant could 
choose one of the paired stimuli by clicking on the box containing the pair; The 
participant could then use a mouse to drag the scroll bar to a position on the slider 
representing their confidence level for the current choice (Figure 6.3, middle left). 
Then the participant should answer the second question ‘Why do you think this (i.e., 
your choice) is correct?’ orally and the software automatically recorded their voice 
using the built-in microphone and saved the recording into a new and unique sound 
file for each trial (Figure 6.3, middle right). These files were later translated into 
digital text files with assistance from Meggie Rix, who volunteered to translate the 
oral reports. Once the voice was recorded, the participant could press the ‘Choice 
result’ button to see the choice result displayed on the right side of the top box (Figure 
6.3, bottom left), and then click the same button with the changed label ‘Next trial’ to 
advance to the next trial (Figure 6.3, bottom right). The above process was repeated in 
each learning trial until the participant made six correct choices in a row. A new stage 
was then started for the participant to learn. The participant could, however, stop the 
task at any time if they did not feel comfortable or for any other reason. 
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Figure 6.3: screen-shots of the software to demonstrate the procedure when 
performing the task. Top two: before making a choice, the participant could press the 
arrow button below the stimuli box to view either the first pair of stimuli (top-left) or 
the second pair of stimuli (top-right). Middle left: the participant chose the second 
pair of stimuli by clicking the box containing the stimuli. Middle right: the participant 
dragged the bar on the slider to a position representing their confidence that the choice 
was correct;this activated the microphone icon, which prompted the participant to 
verbalise the reason for their choice. Bottom left: after pressing the ‘Feedback’ button, 
the choice result appeared on the right side of the top box, and  the ‘Feedback’ button 
became ‘Next trial’ button. Bottom right: the participant clicked the ‘Next trial’ button 
and a new trial started, in which the combination of blob and stick could be changed. 
 
Typically, participants finished the task in around 40 minutes and were then debriefed 
about the true purpose of the study. This study received ethical approval from the 
School of Psychology and Neuroscience Ethics Committee (SEC), with approval code 
PS12391 (Appendix A). Relevant forms for advertisement, debriefing, participant 
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information, etc. are also appended (Appendices B- F). 
6.3 Human behavioural simple Bayesian model 
We used Bayesian analysis to quantify the rats’ performance using the classical Bayes’ 
rule (Equation 2.1 in Section 2): 
*)|(
*)|(*}),{|(
*}),{|(
E
EE
E
EP
hHPhHEP
EhHP iii

                (6.1) 
Note that the comma ‘,’ in the likelihood *}),{|( EihHEP   means ‘and’, therefore 
*}),{|( EihHEP   represents the probability of E given ihH   and *E . The 
performance of participants in the human attentional set-shifting task may also be 
analysed by the behavioural Bayesian model that I developed for the rat task. 
However, considering the differences between humans and rats in performing the 
tasks, the behavioural Bayesian model needs to be modified from the following 
aspects before being applied to the human task. 
Likelihood 
The likelihood item about the ‘1st/2nd’ observation in the rat behavioural Bayesian 
model is mainly to differentiate spatial rules (or ‘hypotheses’) from perceptual rules 
(or ‘hypotheses’). However, human participants cannot have adopted any spatial rules 
to make their choice because stimuli were displayed not on the left and right but on 
the centre in the human task. So the likelihood item about the ‘1st/2nd’ observation is 
removed, and the likelihood function is simply designed as  





Enobservatiowithntinconsistehif
Enobservatiowithconsistenthif
hHEP
i
i
i


1
*),|( E   (6.2) 
This likelihood function is exactly the same as that developed for my Honours-year 
project and can be considered as a simplification of the one developed in Section 2. 
As discussed before,  should be set to a high value close to 100%. I used 85.0 .  
Hypotheses 
Since the human participants could not use spatial rules to make their choices, the 
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four spatial hypotheses used for the rat behavioural Bayesian model were removed. 
Instead, I observed, from the participants’ oral reports, that sometimes they used the 
combination of blob and stick to make their choice, and sometimes they used the 
alternation of two blobs or alternation of two sticks over trials to make choices (Table 
6.1). Therefore, I added four more ‘combination’ hypotheses and two stimuli 
alternation hypotheses, resulting in the following 10 perceptual hypotheses H : 
 Hypothesis 1 (
1h ): participant uses the blob B1 to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 2 (
2h ): participant uses the other blob B2 to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 3 (
3h ): participant uses the stick L1 to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 4 (
4h ): participant uses the other stick L2 to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 5 (
5h ): participant uses blob B1 and blob B2 alternatively to 
make choice. 
 Hypothesis 6 (
6h ): participant uses stick L1 and stick L2 alternatively to 
make choice. 
 Hypothesis 7 (
7h ): participant uses the combination of blob B1 and stick L1 
to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 8 (
8h ): participant uses the combination of blob B1 and stick L2 
to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 9 (
9h ): participant uses the combination of blob B2 and stick L1 
to make choice. 
 Hypothesis 10 (
10h ): participant uses the combination of blob B2 and stick 
L2 to make choice. 
 
With the exception of the above two aspects, all the details of the simplified Bayesian 
model are the same as those of the rat behavioural Bayesian model described in 
Section 2. In the following, I call this simplified Bayesian model the human 
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behavioural simple Bayesian model. 
 
Table 6.1: the number of participants using each response pattern with corresponding 
hypothesis, as determined by their self reports. B1B2: blob alternation, L1L2: stick 
alternation; B1+L1: combination of B1 and L1, similarly for the other three 
combinations. 
Hypotheses B1 B2 L1 L2 B1B2 L1L2 B1+L1 B1+L2 B2+L1 B2+L2 
Participants 
(n=33) 
33 33 33 33 4 6 3 0 3 3 
 
 
6.4 Human latent probabilistic model and behavioural reward Bayesian 
model 
As well as applying the Bayesian approach to the estimation of participants’ 
behavioural patterns in making choices in the attentional set-shifting tasks, we are 
also interested in whether the Bayesian approach can be used to infer participants’ 
latent information processing (e.g., latent rules used to make choices) evoked by 
choice feedback. In the attentional set-shifting task, participants learned the correct 
rule based on feedback arising as a consequence of their choice (correct/incorrect or 
rewarded/unrewarded) in each trial within a learning stage. For example, if a 
participant used the blob stimulus B1 to make their choice and the choice result is 
incorrect in one trial, the participant would likely consider that B1 is not related to the 
correct choice. In the next trial, the participant would be more likely to make their 
choice using a different stimulus. On the other hand, if the choice was correct, the 
participant would be likely to continue using B1 to make their choice in the next trial. 
In other words, the correctness of previous choices could largely affect a participant’s 
confidence on which stimuli are more related to correct choice and which are not, and 
therefore affect their  choice in the current trial. Such hypothesis-testing learning 
appears in human participants and has been supported by participants’ oral reports 
(Table 6.2). Note, however, that rats might have been reliant on associative learning, 
by which actions and outcomes are learned gradually. In comparison, hypothesis-
testing learning is more likely to be driven by high-level cognition (see Section 8 for 
more discussion). Therefore, in order to estimate our human participants’ pattern of 
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decision-making, the effect of feedback at the end of each trial was incorporated into 
the Bayesian analysis. 
 
Table 6.2: an example of an oral report from one participant’s ED stage, showing the 
hypothesis-testing learning process. In this example, the participant quickly changed 
rules if their choice was wrong and continued using the rule if their choice was correct 
(see last column). The two paired stimuli in each trial are also shown. 
Trial Transcribed self-report 
and two paired stimuli  
B3:        B4:            L3:          L4:  
Choice 
feedback 
Researcher’s 
remark 
1 I have been presented with new shapes, so I am guessing at 
this point. 
                          (Chosen)   
 
 
Correct 
Made choice 
randomly 
2 I got the previous question correct and the black line has 
the same design, so I am going to go with this choice.  
(Chosen)            
 
 
Correct 
Made choice 
based on stick L4 
because the 
previous choice 
included L4 and 
was correct.  
3 I got the previous question correct and the black line has 
the same design, so I am going to stick with it. 
                         (Chosen) 
 
 
Incorrect 
Made choice 
based on L4 
because the 
previous choice 
included L4 and 
was correct. 
4 I am quite surprised that I got the previous question wrong, 
so maybe I have been wrong about the design of the black 
line and try this design instead. 
                           (Chosen)   
 
 
Correct 
Choice based on  
L4 was wrong in 
the previous trial, 
so made choice 
based the other 
stick L3. 
 
5 I got this design of the black line correct in the previous 
question, so I am just going to stick with the same design. 
                          (Chosen) 
 
 
Incorrect 
Continue using 
L3 because 
previous choice 
was correct. 
6 I wonder if the orange shape behind plays a role, but at this 
point I am guessing. 
                          (Chosen) 
 
 
Correct 
Choice based on  
L3 was wrong in 
the previous trial, 
so changed rule 
from stick to 
blob. Randomly 
chose one blob 
B4. 
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7 I have got a strong feeling that the orange shape behind has 
got something to do with the correct answer, so I am going 
to look for the same orange shape. 
                           (Chosen) 
 
 
Correct 
Continue using 
B4 because 
previous choice 
was correct 
8 I am quite confident that the orange shape has got 
something to do with the correct answer, so I am sticking 
with the same orange shape from the previous question 
because I got it correct. 
(Chosen)           
 
 
Correct 
Continue using 
B4 because 
previous choice 
was correct 
9 I am quite sure that the orange shape has got something to 
do with the correct answer, so I am sticking with the same 
orange shape from the previous question because I got it 
correct. 
(Chosen)          
 
 
Correct 
Continue using 
B4 because 
previous choice 
was correct 
10 I am quite confident of my answer because I have been 
choosing the same orange shape for the previous three to 
four questions and I got all of them correct. 
                       (Chosen) 
 
 
Correct 
Continue using 
B4 because 
previous choice 
was correct 
11 I am very confident that the orange shape has got 
something to do with the correct answer. 
                        (Chosen) 
 
 
Correct 
Continue using 
B4 because 
previous choice 
was correct 
 
 
Before describing the new human model, I would like to clarify the difference 
between two sets of hypotheses: behavioural hypotheses H  and latent (cognitive) 
hypotheses 'H . Behavioural hypotheses are the possible hypotheses corresponding to 
participants’ behavioural choice patterns, and have been used in the rat behavioural 
Bayesian model when analysing rats’ behavioural patterns (Section 2). In comparison, 
latent hypotheses are the possible hypotheses which participants think are correct. 
Behavioural hypotheses H have been described in the human behavioural simple 
Bayesian model above (Section 6.3). Latent hypotheses 'H  include: 
- Hypothesis 1 ( '1h ), or B1 hypothesis: participant thinks blob B1 is correct 
- Hypothesis 2 ( '2h ), or B2 hypothesis: participant thinks blob B2 is correct. 
- Hypothesis 3 ( '3h ), or L1 hypothesis: participant thinks stick L1 is correct. 
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- Hypothesis 4 ( '
4h ), or L2 hypothesis: participant thinks stick L2 is correct. 
- Hypothesis 5 ( '5h ), or B1B2 hypothesis: participant thinks blob B1 and blob B2 
are alternatively correct. 
- Hypothesis 6 ( '6h ), or L1L2 hypothesis: participant thinks stick L1 and stick L2 
are - alternatively correct. 
- Hypothesis 7 ( '7h ), or B1+L1 hypothesis: participant thinks the combination of 
blob B1 and stick L1 is correct. 
- Hypothesis 8 ( '8h ), or B1+L2 hypothesis: participant thinks the combination of 
blob B1 and stick L2 is correct. 
- Hypothesis 9 ( '9h ), or B2+L1 hypothesis: participant thinks the combination of 
blob B2 and stick L1 is correct. 
- Hypothesis 10 ( '10h ), or B2+L2 hypothesis: participant thinks the combination of 
blob B2 and stick L2 is correct. 
 
Note that each behavioural hypothesis has a corresponding latent hypothesis which 
shares the same stimulus or stimuli, e.g., 
1h  corresponding to 
'
1h , and 8h  
corresponding to '8h . Also note that, in the SD stage, only two stimuli appear in the 
boxes. Therefore, for SD stages, there are just three latent hypotheses, comprising two 
hypotheses of single stimulus and one stimulus alternation hypothesis. 
 
Our objective, after the participant made their choice and saw the choice result in the 
current trial, was to estimate the probability that (the participant thinks) each 
hypothesis 'ih  was correct, based on the relevant observed data from both the current 
trial and all previous trials. The relevant observation data in each trial includes (1) the 
blob and the stick in the chosen box, and the other blob and stick in the un-chosen box, 
(2) which box was chosen, and (3) whether the choice is correct. 
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Before formally introducing the new human model, here is an example to show how 
we, as researchers, could infer an ideal learner’s learning process by considering the 
effect of choice result (Figure 6.4). At the first trial, suppose that the participant 
looked at the two boxes, chose the box containing Blob 1 and Stick 1, and then found 
that her choice was wrong. Based on the participant’s learning behaviour in this trial, 
we, as researchers, could infer the following information: Firstly, the participant 
probably made her choice based on Blob 1 or Stick 1, because she chose the box 
containing Blob 1 & Stick 1. Secondly, after the participant found her choice was 
wrong, she would probably exclude Blob 1 and Stick 1 as putative stimuli related to 
the correct response. This is the effect of choice result on her learning. Then, in the 
next (2nd) trial, suppose that the participant chose the box containing Blob 1 and Stick 
2, rather than the box containing Blob 2 and Stick 1, and then found that her choice 
was correct. Again, we may infer that the participant is more likely to have made her 
choice based on Stick 2, because she chose the box containing Blob 1 and Stick 2, but 
after her last trial, she probably thought Blob 1 was not related to the correct response. 
Also, since the participant found that her choice was correct, she would probably 
think that Stick 2 was related to the correct response. Again, this is the effect of choice 
result on her learning. Here we may even predict the participant would be likely to 
choose the box containing Stick 2 in the next trial. Then, at the third learning trial, we 
observed that the participant chose the box containing Stick 2. From this observation, 
we would be more certain that the participant used Stick 2 to make her choice, and 
also we would think that the participant was more certain that Stick 2 was related to 
the correct response.  Note that this example assumes the participant approaches an 
‘ideal observer’ – namely, somebody that uses the information rationally to solve the 
problem. 
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Figure 6.4: example of the inferred effect of choice result on a participant’s learning, 
from the perspective of the researchers. Text in light green is relevant to the 
behavioural hypotheses, and text in light blue is relevant to the latent (cognitive) 
hypotheses. Both types of hypotheses are from the perspective of the researchers. 
 
We developed a new Bayesian analysis to estimate the participants’ latent deductions. 
Formally, let E  and *E , respectively, denote the observed data from the current trial 
and all previous trials. Then all the observed data, from the first trial to the current 
trial, within a learning stage will be the combined observation *},{ EE E . To 
estimate the probability )|'( ' EihHP   of a specific latent hypothesis 
'
ih  after we 
observed the participant’s data E , the ‘Law of total probability’ (Mendenhall et al., 
2005) tells us 



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h
jii
hHPhHhHP
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       (6.3) 
We call Equation (6.3) the human latent probabilistic model. In the model, 
)|( EjhHP   is the Bayesian probability of behavioural hypothesis jh , which can be 
estimated in a similar way to that  for the rat behavioural Bayesian model. 
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Psychologically, )|( EjhHP   represents how likely it is that the participant used the 
response pattern (or rule/strategy in literature) corresponding to a specific hypothesis 
jh  to make their choice at the current trial, after the participant’s behaviour (included 
in E ) has been observed. The other term, }),{|'( ' Eji hHhHP  , is the conditional 
probability of 'ih  given a specific behavioural hypothesis jh . This term can be 
psychologically interpreted as, if the participant used the response pattern 
corresponding to the specific hypothesis jh  to make their choice and saw the choice 
result (included in E ) at the current trial, how likely is it that the participant would 
think the specific latent hypothesis 'ih  is related to the correct response. The product 
)|(}),{|'( ' EE jji hHPhHhHP   of the two terms is summed over all possible 
behavioural hypotheses because we are not sure which response pattern the 
participant is using to make their choice in the current trial, but can only estimate the 
probability of each behavioural hypothesis corresponding to each response pattern.  
 
To estimate the posterior probability )|'( ' EihHP   of a specific associative 
hypothesis 'ih  at the current trial, we need to compute the conditional probability 
}),{|'( ' Eji hHhHP  of the specific latent hypothesis 
'
ih and the posterior 
probability )|( EjhHP  of each behavioural hypothesis jh . 
Feedback effect function }),{|'( ' Eji hHhHP   
This conditional probability function is designed to reflect the effect of choice result 
in the current trial (not in the previous trial) on a participant’s confidence in the 
specific latent hypothesis 'ih  after the participant observed the feedback at the end of 
the current trial, therefore called ‘feedback effect function’. Depending on whether a 
specific behavioural hypothesis jh is consistent with the observed data and whether 
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the participant’s choice is correct in the current trial, the effect of the choice result on 
a specific latent hypothesis 'ih  would be different. Therefore, I designed this 
probability function by considering four different conditions as detailed below. 
 
(1) If the corresponding stimulus of jh  is in the chosen box, and the participant’s 
choice is correct, then the participant would think that the corresponding latent 
hypothesis '
jh  (note the subscript j ) is very likely to be related to the correct response 
(Figure 6.5). Therefore, the probability of the latent hypothesis '
jh  should be much 
higher than those of the other latent hypotheses 'ih , i.e.,  in the following equation 
(Equation 6.4) should be set to a high value close to 100%. Here I set 98.0 . 





otherwisemn
htoscorrespondhif
hHhHP jiji
)1/()1(
}),{|'(
'
'


E     (6.4) 
In general n  and m  are the numbers of hypotheses which are respectively consistent 
and inconsistent with the choice of the current trial. 1mn appears in Equation (6.4) 
in order to make the sum of }),{|'( ' Eji hHhHP  over all latent hypotheses 
'
ih  
equal to 1.0.  
 
Figure 6.5: an example demonstrating the effect of feedback when a participant made 
a correct choice. 
 
(2) If the corresponding stimulus of jh  is in the chosen box, and the participant’s 
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choice is incorrect, then the participant can exclude both stimuli as being correct. In 
this case, the participant would think that every latent hypothesis 'ih  consistent with 
the choice is not likely to be related to the correct response, and the correct response 
is more likely to be related to any latent hypothesis consistent with the stimuli in the 
un-chosen box (Figure 6.6); the probability function could, therefore, be designed as 

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 
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Figure 6.6: an example demonstrating the effect of feedback when a participant made 
an incorrect choice. 
 
(3) If the corresponding stimulus of jh  is not in the chosen box, and the participant’s 
choice is correct: in this case, any latent hypothesis 'ih  consistent with the choice 
could be related to the correct response, while any other associative hypothesis 'ih  
inconsistent with the choice would be much less likely to be related to the correct 
response (Figure 6.7). So the function could be designed as 
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Figure 6.7: An example demonstrating the effect of feedback when a participant chose 
the correct box although she planned to choose the other box. 
 
(4) If the corresponding stimulus of jh  is not in the chosen box, and the participant’s 
choice is incorrect (Figure 6.8): this condition is similar to the condition (2) above, so 
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Figure 6.8: An example demonstrating the effect of choice result when a participant 
chose the incorrect box although she planned to choose the other box. 
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Human behavioural reward Bayesian model )|( EjhHP   
)|( EjhHP   measures how likely it is that the participant is using the specific 
behavioural hypothesis jh  to make their choice. Like the human behavioural simple 
Bayesian model above (Equation 6.1), )|( EjhHP  can be calculated by    
*)|(
*)|(*}),{|(
)|(
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EE
E
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hHP
jj
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
            (6.8) 
The only difference between this Bayesian model and the human behavioural simple 
Bayesian model is in the design of the prior probability *)|( EjhHP  . Intuitively, 
before making their choice at the current trial, when the participant thinks a specific 
latent hypothesis 'jh is more likely to be related to the correct response than any other 
latent hypotheses, the participant would be more likely to use the corresponding 
response pattern linked to the behavioural hypothesis jh  (note subscript is the same 
between jh  and 
'
jh ) to make their choice rather than use any other behavioural 
hypotheses. So here I use the posterior probability of the latent hypothesis at the 
previous trial to represent the prior probability of the corresponding behavioural 
hypothesis at the current trial. As a result, the prior probability has implicitly 
considered the effect of feedback (or reward) from previous trials. This is different to 
the design of the prior function in the rat behavioural Bayesian model (Section 2) and 
the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, where the posterior probability of the 
behavioural hypothesis in the previous trial is used to represent the prior probability 
of the same behavioural hypothesis in the current trial. In view of this, I call Equation 
(6.8) the human behavioural reward Bayesian model. See Table 6.3 for more details 
about these different rat and human models. 
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Table 6.3: development of Bayesian analyses 
Bayesian analyses with parameters Hypotheses  Properties Dataset 
Rat behavioural simple Bayesian model: 
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hHP iii
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   
likelihood 


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otherwise
Ehif
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

E
; 85.0  
prior )|( EihHP   is from previous trial’s posterior; undergraduate work  
9 behavioural hypotheses: left 
bias, right bias, spontaneous 
alternation, win-stay, win-shift, 
M1 (Medium 1), M2, O1 (odour 
1), O2 
‘1st/2nd’ observation was not 
considered in likelihood 
function; reward effect not 
considered; model for rats’ 
behavioural patterns. 
16 rats’ 
4ID data 
Rat behavioural Bayesian model: 
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    
8 behavioural hypotheses: 
spontaneous alternation, 
perseveration, win-stay, win-shift, 
M1, M2, O1, O2. 
‘1st/2nd’ observation was 
considered in likelihood 
function; impact of feedback 
not considered; model only 
for rats’ behavioural patterns. 
93 rats’ 7-
stage data 
Likelihood function for spatial hypotheses: 
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9.0  8.01   and 05.02   
Likelihood function for perceptual hypotheses: 





otherwise
hEif
EhHEEP
i
i
st
,5.0
~,
*}),{|1,(
1
21
12

  





otherwise
hEif
EhHEEP
i
i
nd
,5.0
~,
*}),{|2,(
2
22
12

  
45.021  
 
Human behavioural simple Bayesian model: the same as the first row above 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 behavioural hypotheses: blob 
1, blob 2, stick 1, stick 2, blob1 
and blob 2 alternate, stick 1 and 
stick 2 alternate, blob 1 + stick 1, 
blob 1 + stick 2, blob 2 + stick 1, 
blob 2 + stick 2 
‘1st/2nd’ observation not 
considered; reward effect not 
considered; model for 
humans’ behavioural 
patterns. 
32 
humans’ 
7-stage 
data 
Human latent probabilistic model:  
jh
jjii hHPhHhHPhHP )|(}),{|'()|'(
'' EEE  10 associative hypotheses: 
blob 1, blob 2, stick 1, stick 2, 
blob1 and blob 2 alternate, stick 1 
and stick 2 alternate, blob 1 + 
stick 1; blob 1 + stick 2; blob 2 + 
‘1st/2nd’ not considered; 
reward effect considered; 
model for both humans’ 
behaviour and reward 
association; conceptually, 
32 
humans’ 
7-stage 
data )|( EjhHP  is a human behavioural reward Bayesian model, wherein prior function is from previous 
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trial’s )|'( ' EihHP   which considers effect of feedback/reward.  stick 1; blob 2 + stick 2 
 
10 behavioural hypotheses:  
blob 1, blob 2, stick 1, stick 2, 
blob1 and blob 2 alternate, stick 1 
and stick 2 alternate, blob 1 + 
stick 1, blob 1 + stick 2, blob 2 + 
stick 1, blob 2 + stick 2 
also applicable to rats. 
Feedback effect function ),|'( ' Eji hHhHP 
:  98.0 ; n=3, m=5 
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6.5 Data screening 
Thirty-eight participants participated and finished the human 7-stage task. While most 
participants finished the task within 100 trials, four participants took more than 200 trials 
which made them appear to be outliers (z>2; Figure 6.9, left). Therefore, I did not analyse the 
four cases on the following data analysis. For the remaining 34 cases, I further collected the 
maximum stage trials from each participant’s data and found that one participant took more 
than 90 trials to finish a single stage (more specifically the ID stage; see Figure 6.9, right), 
which, again, is much higher than the other participants’ maximum stage trials (z>3). In 
addition, one participant wrote down everything observed in each trial during learning; this 
participant’s data was removed as well, therefore. As a result, this participant’s data were also 
excluded, resulting in a final sample size of n=32 participants.  
 
      
Figure 6.9: the histogram of task trials over all 38 data (left) and the histogram of the 
maximum stage trials after removing four outliers (right). The data on the right side of 
the dashed vertical lines (z=2 in the left figure and z=3 in the right figure) were 
considered outliers and were removed. 
 
In addition, when analysing participants’ confidence, I excluded the data of those participants 
whose confidence was likely not to have been properly reported. In the remaining 32 
participants’ data, visual inspection of the reported confidence found that two participants 
reported confidence ‘0’ (i.e., the minimum possible value) in almost every trial  in each stage 
(even in the last six correct trials), suggesting that these two participants did not respond to 
the question about confidence in the entire task. The other two participants reported 
confidence ‘100’ (i.e., the maximum possible value) in almost every trial in each stage, 
suggesting that the two participants probably failed to understand the instruction on 
answering the confidence question. As a result, 28 participants’ confidence data were 
remained after excluding the four participants’ data, as described above. Note that such 
confidence data exclusion is applied only to the analysis about participants’ confidence 
(Section 7.4). 
  114 
7 Results 
7.1 Trials to criterion 
One-way between-subject ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of learning 
stage on the trials to criterion, F(6, 224)=8.32, p<0.001, partial η2=0.182. Pairwise post-hoc t-
tests with Dunn-Sidák’s correction indicated that trials to criterion in the ED stage were 
significantly higher than those in all the other six stages, while there is no significant 
difference in the trials to criterion between any two of the other six stages (Figure 7.1), as 
though the participants formed an attentional set before the ED stage. Therefore, similar to 
findings in the rat 7-stage task, humans take significantly more trials to learn the ED stage 
compared to the ID stage. Note that although participants often took more trials to criterion in 
REV1 than in the CD, the difference in trials between the two stages was not significant, 
probably because human participants could quickly change response patterns to make their 
choice when spotting wrong choices early in the REV1 stage. 
 
Figure 7.1: trials to criterion for each of the seven stages. Humans took significantly 
more trials in ED than that in ID stage.  
 
7.2 Can Bayesian model accurately estimate which erroneous rules were used? 
One main purpose of designing the human 7-stage task is to check whether a participant 
really did use a specific response pattern to make their choice when the Bayesian estimate of 
the corresponding hypothesis was high (see Section 2.3 for the relationship between response 
pattern and corresponding hypothesis). Since both the human behavioural simple Bayesian 
model (Equations 6.1-6.2) and the human behavioural reward Bayesian model (Equation 6.8) 
can be used to estimate what response patterns (sometimes called rules in the research 
literature) have been used to make choices, these two Bayesian models were evaluated as to 
how reliably they estimated response patterns, particularly the reward-irrelevant (i.e., 
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erroneous) response patterns, in this section. Specifically, if a Bayesian model estimated that 
one irrelevant response pattern was used (i.e., the Bayesian probability of the corresponding 
hypothesis is larger than 0.6) in one or more trials in a learning stage, and the participant also 
did use this response pattern (known from participant’s oral response) in the stage, then we 
would consider that the Bayesian model has correctly found (or estimated) one erroneous 
response pattern; otherwise, the Bayesian model has incorrectly estimated one erroneous 
response pattern. Note that even if the probability of one type of response pattern is larger 
than 0.6 in more than one trial in a stage, we only count once for this type of response pattern 
in the stage. The focus of data analysis here is to compare which Bayesian model can 
correctly estimate more erroneous response patterns. Across all participants’ seven learning 
stages, the human behavioural simple Bayesian model correctly estimated 155 irrelevant 
response patterns and incorrectly estimated 21 irrelevant response patterns (Table 7.1), after 
removing four uncertain estimates due to participants’ ambiguous oral responses, such as ‘I 
guess this one is correct’ or ‘I want to see what happens’. In comparison, the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model correctly estimated 181 hypotheses and incorrectly 
estimated just seven hypotheses (Table 7.1, last row), after removing three uncertain 
estimates. A chi-square test supports that the human behavioural reward Bayesian model 
found relatively more correct estimates of response patterns and fewer incorrect estimates 
than the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, Chi-square (1) =8.63, p=0.003.  Note 
that the total number of estimated erroneous response patterns is different between the two 
Bayesian models (176 vs 188), because the human behavioural simple Bayesian models 
missed more erroneous rules used by rats (while it found more false erroneous rules). 
 
Table 7.1: number of reward-irrelevant response patterns correctly and incorrectly 
estimated by two Bayesian models, across all participants’ seven learning stages, with 
percentage of correct and incorrect estimates in parentheses and expected values in 
italics. 
 Correct estimates of 
irrelevant response 
patterns 
Incorrect estimates of 
irrelevant response 
patterns 
Human behavioural 
simple Bayesian model 
155 (88.1%) 
162.5 
21 (11.9%) 
13.5 
Human behavioural 
reward Bayesian model 
181 (96.3%) 
173.5 
7 (3.7%) 
14.5 
 
 
A mixed design two-way ANOVA analysis showed that the number of correctly estimated 
irrelevant (i.e., erroneous) response patterns, when using the human behavioural reward 
Bayesian model, is significantly higher than using the simple Bayesian model, 
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F(1,224)=17.56, p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.073. Also, the number of correctly estimated 
erroneous response patterns is significantly different between the seven stages, 
F(6,224)=48.91, p<0.001, partial η2 = 0.567. The interaction of model with stage is 
significant, F(6,224) = 15.74, p<0.001, partial η2= 0.297. 
 
Post-hoc Tukey’s HSD tests showed that significantly more irrelevant response patterns are 
found in the ED and three reversal stages than in the other three stages (SD, CD, ID), and 
significantly fewer irrelevant hypotheses are found in the CD and ID stages than in the SD 
stage, all at the .05 level of significance. All other comparisons were not significant (Figure 
7.2).  
  
Figure 7.2: the number of reward-irrelevant (i.e., erroneous) response patterns 
correctly estimated by the two Bayesian models for each learning stage. The human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model can find more irrelevant (erroneous) hypotheses 
used by participants in the ED stage. 
 
The human behavioural reward Bayesian model found significantly more irrelevant 
hypotheses in the ED stage than the simple Bayesian model does (Figure 7.2), paired t(32) = 
5.81, p<0.001, d=1.03. For example, the reward Bayesian model has correctly estimated three 
erroneous response patterns in the ED stage (pointed by arrows in Figure 7.3, left) from the 
data of participant ‘A003’: two response patterns from the irrelevant dimension (solid and 
dotted black curves) and the stick alternation hypothesis (solid red curve), while the simple 
Bayesian model only estimated one erroneous response pattern from the irrelevant dimension 
(dotted black curve pointed by arrow; Figure 7.3, right). 
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Figure 7.3: an illustrative example of the behavioural pattern estimated by the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model (left) and by the human behavioural simple 
Bayesian model (right) on the same data from participant ‘A003’. The reward 
Bayesian model has correctly estimated more erroneous hypotheses (left), where the 
three estimated hypotheses were found to be used in this participant’s oral report. Solid 
and dotted black curves: probabilities of two hypotheses from the previously rewarded 
but currently irrelevant dimension; Solid blue curve: rewarded stimulus; Dotted blue 
curve: non-rewarded stimulus from the currently relevant dimension; Solid and dotted 
red curves: stick alternation and blob alternation hypotheses; Solid and dotted magenta 
and green curves: four blob-stick combinations. 
 
7.3 Individual estimate of set-formation before the ED stage 
Bayesian analysis provides a way to check whether individual participants have formed an 
attentional set. The rationale is that if a participant has formed an attentional set before 
starting the ED stage this participant would use (new) stimuli of the previously relevant but 
currently irrelevant dimension to make choices at the first several (e.g., 4) trials in the ED 
stage. This would lead to a relatively high Bayesian estimate for such irrelevant stimuli at the 
beginning of ED stage, if the human behavioural reward Bayesian model works well.  
 
The human behavioural reward Bayesian model (Equation 6.8) can accurately estimate that 
participants had formed an attentional set when they really did. For 27 out of 32 participants’ 
data, the posterior probability of one or two hypotheses from the previously rewarded but 
currently irrelevant dimension becomes relatively high (i.e., >0.6) at the first several trials in 
the ED stage (see Figure 7.4 for two representative examples). Based on the participants’ oral 
response to the question ‘why do you think this is correct?’, it appears that these 27 
participants did use stimuli from the previously relevant dimension to make choices at the 
beginning of the ED stage, indicating that these participants had formed an attentional set 
before starting the ED stage.  
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What is more, for the remaining five participants for whom the posterior probability of each 
stimulus from the previously reward-relevant dimension is relatively low (all less than 0.4) at 
the first several trials in ED (Figure 7.5), these participants’ oral responses tell us that they 
really did not make choices based on the previously reward-relevant dimension at the 
beginning of the ED stage. More specifically, one participant ‘A012’ used ‘how much the 
stick is outside the blob region’ to make choices (Figure 7.5, left), whereas the other 4 
participants immediately used the currently reward-relevant dimension to make choices at the 
beginning of the ED stage (Figure 7.5, right). 
 
The perfect match between Bayesian estimate and participants’ oral responses suggests that 
the reward Bayesian model can be used to analyse whether each individual participant has 
formed an attentional set or not from the first several trials in the ED stage. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: posterior probability of each hypothesis over ED trials by the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model from two representative participants who made 
choices based on the previously relevant dimension’s stimuli at the beginning of the ED 
stage. Solid and dotted black curves: two stimuli from the previously relevant but 
currently irrelevant dimension; Solid blue curve: rewarded stimulus; Dotted blue curve: 
non-rewarded stimulus from the currently relevant dimension; Solid and dotted red 
curves: stick alternation and blob alternation hypotheses; Solid and dotted magenta and 
green curves: four blob-stick combinations. 
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Participant A012 Participant A024
  
Figure 7.5: posterior probability of each hypothesis over ED trials by the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model from two participants who did not make choices 
based on stimuli (the sticks in the stimulus) in the previously relevant dimension at 
the beginning of the ED stage. The Bayesian estimates of the two hypotheses from the 
previously relevant dimension (two black sticks) were less than 0.6 over all trials in 
each ED stage. 
 
In comparison, with the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, for those 27 participants 
who made choices based on the newly irrelevant dimension’s stimuli at the beginning of the 
ED stage, the posterior probabilities of certain hypotheses from the irrelevant dimension 
become relatively high on only 16 participants’ data. In other words, the simple Bayesian 
model failed to find that 11 participants focused on the previously relevant but currently 
irrelevant dimension at the beginning of the ED stage. For those five participants who did not 
make their choices based on the irrelevant dimension’s stimuli at the beginning of the ED 
stage, the posterior probability of a hypothesis from the irrelevant dimension becomes 
relatively high on one participant’s data. This result suggests that the simple Bayesian model, 
which did not consider the effect of choice feedback, cannot reliably estimate whether or not 
each participant has formed an attentional set. 
 
7.4 Latent probabilistic model can more accurately estimate participants’ confidence 
The human latent probabilistic model (Equation 6.3) was developed to estimate the likelihood 
that each hypothesis is associated with reward (or ‘correct’) by considering the effect of the 
choice result (‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’) on consequent learning. During learning to find the 
‘correct’-associated hypothesis, participants’ confidence in making choices would probably 
be affected by their choice feedback (‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’) from previous trials, which is 
supported by the result shown in Figure 7.6. Therefore, compared to the human behavioural 
simple Bayesian model, which can only estimate the likelihood each hypothesis is used to 
make choice, the reward Bayesian model may more reliably estimate participants’ confidence 
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in making choices.  
 
Since participants took, on average,  just 6 to 10 trials to finish most learning stages except 
for the ED stage, the pattern of participants’ confidence in these six stages may not be rich 
enough to show potential differences in confidence estimation between the behavioural 
simple Bayesian model and the latent probabilistic model. Therefore, I analysed only the 
confidence data in the ED stage. With the latent probabilistic model, the correlation between 
the reported confidence and the posterior probability (i.e., b-value) of the correct (latent) 
hypothesis in the ED stage was calculated for each of the 21 participants, resulting in 21 
confidence-b-value correlations. Similarly, with the simple Bayesian model, the correlation 
between the reported confidence and the probability estimate of the correct (behavioural) 
hypothesis was calculated for each participant. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the 
confidence-b-value correlation from the latent probabilistic model is significantly higher than 
that from the simple Bayesian model (Z=2.41, p=0.016, r=0.32), median=0.74 with latent 
probabilistic model and median=0.62 with simple Bayesian model (Figure 7.7). Figure 7.8 
shows an example of the scatter plot of b-value versus reported confidence with the latent 
probabilistic model and the simple Bayesian model, respectively.  
 
Figure 7.6: effect of choice feedback in current trial on the change in participants’ 
choice confidence in the next trial. The average changes in participants’ reported 
confidence (within the range 0 to 100) for both ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ feedbacks 
were collected over trials in the ED stage for each participant. A Mann-Whitney U test 
showed that the change in participants’ choice confidence is significantly different 
between the ‘correct choice’ feedback and the ‘incorrect choice’ feedback (median 
change in confidence is 9.8 when choice is ‘correct’, and −3.8 when choice is 
‘incorrect’), U=121.0, n1=28, n2=28, Z=−4.44, p<0.001.  
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Figure 7.7: the correlation between reported confidence and the b-value with the 
human latent probabilistic model and the simple Bayesian model, respectively. The b-
value from the latent probabilistic model is more correlated with the reported 
confidence than that from the simple Bayesian model.  
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Figure 7.8: an illustrative example to show that the b-value from the human latent 
probabilistic model (left) is more strongly correlated with the reported confidence 
than that from the simple Bayesian model (right). 
 
7.5 Bayesian learning criterion based on the latent probabilistic model performs 
better than the simple Bayesian model 
As discussed for the rat Bayesian model, a Bayesian learning criterion can be used as an 
alternative learning criterion to decide the point at which participants have learned the correct 
rules. Since we know what actual hypotheses participants are using for each learning trial, 
based on their oral report for each trial, we can validate how well the Bayesian learning 
criterion is based both on the human behavioural simple Bayesian model and on the latent 
probabilistic model, and also validate how well the 6-in-a-row criterion is.  
 
From the participants’ oral reports, I found that 29 out of 32 participants started to use the 
correct rules from either the sixth last, fifth last, fourth last, or the third last trials in each of 
the seven learning stages. This suggests that the 6-in-a-row criterion is well aligned with the 
point at which participants learned the correct rules.  
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For the other three participants, a total of four false positives were found from their ED or 
reversal stages, whereas participants in general made the last six correct choices based on the 
combination or interaction of blob and stick stimuli, like “more proportion of sticks insides 
the blob region”.  
 
Based on the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, I found that the Bayesian learning 
criterion was not satisfied in the last trial of the three reversal stages for most participants and 
in the last trial of the ED stage for about half of the participants (Figure 7.9). This suggests 
that the Bayesian learning based on the simple model is not consistent with participants’ oral 
reporting of the point at which they have learned the correct response patterns.  
 
In comparison, with the human latent probabilistic model, Bayesian learning criterion is 
satisfied in the last trial of all stages for all participants (Figure 7.10). Detailed analysis also 
shows that the criterion is satisfied within the last three trials for ID, ED, and reversal stages. 
This suggests that the Bayesian learning criterion based on the latent probabilistic model is 
well aligned with the 6-in-a-row criterion and consistent with participants’ oral report of 
when they have learned the rules for all learning stages except the six false positive learning 
stages. 
 
Figure 7.9: histogram of probability of ‘correct’-associated hypotheses in the last trial 
for each learning stage over 32 participants with the human behavioural simple 
Bayesian model. The Bayesian learning criterion based on the simple Bayesian model 
is not working well in at least the three reversal stages and the ED stage. 
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Figure 7.10: histogram of probability of ‘correct’ latent hypotheses at the last trial for 
each learning stage over 33 participants with the human latent probabilistic model. 
The Bayesian learning criterion based on the latent probabilistic model is well aligned 
with participants’ oral reports of the point at which they learned the correct rules. 
 
7.6 Human latent probabilistic model better predicts whether participants are using 
correct response patterns to make choices 
After showing that the human latent probabilistic model can better predict the point at which 
participants started to use the correct response pattern to make their choices, we investigated 
whether the b-value (i.e., the posterior probability of the correct latent hypothesis) from the 
human latent probabilistic model performs better than the b-value from the human 
behavioural simple Bayesian model in predicting whether a participant is using the correct 
response pattern to make their choice in each (current) trial in the ED stage. Specifically, the 
b-value and ‘whether or not participants are using the correct response pattern to make their 
choice’ (obtained from participants’ oral reports) were collected for each trial in the ED 
across all 32 participants. Then a logistic regression was fitted to predict ‘whether or not 
participants are using the correct response patterns to make their choice’ with b-value as the 
predictor. Similarly, another logistic regression was fitted using the b-value of the simple 
Bayesian model as the predictor.  
 
For both predictors, the residual of prediction for each trial was computed as the difference 
between the predicted value (within the range 0 to 1) and the actual value (with ‘1’ for ‘using 
correct response pattern to make their choice’ and ‘0’ otherwise). If the b-value from the 
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human behavioural simple Bayesian model and the b-value from the human latent 
probabilistic model have similar prediction performance, the mean absolute residuals over all 
trials per participant from both predictors should be similar when predicting the actual value. 
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the absolute residual from the human latent 
probabilistic model (median=0.20) is significantly lower than that from the human 
behavioural simple Bayesian model (median=0.28), Z=−4.77, n=32, p<0.001, r=0.60. (Figure 
7.11). This supports the view that the latent probabilistic model is better than the simple 
Bayesian model in predicting whether or not participants are using the correct response 
pattern to make their choice in each trial.  
 
Figure 7.11: average absolute value of the residual per participant based on the frequentist p-
value, b-value from the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, and b-value from the 
human latent probabilistic model. 
 
In addition, I also fitted a logistic regression with the frequentist p-value as predictor. A 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that the absolute residual based on p-value (median=0.21) 
is also significantly lower than that from the simple Bayesian model (median=0.28), Z=−4.06, 
n=32, p<0.001, r=0.51, but is significantly higher than that from the latent probabilistic 
model, Z=3.33, p<0.01, r=0.42 (Figure 7.11). These results suggest that although both the 6-
in-a-row and the Bayesian learning criterion based on the human latent probabilistic model 
are aligned with the point at which participants started to use the correct response pattern to 
make their choice, the latent probabilistic model can better predict whether participants are 
using the correct response pattern to make their choice for each learning trial (including the 
trials before the last six correct trials). 
7.7 The human behavioural reward Bayesian model does not work well on rats 
Considering the good performance of the human behavioural reward Bayesian model on the 
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human task, it is interesting to explore whether the human reward Bayesian model performs 
well on the archival rat data used in the previous chapter (see Section 2.1). The evaluation of 
the human behavioural reward Bayesian model requires that we know what response patterns 
have been actually used by rats. However, we can never know for certain the rats’ internal 
decision-making processes in any given learning stage. Even so, we may assume a rat used 
the perseveration response pattern when the rat directly chose bowls on the same side (either 
left side or right side) over six or more trials in a row, without going to check the other bowl. 
Note that in this case, the rat cannot make six correct choices in a row because the 
configurations of bowls were designed such that the reward-relevant stimulus would not 
appear on the same side for more than three trials in a row. Similarly, the rat probably won’t 
make choice based on other perceptual response patterns. In this case, we may evaluate 
whether a Bayesian model can correctly estimate that the rat is actually using the 
perseveration response pattern to choose bowls. From all the 47 control rats, I observed that 
there are 28 stages where the rats chose bowls on the same side over six or more consecutive 
trials. For these 28 stages, the rat behavioural Bayesian model developed for the rat task (aka 
‘rat model’) correctly estimated that the rat used the perseveration response pattern in all the 
28 stages, while the human behavioural reward Bayesian model (aka ‘human model’) found 
the perseveration response pattern was used in only 11 stages (Table 7.2). Each Bayesian 
model estimated that a rat used the perseveration response pattern when the posterior 
probability of the corresponding hypothesis is larger than 0.6. A Chi-square test shows that 
the rat model performs significantly better than the human model in correctly estimating the 
perseveration hypothesis, Chi-square(1) = 24.4, p<0.001. Figure 7.12 shows an example 
where the rat model found that the rat used the perseveration response pattern (red dotted 
curve) while the human model did not, based on the criterion that the Bayesian estimate of 
the hypothesis is larger than 0.6. A similar result was obtained when the parameter in the 
human model was changed, precisely by varying the parameter in the feedback effect 
function (Equations 6.4 – 6.7). The results suggest that although the human model can 
accurately estimate the response patterns used by human participants in the human task it 
does not work well on the rat task. This is because the human model estimated that the rat 
would be more likely to use certain other response pattern(s) than the perseveration response 
pattern once the rat made a wrong choice, whereas the rat made choices on the same side 
even after making multiple wrong choices. 
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Table 7.2: estimate of perseveration response pattern (based on the threshold 0.6; see 
main text) with two Bayesian models from those stages where rats chose bowls from 
the same side on at least six consecutive trials.  
 Correct estimate Incorrect estimate 
Rat behavioural Bayesian model 
(rat model) 
28 (100%) 
(expected: 19.5) 
0 (0%) 
(expected: 8.5) 
Human behavioural reward 
Bayesian model (human model) 
11 (39.3%) 
(expected: 19.5) 
17 (60.7%) 
(expected: 8.5) 
 
   
(a) from rat Bayesian model                       (b) from human Bayesian model 
Figure 7.12: a representative example of the Bayesian estimate of the ‘perseveration 
hypothesis’ (red dotted curve) with the rat model (left) and the human model (right) 
when the rat (‘09/143’) probably used the spatial perseveration response pattern to 
make its choice over eight consecutive trials in the REV3 stage. The rat model 
correctly estimated the hypothesis, but the human model did not. A red dashed bar 
above each figure indicates trials in which rats used perseveration for bowl choice. 
 
To further compare the rat model and the human model on rat data, I also evaluated their 
performance in predicting whether a rat’s next trial choice is correct or not based on the 
current trial’s b-value, where the b-value is either from the rat model or from the human 
model. Specifically, an individual logistic regression was fitted to predict the next trial’s 
choice correctness, based on the current trial’s b-value over all seven stages’ learning trials 
for each individual rat, resulting in 93 individual logistic regressions for each b-value 
predictor. The residual of prediction for each trial was computed as the difference between 
predicted value (within the range 0 to 1) and the actual correctness (with ‘1’ for correct 
choice and ‘0’ for incorrect choice).  
 
If the b-value from the rat model and the b-value from the human reward Bayesian model 
have similar prediction performance, the mean absolute residuals over all trials per 
participant from both predictors should be similar when predicting the actual value. A paired 
t-test showed that the absolute residual from the human model (m=0.350, sd=0.061) is 
significantly lower than that from the rat model (m=0.357, sd=0.060), t(92)=−4.58, p<0.001, 
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d=0.48. However, considering the very large absolute residual (0.350 vs. 0.357; the expected 
absolute residual from random guess is 0.500) and the very small difference (−0.007) in 
average absolute residual between the two models, it suggests that the rat model and the 
human model have similar performance in predicting the next trial’s outcome. A similar 
finding was obtained when the b-value is from the human latent probabilistic model, 
replacing the b-value from the human behavioural reward Bayesian model. 
8 Discussion on Bayesian analysis of the human task 
The Bayesian analysis of the human task shows that the Bayesian estimates of both correct 
and erroneous response patterns match with what participants reported orally, providing 
indirect evidence for the validity of Bayesian analysis of rat data with a similar Bayesian 
model. For humans, the Bayesian analysis considering the effect of choice feedback is clearly 
better than the model without considering the effect in estimating participants’ response 
patterns and choice confidence. However, the human reward Bayesian model does not offer 
any substantive advantage to analysing the archival rat data, in spite of doubling the free 
parameters used in the analysis relative to the rat Bayesian model in both cases. Thus, I 
believe that the enhanced predictive accuracy in humans of incorporating feedback into the 
analysis is not simply a statistical artefact. I speculate that humans and rats use different 
learning approaches, with humans using rapidly adapting hypothesis-testing and rats relying 
on more gradual associative learning. 
8.1 Human reward Bayesian model can accurately estimate erroneous rules used by 
participants 
Participants may often try one or more types of erroneous, irrelevant response patterns before 
learning to find the correct, rewarded response patterns, particularly in the ED stage. If our 
Bayesian model(s) can find (at least some of) the erroneous response patterns used by 
participants, it would provide very useful information for investigating individuals’ detailed 
learning processes. Both the human behavioural simple Bayesian model and the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model have shown their ability to estimate the erroneous 
response patterns. Specifically, when the Bayesian estimate of one response pattern is high in 
an individual’s learning stage, most of the time the estimate is correct by comparing with the 
participant’s oral report. The estimate accuracy is 96.3% (181 correct estimates out of 188 
response patterns) for the human behavioural reward model and 88.1% (155/176) for the 
human behavioural simple Bayesian model. The human behavioural reward model correctly 
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found more erroneous response patterns (particularly in the ED stage) with fewer mistakes 
than the human behavioural simple Bayesian model. When the human behavioural reward 
model made a mistake, it was either because the participant accidently made a choice that 
he/she did not mean to, or because the participant used rare and special rules about the 
conjunction of blob and stick stimuli. This suggests potential future improvements in human 
task design, e.g., providing an opportunity for participants to change their choice at each 
learning trial, and carefully designing and pairing blob and stick stimuli such that the rare 
blob-stick interaction response patterns become invalid in differentiating the two choices at 
each trial.  
 
In addition, the good estimate accuracy (88.1%) by the human behavioural simple Bayesian  
model provides additional evidence for the effectiveness of the rat behavioural Bayesian 
model for the rat task, because the rat behavioural Bayesian model used for rats’ data analysis 
has shown better performance than the (rat) behavioural simple Bayesian model in estimating 
the erroneous response patterns, at least based on the simulated data (see Section 5).  
 
Overall, when Bayesian estimate of a hypothesis is high, the participant did use the 
corresponding response pattern to make their choice.  
8.2 Human reward Bayesian model can estimate set formation for each individual 
In both rat and human 7-stage tasks, any evaluation of a participant’s ED performance is 
based on the implicit assumption that the participant has focused on the previously relevant 
but currently irrelevant dimension stimuli (i.e., has formed an attentional set) before shifting 
their attention in the ED stage. In previous work, such set-formation is evaluated by the 
‘ID/ED trial difference’ based on a group of participants’ performance in the 7-stage task. 
However, forming an attentional set at group level does not necessarily mean that every 
individual participant has formed an attentional set.  
 
The human behavioural reward Bayesian model, which considers the effect of choice 
feedback (in the model’s prior), shows its ability to estimate whether each individual 
participant has formed an attentional set or not. If a participant has formed an attentional set 
before starting the ED stage, the participant would be more likely to make choices based on 
the response patterns linked to the irrelevant dimension at the first several trials of the ED 
stage. Therefore, reliably estimating whether or not a participant uses response patterns of the 
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irrelevant dimension at the beginning of the ED stage can be used to infer whether or not the 
participant has formed an attentional set. The human behavioural reward Bayesian model 
correctly estimated whether or not each participant used response patterns of the irrelevant 
dimension to make choices at the beginning of the ED stage. With this ability of the reward 
Bayesian model, we can accurately decide whether a participant’s ED data should be used or 
not when analysing ED performance in any future study, or assess whether the participant is 
capable of forming an attentional set if they suffer brain damage of some kind or another. 
Note that the ability to reliably estimate whether or not a participant forms an attentional set 
is seen in the human behavioural reward Bayesian model, but not in the human behavioural 
simple Bayesian model. Therefore, although the reward Bayesian model can help analyse 
individual set-formation in the human 7-stage task, it is not clear whether the rat behavioural 
Bayesian model, which does not consider the effect of choice feedback and is an extension of 
the (rat) behavioural simple Bayesian model, can reliably estimate set-formation in a rat’s 7-
stage task.  
8.3 Human latent probabilistic model can more reliably estimate participants’ 
confidence than behavioural simple Bayesian model 
The human latent probabilistic model can not only help estimate erroneous response patterns 
used by participants and estimate whether or not participants have formed an attentional set, 
it might also be used to predict the participants’ confidence when making choices at each trial. 
Specifically, the posterior estimate (i.e., b-value) of the correct (rewarded) latent hypothesis 
from the latent probabilistic model is highly correlated with participants’ reported confidence 
and the correlation is higher than that from the human behavioural simple Bayesian model. 
The b-value from the latent probabilistic model is estimated by considering the effect of the 
choice feedback on learning, and there is clear evidence for the effect of feedback on 
participants’ confidence change. Therefore, it is reasonable that the b-value from the latent 
probabilistic model and participants’ confidence have a high correlation. In contrast, the b-
value from the human behavioural simple Bayesian model is estimated without considering 
the effect of feedback and therefore it is reasonable to have lower correlation with 
participants’ confidence. When participants’ confidence is of interest in any set-shifting study, 
the high correlation between b-value and confidence could imply that the b-value could be 
used to infer confidence and therefore can act as a surrogate measure.  
8.4 Human latent probabilistic model can better estimate participants’ learning 
As another application of the human latent probabilistic model, the Bayesian learning 
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criterion based on the latent probabilistic model is consistent with participants’ oral reports of 
the point at which they learned the correct response patterns in most stages (except for the 
four false positive learning cases). In comparison, the Bayesian learning criterion based on 
the human behavioural simple Bayesian model is not consistent with participants’ oral reports 
in three reversal stages for most participants, and, in the ED stage, for about half of 
participants, and is therefore not good enough to predict when participants will have learned 
the correct response patterns in reversal and ED stages. Such a comparison result suggests 
that it is necessary to consider the effect of choice feedback in order to more accurately 
estimate the time point when participants have learned the correct response pattern for each 
learning stage. However, the Bayesian learning criterion based on the human latent 
probabilistic model is always satisfied when participants make six correct choices in a row at 
the end of each learning stage, including the four false positive learning cases. Note that the 
false positive learning is not due to random guesses when making choices. Instead, 
participants reported using esoteric response patterns, which happen to be consistent with the 
correct response patterns, in making their choices. These false positives could be reduced by 
more carefully designing and pairing blob and stick stimuli in each stage such that the rare 
response patterns are no longer valid to differentiate two choices at each learning trial.  
 
On the other hand, although the Bayesian learning criterion based on the human behavioural 
simple Bayesian model is not consistent with participants’ oral reporting, such inconsistency 
does not imply that the Bayesian learning criterion from the rat behavioural Bayesian model 
is not accurate as well. Actually, the rat behavioural Bayesian model, which considers the 
effect of ‘1st/2nd’ observation at each trial, has shown better performance than the rat 
behavioural simple Bayesian model in estimating the rules used in a stage based on the 
simulated data. Of course, the rat behavioural Bayesian model (see Table 6.3 for various 
Bayesian models) could, and probably should, be extended to include the effect of choice 
feedback at each trial to further improve its ability in individual rat’s data analysis, as has 
been shown on individual human’s data analysis.  
 
The human latent probabilistic model not only provides a better learning criterion to estimate 
when participants learn the correct hypothesis for each learning stage, but is also better than 
both the human behavioural simple Bayesian model and the frequentist approach in 
predicting whether or not participants are using correct response patterns to make their choice 
in each learning trial, including the trials before the last six correct trials in each stage. This 
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provides more evidence to support the view that the human latent probabilistic model, which 
includes the human behavioural reward Bayesian model, is a better choice to describe 
participants’ learning at each trial. 
8.5 Humans and rats may use different learning approaches 
While the human behavioural reward Bayesian model can effectively estimate the response 
patterns used by participants in the human task, it cannot estimate that the rats are using the 
perseveration response pattern when the rats chose bowls on the same side over six or more 
consecutive trials. This not only suggests that the human behavioural reward Bayesian model 
does not work well on the rat task, but also provides evidence that rats might use a different 
learning approach compared to humans in the set-shifting task. From human participants’ oral 
reporting, I observed that humans often used a hypothesis-testing approach to learning the 
correct response patterns, i.e., humans first hypothesise (or guess) that a certain response 
pattern is the correct rule before making their choice, and then, based on the choice feedback, 
either continue using the same response pattern (if the choice feedback is correct) or quickly 
shift to another response pattern (if the choice is incorrect) in the next learning trial. This 
observation is consistent with previous human (Rolls et al., 1994a; Hampton et al., 2007) and 
rhesus monkey (Costa et al., 2015; Murray & Gaffan, 2006, in Izquierdo et al., 2017) studies 
which showed subjects performed reversal learning by quickly shifting rules. A recent 
reversal learning study with a non-Bayesian reinforcement learning approach showed that 
human participants implicitly hypothesise that a certain cue is associated with the prediction 
of choice outcome, and that they then either keep focusing on the cue if their prediction is 
correct or otherwise shift to another cue in the next trial (Akaishi et al., 2016). The human 
latent probabilistic model for the human task is particularly developed by considering such a 
hypothesis-testing learning style. However, rats may use reinforcement learning to find the 
correct rule in the set-shifting task, where the rats gradually learn the association between the 
correct stimulus-response rule and the reward over multiple trials. It is probably the different 
learning approaches between the two species that cause the poor performance of the human 
Bayesian analysis on the archival data from the rat task.  
 
  132 
9 Human set-shifting task with Gabor patches 
To further confirm the results found on the human 7-stage task with blobs and sticks as 
stimuli, another human 7-stage was designed by replacing the blob and stick stimuli with 
Gabor patches with varying orientations and frequencies (Figure 9.1).  Gabor patches have 
the advantage that the parameters used to construct them can be considered dimensions, 
whereas the stick and blob stimuli used in the previous task have perceptual dimensions that 
can vary across individuals (e.g., as evidenced by the esoteric rules reported by some 
participants).  Additionally, the parameters used in making Gabor patches can be adjusted to 
vary task difficulty and thus attentional load.   
 
 
Figure 9.1: stimuli used in the human Gabor patch 7-stage task. Two dimensions of 
stimuli are used: orientation and frequency of lines in the Gabor patch. The four 
stimuli in each row were used for a unique compound stage (either CD, ID, or ED) 
and subsequent reversal stage. 
 
Nineteen participants were recruited to complete the Gabor patch set-shifting task. The task 
data were collected and the participants’ oral responses were transcribed by Meggie Rix as 
part of an undergraduate research project; however, I developed the software for running the 
task and the routines used below for analysing the resulting data.  According to the criterion 
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used for the human blob-stick task (see Section 6.5), no participants’ data were considered as 
outliers. The other details about the methodology are presented above in Sections 6.3-6.4. 
9.1 Trials to criterion 
A one-way between-subjects ANOVA showed that the trials to criterion (dependent variable) 
are significantly different across learning stages (independent variable), F(6, 126)=3.66, 
p=0.002, partial η2=0.148.  A post-hoc Sidák-Dunn test tells us that the trials to criterion in 
the ED are significantly higher than those in the other five stages except for the REV1 stage, 
whereas there is no significant difference in the trials to criterion between any two of the six 
stages except for the ED stage (Figure 9.2). Note that there is no significant difference in the 
trials between CD and REV1, although participants often took more trials in REV1 than in 
CD (Figure 9.2).  Similar to findings in the rat 7-stage task and in the human blob-stick 7-
stage task, humans take significantly more trials to learn the ED stage compared to ID stage 
in the Gabor-patch 7-stage task. This indicates that, at the group level, humans have formed 
an attentional set before the ED stage.  
 
Figure 9.2: trials to criterion for each of the seven stages. Participants took 
significantly more trials in the ED than that in the ID stage, similar to the findings in 
the blob-stick human task (Figure 7.1). Vertical lines: standard errors. 
9.2 Can the human behavioural reward Bayesian model reliably estimate which 
erroneous rules were used? 
Just as with the human blob-stick 7-stage task, here we try to evaluate whether participants 
really use a specific response pattern (or rule) to make their choices when the Bayesian 
estimate of the corresponding hypothesis is high. Across all participants’ seven learning 
stages, the human behavioural simple Bayesian model correctly estimated (see Section 7.2 for 
details) 76 irrelevant hypotheses and incorrectly estimated 15 irrelevant hypotheses (Table 
9.1). By comparison, the human behavioural reward Bayesian model has correctly estimated 
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96 hypotheses and incorrectly estimated just nine hypotheses (Table 9.1, last row). The 
human behavioural reward Bayesian model has a trend of more correct hypothesis estimates 
and fewer incorrect estimates than the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, Chi-
square(1) =2.84, p=0.092.  
Table 9.1: number of reward-irrelevant hypotheses correctly and incorrectly estimated 
by two human Bayesian models, across learning stages for all participants, with 
percent of correct and incorrect estimates in parentheses and expected values in 
italics. 
 Correct hypothesis 
estimates 
Incorrect hypothesis 
estimates 
Human behavioural 
simple Bayesian model 
76 (83.5%) 
79.9 
15 (16.5%) 
11.1 
Human behavioural 
reward Bayesian model 
96 (91.4%) 
92.1 
9 (8.6%) 
12.9 
 
 
A mixed two-way ANOVA analysis showed that the numbers of estimated irrelevant/incorrect 
hypotheses are significantly different not only between the two Bayesian models, 
(F(1,126)=21.81, p<0.001, partial η2=0.148), but also between the seven stages 
(F(6,126)=40.01, p<0.001, partial η2=0.656). The interaction of model with stage is 
significant, F(6,224) = 18.12, p<0.001, partial η2=0.463.  
 
Post-hoc Dunn-Sidák tests showed that significantly more irrelevant/incorrect response 
patterns are found in the ED and three reversal stages than in the other three stages (SD, CD, 
ID), and significantly fewer irrelevant/incorrect response patterns are found in the CD stage 
than in the SD stage, all at the 0.05 level of significance. All other comparisons were not 
significant (Figure 9.3).  
    
Figure 9.3: the number of irrelevant response patterns correctly estimated by the two 
Bayesian models for each learning stage. The human behavioural reward Bayesian 
model can find more irrelevant (erroneous) response patterns used by participants in 
the ED stage. 
  135 
 
An additional paired-samples one-tailed t-test showed that the human behavioural reward 
Bayesian models found significantly more irrelevant response patterns in the ED stage than 
the human behavioural simple Bayesian model does (Figure 9.3), t(18) = 6.54, p<0.001, 
d=1.54.  
9.3 Bayesian analysis can estimate individual set formation 
The human Gabor patch 7-stage task also provides evidence to support the view that 
Bayesian analysis can check whether each individual participant has formed an attentional set. 
Using the human behavioural reward Bayesian model, I found that, for 17 out of 19 
participants’ data, the posterior probability of responding to stimuli from the previously 
reward relevant, but currently irrelevant, dimension becomes relatively high (i.e., >0.6) at the 
first several trials in the ED (Figure 9.4, left). Based on the participants’ oral responses, these 
17 participants did use stimuli from the previously relevant dimension to make their choices 
at the beginning of the ED stage, indicating that these participants had formed an attentional 
set before starting the ED stage. Furthermore, for the remaining two participants’ data where 
the posterior probability of each stimulus from the previously relevant dimension is relatively 
low (all less than 0.4) at the first several trials in the ED, these participants’ oral responses are 
not consistent with making choices based on the previously relevant dimension at the 
beginning of the ED stage. The perfect match between the Bayesian estimate and the 
participant’s oral response, again, suggests that the human behavioural reward Bayesian 
model can be used to analyse whether each individual participant has formed an attentional 
set or not from the first several trials in the ED stage. 
 
In comparison, for those 17 participants who made choices based on the irrelevant dimension 
stimuli at the beginning of the ED stage, the human behavioural simple Bayesian model 
(incorrectly) estimated that 13 out of 17 participants did not use the stimuli in the irrelevant 
dimension to make their choices (Figure 9.4, right). For those two participants who did not 
make their choices based on irrelevant dimension stimuli at the beginning of the ED stage, 
the human behavioural simple Bayesian model correctly estimated that the two participants 
used the stimuli in the irrelevant dimension to make their choices. As explained in Section 7.3, 
if a participant has formed an attentional set, the participant should use stimuli from the 
previously relevant but currently irrelevant dimension to make their choices at the first 
several trials in the ED stage., This result suggests, therefore, that the human behavioural 
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simple Bayesian model, which did not consider the effect of choice result, cannot reliably 
estimate whether or not each participant has formed an attentional set. 
 
Figure 9.4: posterior probability of each hypothesis over ED trials by the two 
Bayesian models for one representative participant who made choices based on the 
previously relevant dimension’s stimuli at the beginning (first three trials) of the ED 
stage, with correct estimate (arrow in the left figure) of set-formation from the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model, and the incorrect estimate (arrow in the right 
figure) from the human behavioural simple Bayesian model. Solid and dotted black 
curves are for the two stimuli from the previously relevant but currently irrelevant 
dimension; Solid blue curve: rewarded stimulus; Dotted blue curve: non-rewarded 
stimulus from currently relevant dimension; Solid and dotted red curves: frequency 
alternation and orientation alternation hypotheses; Solid and dotted magenta and 
green curves: four orientation-frequency combinations. 
9.4 Bayesian learning criterion based on the latent probabilistic model performs 
better 
Since we may assume that we know which response patterns (or rules) participants used for 
each learning trial, based on their oral report for each trial, we can evaluate how good the 
Bayesian learning criterion is, based on both the human behavioural simple Bayesian model 
and the human latent probabilistic model, and also how good the 6-in-a-row criterion is, just 
as in the human blob-stick 7-stage task.  
 
From participants’ oral reporting, I found that 18 out of 19 participants started to use the 
correct rules from one of the last six trials in each learning stage. This suggests that the 6-in-
a-row criterion is well aligned with the point at which participants learned the correct rules. 
The remaining participant made the last six correct choices in the REV1 and REV2 stages by 
remembering specific exemplars.  
 
Based on the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, I found that the Bayesian learning 
criterion was not satisfied by the last trial of the three reversal stages for most participants 
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and by the last trial of the ED stage for about half of the participants (Figure 9.5). This 
suggests that the human behavioural simple Bayesian model is not good enough from the 
perspective of learning criterion. 
 
In comparison, with the human latent probabilistic model, the Bayesian learning criterion is 
satisfied by the last trial of all stages for all participants (Figure 9.6). Detailed analysis also 
shows that the criterion is satisfied within the last 3 trials for ID, ED, and reversal stages. 
This suggests that the Bayesian learning criterion based on the human latent probabilistic 
model is consistent with the 6-in-a-row criterion and consistent with participants’ oral 
reporting of the point at which they learn the correct rules for all learning stages except the 2 
false positive learning stages. 
 
Figure 9.5: histogram of probability of ‘correct’-associated hypotheses at the last trial 
for each learning stage over 19 participants with the human behavioural simple 
Bayesian model. The Bayesian learning criterion based on the simple Bayesian model 
is not working well, at least in the three reversal stages and the ED stage. 
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Figure 9.6: histogram of probability of ‘correct’-associated hypotheses at the last trial 
for each learning stage over 19 participants with the human latent probabilistic model. 
The Bayesian learning criterion based on the human latent probabilistic model is 
consistent with the 6-in-a-row criterion.  
9.5 Discussion 
The results from the Bayesian analysis of the human Gabor patch task are consistent with 
those from the human blob-stick task. More specifically, the analysis shows that the Bayesian 
estimates of both correct and erroneous response patterns match participants’ self-reports, and 
the set-formation of each individual participant can be reliably estimated at the beginning of 
the ED stage with the help of the human behavioural reward Bayesian model. Also, the 
analysis again shows that the Bayesian learning criterion based on the human latent 
probabilistic model is consistent with the 6-correct-in-a-row criterion and with the oral report 
from participants. All these findings again provide evidence for the usefulness of Bayesian 
analysis on set-shifting tasks, which indirectly provides evidence for a similar Bayesian 
analysis on rat data where it is impossible to know for sure the latent decision processes. 
 
While the human Gabor patch task is an alternative to the human blob-stick task, several 
issues were observed in the Gabor task. First, the stimuli across stages in the Gabor task are 
highly related, such that the correct rule (response pattern) in one reversal stage often heavily 
influenced the participants’ choices in the next stage where completely new stimuli were used. 
For example, when participants found that the Gabor patch with more lines (stripes) was 
associated with the correct rule in REV1, they would naturally choose the Gabor patch with 
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more lines from the two new GaboI r patches at the beginning of the ID stage, although the 
line frequencies in both new Gabor patches in the ID were different from those in REV1. This 
suggests that one rule (response pattern) in one reversal stage could naturally appear in the 
next stage even with completely new stimuli. However, a qualified set-shifting task design 
should ensure that participants would use brand new stimuli-related rules in a new stage with 
completely new stimuli, which is the essential objective of the ‘total change’ in the well-
known CANTAB ID/ED task. The second issue from the Gabor task is that a few participants 
reported uncomfortable feelings (‘irritated’, ‘hate it’) when seeing the Gabor patches with 
either very dense (thin) lines or very few (thick) lines. In comparison, participants performing 
the blob-stick task did not report any such uncomfortable feelings. While participants’ self-
reports may be more interpretable with the Gabor patch task because Gabor patches can be 
verbally described more easily than the irregular blobs and sticks in the blob-stick task, the 
ease of verbalising the properties of the stimuli, as shown in the self-report, might cause 
participants to try to solve the problem through verbal reasoning. On the other hand, Gabor 
patches could provide more dimensions of features, such as the stripe orientation, frequency, 
contrast, colour, and even movement of stripes. Therefore, the above issues from the Gabor 
task and obvious advantages suggest both that the human task with the Gabor patch stimuli 
may need to be further explored and that it could be refined for future human set-shifting 
study. 
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Chapter IV: Future Work and Conclusions 
 
10 Future work 
Building on the developed effective Bayesian models and interesting and novel findings on 
rat and human 7-stage tasks, multiple lines of future work can be investigated, including the 
development of a reward Bayesian model specifically for the rat task, the development of 
adaptive design for the 7-stage tasks, and further evaluation of the Bayesian learning criterion, 
particularly on the rat set-shifting task.  
10.1 Refinement of Bayesian model 
Currently, the reward information (i.e., ‘whether a participant got reward or not for each trial’) 
has been included in the latent probabilistic model for the human set-shifting task. However, 
the direct application of this human model to the analysis of the rat set-shifting task was not 
successful, even with various parameter settings in the reward model. We speculate that this 
might be because the reward model developed for human task is suitable for the human 
hypothesis-testing learning style but not suitable for rats’ associative learning style. Therefore, 
one future study is to investigate how to embed reward information into the Bayesian model 
for the rat set-shifting task. Such a refined model would not only consider which response 
pattern the rat is using for bowl choice, but also consider which response pattern is possibly 
associated with food reward, both from the experimenter’s point of view.  
 
In addition, all the reported findings were obtained with a specific set of pre-fixed parameter 
values in the rat model and the human model respectively. It is worth investigating whether 
we would still obtain similar findings by varying the parameter values in both the rat model 
and human model. Initial Bayesian re-analysis for some of the key findings has already 
shown that both rat and human models are robust with varying model parameter values 
(Appendix A). More comprehensive investigation of model parameters could be performed 
on all the reported findings in the future. 
10.2 Adaptive design 
Traditionally, for each trial of a learning stage in the 7-stage task, researchers pre-determine 
which stimuli will be put into each bowl. Such a fixed trial design is meant to counterbalance 
across rats the positioning of different stimuli, such that the reward-associated stimulus (e.g., 
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M1) appears both in the left and in the right bowls over trials, and the pairing of different 
stimuli (e.g., O1 and O2) of the other dimension to the correct stimulus. However, this fixed 
design does not consider the performance of each rat (or human) over trials. For example, a 
rat may be using an incorrect response pattern to choose bowls and the food reward may 
happen to appear in the chosen bowls in several consecutive trials. In this case, the rat may 
strengthen the association between the incorrect response pattern and food reward. 
Consequently, the rat has to spend more trials in finding the food-associated response pattern.  
 
Using Bayesian analysis of a rat’s performance in the previous trial, we can adaptively 
determine which bowl will contain which stimuli for a given trial. I call such a dynamic 
process adaptive trial design. Different goals of adaptive trial design require different design 
principles. One possible goal of adaptive trial design is to potentially speed up rats’ learning 
in each stage. This goal could be achieved by minimising ambiguity and maximising 
information available to the rat concerning its most likely hypothesis. For example, suppose 
Bayesian analysis tells us that the rat is likely to respond to O2, even though M1 is reward-
associated, then for the next trial, M1 and O2 can be placed in different bowls. In this case, 
the rat would not be rewarded if it chooses the bowl with O2. This will have the effect of 
decreasing the association between the incorrect response pattern (‘O2’) and food reward. In 
this way, the rat may more quickly find the correct response pattern. 
 
 
The above example also indicates the principle of adaptive design for the goals of speeding 
up rats’ learning: put the food-associated stimulus into the bowl that the rat is least likely to 
choose. In more detail, suppose M1 is associated with food reward, each trial can be 
adaptively designed as follows: 
(1) Determination of stimulus pairs: if the Bayesian probability of O2 is higher than that 
of O1 based on the last trial’s observation, then put M1 and O1 into one bowl, and put 
the remaining stimuli (M2 and O2) into the other bowl. Otherwise, put M1 and O2 into 
one bowl. 
(2) Determination of side: If the rat is more likely to choose the left bowl than the right 
bowl based on Bayesian analysis of all four spatial hypotheses in the last trial, then put 
the food-associated M1 (and its paired odour stimulus) into the right bowl. Otherwise, 
put M1 into the left bowl. 
 
  142 
Based on the above principles, we can adaptively design each trial based on the Bayesian 
analysis of previous trials, which will potentially speed up rats’ learning process.  
 
Figure 10.1 shows the brief structure of the adaptive design software implemented in 
MATLAB. For each trial, the software displays the bowl information through the user 
interface (see the ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ bowls in Figure 10.2). Based on the displayed bowl 
design, the user (i.e., experimenter) sets up the real trial, and then observes and inputs the 
rat’s behaviour through the user interface (Figure 10.2). Then the software performs Bayesian 
analysis of the current trial to estimate the posterior probability of each hypothesis. Based on 
the posterior probabilities and the adaptive design principles, the software determines and 
displays which bowl should contain which stimuli for the next trial. The above process is 
repeated until each learning stage is finished by satisfying the Bayesian criterion (i.e., 
Bayesian probability of the correct hypothesis is larger than 0.95 by default). The rat’s 
behavioural responses and the estimated posterior probabilities for each hypothesis are saved 
into one Excel file for each rat.  
 
Figure 10.1: the basic framework of adaptive design. 
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Figure 10.2: a screen-shot of the adaptive design software. The stimuli in the ‘Left’ 
and the ‘Right’ bowls are determined from the adaptive design process, with the bold 
green stimulus associated with reward. User can input rat’s behaviour by clicking one 
of the two bowls, according to whether rat’s response is correct (i.e., got reward) or 
not and whether it digs the 1st or 2nd bowl it encounters, and recording the time spent 
to choose a bowl. Clicking ‘Next trial’ will trigger the Bayesian analysis of the current 
trial and then adaptively determine and display the pairing of stimuli in each bowl for 
the next trial. The right column on the user interface displays general information, 
including rat identity, current stage and trial number, the Bayesian learning criterion, 
and the estimated posterior probabilities of the four perceptual hypotheses from the 
previous trial. 
 
Using the adaptive design software, 12 normal rats and 11 mPFC-lesioned rats have 
performed the 7-stage task with each trial adaptively designed. The initial analysis of these 23 
rats’ data showed that both normal and lesioned rats did not show a difference in the number 
of trials between ID and ED stages. It seems that the adaptive design made both control and 
lesioned rats learn faster in the ED stage by helping rats disambiguate the relationship 
between stimuli and reward, such that the ID/ED difference observed in previous studies 
disappeared. However, considering the following factors, it is too early to draw any 
convincing conclusion from the initial data analysis: 
 
 Bayesian model issue: the rat behavioural Bayesian model has not been well developed 
to capture all relevant observation information, particularly the reward observation at 
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each trial. The current incomplete Bayesian model may not be able to well predict what 
hypothesis a rat would use to choose bowls in next trials, and therefore make the 
adaptive design of learning trials inappropriate. Refinement of the current Bayesian 
model could solve the ID/ED non-difference issue. 
 Data collection issue: the data collection procedure may not be well designed. 
Specifically, for each of the first four trials in each learning stage of the 7-stage task, the 
rat was allowed to dig in the other bowl if it dug first in the unrewarded bowl. This 
special step was designed to make the rat establish what the stimuli were in the bowls, 
and implicitly sped up rats’ learning. However, it may also suppress the perseveration 
errors that the rats could potentially have made. From this perspective, the lack of 
difference between the ID and ED trials based on adaptive design may be potentially 
from the special data collection step during the first four trials in the ED stage. To avoid 
the potential effect of this special step, new rats’ data should be collected and analysed 
using the adaptive design software with the exclusion of this special step. 
 
Therefore, more study is necessary to explore the adaptive design for attentional set-shifting 
tasks. 
 
In addition, besides the above goal and principle of adaptive design, we may also explore 
other design goals. An alternative goal of adaptive design is to maximally distinguish the 
likelihoods of the competing hypotheses (Liepe et al., 2013). To achieve this goal, the 
adaptive design should take into account the posteriors from the previous trial and search for 
the configuration of bowls that, on average across all possible responses to the configuration, 
results in the highest variability in the posterior probabilities after the current trial. In essence, 
what the adaptive design typically aims for is a posterior probability of 1 for the correct 
hypothesis and 0 for all remaining hypotheses.  The only concern is whether such an adaptive 
trial design would work if the conditions are changing, as we expect during learning in each 
stage of the 7-stage task. One future goal is to explore which design goal and corresponding 
design principle is more appropriate for the attentional set-shifting task. 
10.3 Bayesian learning criterion with fixed design 
Besides the refinement of the Bayesian model for the rat task, and adaptive design, another 
future goal is to further evaluate the application of the Bayesian learning criterion in the 
traditional fixed design of bowls. One clear prediction from the current work is that if the 
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rats’ behaviour is judged by a Bayesian criterion, then the seemingly large variability among 
the learning rates of rats might be more homogeneous than when the n-in-a-row criterion is 
used. If so, it could enhance statistical power and thereby reduce the numbers of rats required 
for research, both of which are desirable aims. Thus, simply comparing the apparent 
variability of two cohorts of rats, one of which is trained using the previous 6-in-row criterion 
and the other trained using the Bayesian learning criterion, would seem to be a reasonable test 
of the relative utility of the Bayesian approach. 
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11 Conclusions 
Attentional set-shifting tasks in both animals and humans have been used extensively to study 
cognitive flexibility. Multiple behavioural learning criteria (e.g., 6-correct-choices-in-a-row, 
10-out-of-12-correct-choices) have been adopted in attentional set-shifting tasks. All the 
learning criteria take a classical null-vs-alternative hypothesis inferential testing approach, 
where the null hypothesis is that subjects use random guesses to make their choices during 
learning and the alternative hypothesis is that subjects use the correct rule to make their 
choices. The problem is that, besides the random guess and the correct rule, there are multiple 
alternative erroneous rules that subjects could use to make choices. Before establishing the 
correct stimulus-reward association, a rat (similarly for human participants) may have tried 
other non-random, but reward-irrelevant, spatial patterns or stimulus characteristics to make 
choices. The traditional hypothesis-testing approach can only help us to determine the point 
at which subjects have learned, but it does not allow us to determine which erroneous 
response patterns or rules (either perceptual or spatial) could have been tried in each learning 
stage by each subject. As a result, the data collected from set-shifting tasks typically can only 
be analysed at the group level, e.g., comparing whether two groups of subjects have similar 
performance in the ED stage or a reversal stage.  
 
To solve the issues and limitations of the traditional frequentist hypothesis-testing approach, I 
developed a novel Bayesian approach initially for the rat set-shifting task and then further 
extended the model for human tasks. Bayesian analysis of individual rats’ learning behaviour 
provides us with detailed information about what response patterns (or rules) may have been 
tried in each learning trial for each rat. By comparing the Bayesian probability of the reward-
associated hypothesis with the pre-set high threshold value (0.95) in each learning trial, we 
can determine whether or not each rat has learned the stimulus-reward association in a timely 
manner for each learning stage. Such a Bayesian learning criterion is theoretically better than 
frequentist learning criteria (e.g., 6-correct-choice-in-a-row), because the Bayesian approach 
has estimated the probability of all pre-established spatial and perceptual hypotheses when 
deciding to accept the reward-relevant hypothesis.  
 
Bayesian analysis provides a potentially more powerful approach than the frequentist 
approach to analysing the data collected by set-shifting tasks. Based on the individual 
analysis with the developed rat behavioural Bayesian model, I found that all rats tried various 
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spatial patterns of responding while they were learning the stimulus-reward associations, and 
mPFC-lesioned rats had more spatial trials than control rats in the ED and reversal stages. It 
is difficult, if not impossible, to find such results using only the frequentist approach. 
 
All the Bayesian analysis results from rat set-shifting tasks are valid only if the Bayesian 
estimates of the hypotheses can really suggest the possible response patterns that rats are 
actually using for bowl choice. Considering that we never know for certain what exact 
response pattern a given rat uses to choose bowls at each trial, the validity of the rat 
behavioural Bayesian model was firstly investigated by Bayesian analysis on simulated data 
where the ground-truth response patterns underlying the simulated data were known. The 
analysis on the simulated data showed that, when the Bayesian estimate of a specific 
hypothesis is high in a learning stage the (virtual) rat did use the hypothesis to make its 
choice in the stage.  
 
To further support the validity of the Bayesian analysis, I implemented an analogous human 
7-stage task and purposely collected human participants’ oral reports on which hypotheses 
they actually used to make their choice for each learning trial. In view of the possible 
different characteristics between humans and rats in learning, the rat behavioural Bayesian 
model developed for the rat task cannot be directly applied to the human task. Instead of just 
using the human behavioural simple Bayesian model, which is a simplified version of the rat 
behavioural Bayesian model, I also developed a new, human latent probabilistic model 
(including a human behavioural reward Bayesian model) which considers the effect of choice 
feedback on learning. Bayesian analysis of the human task with both the human behavioural 
simple Bayesian model and the reward Bayesian model clearly shows that the Bayesian 
estimate of both reward-relevant and reward-irrelevant (i.e., erroneous) hypotheses match 
what participants orally reported. This provides supportive, albeit indirect, evidence for the 
validity of performing Bayesian analysis on rats’ data, as the rat behavioural Bayesian model 
for the rat task is an advanced version of the human behavioural simple Bayesian model for 
the human task.  
 
In addition, the strong correspondence between participants’ oral reporting and the Bayesian 
estimate of perceptual hypotheses from the previously rewarded but currently irrelevant 
dimension at the beginning of the ED stage also suggests that the human behavioural reward 
Bayesian model can also help decide whether or not each participant has formed an 
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attentional set before shifting to the newly relevant dimension. This provides a novel way to 
either accept or discard a participant’s data when collecting data for any subsequent analysis 
of ED performance. In contrast, the traditional ‘ID/ED difference’ method is used to decide 
whether a group of participants, but not each individual participant, have formed an 
attentional set or not. Therefore, the reward Bayesian model can help improve the power of 
data analysis by excluding those data where an attentional set has not been well formed, or 
can help classify data such that further analysis can be performed in the group of participants 
who fail to form an attentional set. 
 
In conclusion, I developed two probabilistic (Bayesian) models which can effectively and 
reliably analyse subjects’ discrimination learning at the individual level. The models not only 
provide an alternative learning criterion to decide when subjects have learned the correct 
rules, but also have helped find what erroneous rules may have been tried by subjects before 
learning the correct rules. The model for the human task can also help decide whether 
subjects have a well-formed attentional set before set-shifting, thereby improving the power 
of data analysis. Of course, this is only the first step to the successful application of a 
Bayesian approach to set-shifting tasks. The Bayesian models could be further refined, 
applied to adaptive design and other set-shifting tasks (e.g., 4ID), and eventually applied to 
the study of more general cognitive flexibility and learning.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Robustness of rat model and human model 
All the findings reported in this thesis were obtained with a specific set of pre-fixed 
parameter values in the Bayesian model, either for the rat or human tasks. While these 
findings have already shown the effectiveness and applications of the rat and human 
models, it would be better if the models were robust to variation in the parameters 
chosen for the models. Re-analysis of both rat and human data with different sets of 
model parameters did not reveal qualitative differences in the outcome, suggesting 
that the models are indeed robust. In the following, an example of the re-analysis of 
rat data and human data is given, respectively.   
Lesioned rats tried more spatial trials in the ED stage than normal rats 
In the rat behavioural Bayesian model, the key parameters are those in the likelihood 
function (Equations 2.3, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7). More specifically, the likelihood of spatial 
hypotheses was computed as 
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and the likelihood of perceptual hypotheses was computed as 
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With the above pre-fixed likelihood parameters, Section 3.5 showed that lesioned rats 
tried more spatial trials in the ED stage than normal rats and the difference in the 
number of ED trials between the two rat groups was probably mainly due to the 
difference in the number of spatial trials used by the two groups. To check whether 
such findings can be obtained by varying the Bayesian model’s parameter values, I 
exchanged the above likelihood function with another set of parameters values, with 
the likelihood of spatial hypotheses being 
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and the likelihood of perceptual hypotheses being 
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With the new parameter values of the rat behavioural Bayesian model, I re-analysed 
the 47 normal and 46 lesioned rat data and obtained the same findings. In more detail, 
Figure A.1 (middle pair of bars) shows that lesioned rats used spatial response 
patterns on significantly more trials; m=1.57, sd=2.44 for the control group, m=6.35, 
sd=5.62 for lesion group, t(91)=-5.33, p<0.001, d=0.56. When I excluded these spatial 
trials (where the rats chose bowls using spatial response patterns) from the total trials 
of the ED stage for each rat, there was no significant difference between two rat 
groups in the remaining number of trials; m=11.38, sd=4.51 for control group, 
m=13.52, sd=6.25 for lesion group, t(91)=-1.90, p=0.061, ns. Just as in Section 3.5, 
this suggests that the difference in ED trials between the two groups is mainly due to 
the difference in the number of spatial trials used by the two groups.  
 
 
Figure A.1: number of spatial trials in ED is different between two groups. 
Bayesian analysis can estimate set formation for each participant 
In the human latent probabilistic model, the key parameters include the parameter 
α=0.98 in the feedback effect function (Equations 6.4-6.7) and the likelihood 
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parameter value 0.85 in the human behavioral reward Bayesian model (Equation 6.8). 
With this pre-fixed set of parameter values, Section 7.3 showed that the human 
behavioural reward Bayesian model could accurately estimate whether the 
participants had (or had not) formed an attentional set when they really did (or did 
not). Here I re-analysed the data by (1) only changing the feedback effect parameter 
from α=0.98 to α=0.90, and (2) changing the feedback effect parameter from α=0.98 
to α=0.90 and changing the likelihood parameter in the human behavioral reward 
Bayesian model from 0.85 to 0.90. For both sets of new parameter values, the same 
result was obtained, i.e., the human behavioural reward Bayesian model accurately 
estimated that participants had (or had not) formed an attentional set when they really 
had (or had not). Furthermore, when the pre-fixed threshold (0.6) used to estimate the 
existence of reward-irrelevant hypotheses varied from 0.55 and 0.65, again, the same 
result as above was obtained, supporting the view that the Bayesian analysis is robust 
to this threshold as well.  
